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ABSTRACT 
 
For most of Australia‘s recent history of bushfire management the ‗Stay or Go‘ policy was the 
generally accepted response system to wildfire emergencies throughout the country.  However, the 
devastation incurred by the ―Black Saturday‖ fires of February 2009 has established an urgent need to revise 
the Fire Danger Rating Scale (FDRS), and national response policies. This project has been commissioned by 
the Australasian Fire and Emergency Services Authorities Council (AFAC), to assess the efficacy with which 
changes to the FDRS and warning systems have been adopted by state and territory fire authorities. Research 
conducted by this project has enabled us to provide recommendations to AFAC and these fire authorities as a 
means of establishing more effective fire response policy. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Bushfires, while necessary for the environment in many parts of Australia, continuously threaten 
mankind with their destructive power and speed. In order to help residents prepare for bushfires, the fire 
authorities of Australia adopted the ‗Stay or Go‘ policy in the 1990s, which encouraged residents to either, 
stay and defend their homes during a fire, or to leave early. However, on February 7th, 2009, Australia 
experienced its most destructive bushfire, now dubbed ―Black Saturday‖, which killed 173 people and 
destroyed over 2000 houses (Teague, 2009). With the impact of Black Saturday, a Royal Commission was 
called to investigate the fires and make recommendations for a new warning system to the fire authorities 
based on their findings. These findings included a new Fire Danger Rating Scale (FDRS) and a new bushfire 
policy highlighted by the slogan ―Prepare Act Survive.‖ 
The ultimate goal of this project is to reduce the number of deaths and cost of property damage 
resulting from wildfires in Australia by working with the Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authority 
Council to review how the new Fire Danger Rating Scale has been implemented throughout the various states 
and territories of Australia.  This goal was pursued by identifying objectives of the state and territory fire 
authorities, assessing the extent of the implementation of the Fire Danger Rating Scale, addressing the social 
issues of bushfire risk, and examining the warning systems of each state or territory. 
Our main method of research was conducting interviews with various representatives of the fire 
authorities from each state to see how they had implemented the new system, what parts of the system had 
been working well, and any difficulties they had in implementing the system. The interview questions 
involved topics such as: 
 goals of the fire authority  
 types of communications used 
  bushfire education programs  
 precautions used during a catastrophic warning  
 use of last resort places  
 opinions of the new warning system  
 resources used to implement the new system  
An evaluation of each authority‘s website was also conducted in order to find what information was 
accessible to residents online, how each site was used as a warning tool, and to research specifics about 
bushfire education programs offered by the fire authorities. Media reports were used to help gain a public 
perspective on the warning system as well as to identify bushfire incidents where the system either proved to 
be effective or not. The communication media of the states and territories was also examined to determine 
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what methods had worked well in the past, and what new media could be added to distribute the warnings 
and what media could be improved. Various reports were also examined to help gain information about 
public opinion and psychology to more fully understand how residents react to warnings. In the following, we 
discuss some of our findings that resulted in the use of these methods. 
The fire authorities‘ main goal in relation to bushfire safety is ―to protect life and property against fire‖ 
by providing timely and effective warnings, and assistance when possible, to residents during an emergency 
situation, and by educating the public on the dangers of bushfires and the proper precautions to defend 
against them. How each authority achieves these goals is based on several factors, such as the population 
density of the area, the frequency of bushfires, the resources available to manage bushfires, and the 
expectation of public responsibility for bushfire safety. The responsibilities of the fire authorities vary 
between states due to how funding is distributed and how different authorities work together. In general, if 
there is more than one fire authority, responsibility for bushfires and structural fires in rural areas is given to a 
rural fire service, while structural fires in densely populated areas are the responsibility of a city fire authority. 
In the past the collaboration of multiple emergency services during an incident has yielded much better 
results than when these organizations worked independently. 
In general, Victoria, New South Wales, Australian Capital Territory, South Australia and Tasmania 
have implemented the new warning system by adopting the new Fire Danger Warning Scale, and switching to 
the new slogan of ‗Prepare Act Survive‘. Their websites of the main fire authorities include information such 
as the bushfire rating for the day, bushfire incident reports, bushfire weather, current fire bans, and 
information on Prepare Act Survive, and this information is displayed either on the home page or another 
page the like to which is clearly visible. Western Australia has also implemented the new warning system, and 
was the first to implement the telephone warning system but has opted to make future changes more 
gradually in order to allow time to conduct studies on how the new the system is working. Western Australia 
is also in the process of building a new website designed with the new warning system in mind. Queensland 
has some information about the new warning system on its website, but has yet to fully adopt the new system. 
This is because Queensland was in the middle of its bushfire season when the recommendations were 
released, and its typically wet climate does not normally provide the conditions for major bushfires similar to 
the ones in the southern states. However, the Commissioner of Queensland Fire and Rescue Service is aware 
that changes in climate can happen quickly and is planning to implement the new system fully, to prepare for 
the increase in the intensity of their bushfires that may result.  The Northern Territory has made very little 
changes to their policy and is still currently using the previous system known as the Stay or Go policy. The 
reason that Northern Territory, like Queensland, has not adopted most of the new system is because the 
recommendations were released during their bushfire season, and they decided that to change the system 
midseason would cause too much confusion. However, the main fire authorities of the Northern Territories 
are planning to implement the changes to their system for the next bushfire season. 
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Bushfire education programs are needed to help educate residents on the new warning system and 
how it works. Pamphlets, flyers, and aggressive advertising campaigns have worked well in raising awareness 
of the new warning system. Volunteer programs in which volunteers are trained in distributing bushfire 
preparation information in order to educate their communities have worked well because they can educate 
residents about the new system without putting a strain on a fire authority‘s human and financial resources. 
Distributing bushfire safety DVD‘s has proved useful as well because the recipient does not have to leave his 
or her home or go online to find the information. Also, putting an emphasis on total family education with 
programs specially designed for women, children, and the elderly has worked well in ensuring each member 
of the family understands the new warning system. Targeting specific bushfire prone areas with educational 
information instead of the general public has worked well because these targeted people are much more 
interested in and in need of the information and take more responsibility in preparing for bushfires. 
Using effective communication mediums to convey a warning is crucial to a warning system‘s 
success. There are three main types of warning messages: Advice (an incident has occurred but residents are 
not in danger yet), Watch and Act (bushfire is becoming more severe and may threaten residents), and 
Emergency Warning (residents are in danger and should take action immediately). These messages are sent 
either through mobile and landline phones or broadcast via local and national radio and television stations. 
Emergency Alert is a nationally accepted telephone warning system implemented in each state or territory by 
the fire authorities and while the system has been relatively successful, there are three key drawbacks. Text 
messages are sent only to mobiles registered in the area not the actual mobiles in the area, the information 
provided in these messages is limited, and in many cases warnings take too long to distribute to residents and 
as a result, they are often inaccurate. In most cases the radio and television broadcasts are the primary method 
for distributing these messages. When an Emergency Warning message is released radio and television 
broadcasts often precede the message with the Standard Emergency Warning Signal to help alert residents to 
the important information. These broadcasts have been effective in distributing the warning but have not 
been found to be effective at prompting residents to take action. The Internet is a popular communications 
medium because it allows fire services to upload information quickly to their website, and allows residents to 
access a large amount of information. However, this system requires the resident to be actively paying 
attention to the warnings and would not allow a resident to be warned when they are away from their 
computer. The best strategy has been found to be not trying to use one specific medium for all residents, but 
using as many different forms of communication as possible to ensure all residents are able to receive 
warnings. 
Physical preparation of homes and property is essential for survival during a bushfire, but just as 
important is the emotional and psychological preparation. Defending against a bushfire can be an 
overwhelming psychological strain on residents, and many deaths have occurred when residents break down 
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and abandon their Bushfire Survival Plans. The best way found to combat this is to train and condition the 
general public to be able to deal with the anxiety of defending their homes during a bushfire.  In the event a 
resident must defend their home from a bushfire it is important that they remain calm and collected, which 
can become difficult or impossible if they let their emotions control them. Because psychological 
preparedness is so essential to bushfire preparedness, it needs to be given equal weight to physical 
preparedness, and in some cases special attention depending on the targeted groups. 
Based on our results and analysis, we have produced the following recommendations to help 
improve the implementation of the new warning system. These recommendations have been organized into 
four sections: 
 
Recommendations to changes in Educational Programs 
 Fire Authorities should expand and implement volunteer-run educational programs.  
 Fire Authorities should distribute bushfire informational DVD‘s as part of bushfire awareness 
and preparation campaigns, 
 Fire Authorities should provide Family Complete Bushfire Training, but also focus specifically 
on women and the elderly. 
 Emergency Services and the Bureau of Meteorology should provide more information to the 
public on how warnings are determined and how bushfire risk is assessed. 
 
Recommendations to changes in the ‘Prepare, Act, Survive’ policy and Other State and National 
Policies 
 The Australasian Fire and Emergency Services Authorities Council (AFAC) should consider the 
development a national information website to promote a collective approach to bushfire 
preparation and safety.  
 AFAC and the fire authorities should revise the terminology used in higher level warnings in 
order to provide an appropriate level of intensity and clarity.  
 AFAC and the Fire Authorities should revise the directions to leave early provided in the 
‗Prepare, Act, Survive‘ policy 
 Fire authorities should develop triage policies outlining their priorities during bushfires 
 The new policy should be flexible in some areas to accommodate each state and territory‘s 
unique bushfire situation.  
 The State and Territory governments should work toward revising the way in which emergency 
services are structured so these agencies can work more cooperatively. 
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 Fire authorities should emphasize the importance of the personal responsibility of the public to 
their safety. 
 Fire authorities should encourage the public to view large scale, disastrous fires, as natural 
disasters. 
 AFAC and the fire authorities should develop a national advertisement mascot to help raise 
awareness of bushfire safety. 
 The States and Territories should revise the boundaries between emergency service jurisdictions 
to create the most efficient system.  
 
Recommendations to changes in the National and State Warning Systems 
 Fire Authorities should employ as many communication media as possible, by implementing new 
technologies and improving current technologies. 
 Bushfire, and other hazard, information on Emergency Services‘ websites should be expanded 
and promoted.  
 Fire Authorities should expand the Emergency Alert system to include multiple addresses 
beyond the pre-registered billing address, until the technology is developed to specifically send 
messages to mobiles in an area affected by a bushfire.  
 Specific mobile websites and additional RSS feeds should be designed for each fire authority.  
 Daily fire danger rating signs should be posted at strategic locations to advise people of the 
bushfire risk that day.  
 
Other Recommendations 
 Emergency Services should suggest specific places that residents can relocate to if they decide to 
leave their homes.  
 Fire authorities should encourage the use of fire retardant plants on properties instead of native 
plants that burn easily.  
 Reports of bushfire history and special considerations in the area should be provided to new 
residents.  
 Emergency Services should implement media training for emergency response officials. 
 Fire authorities and organizations like AFAC and the Bushfire CRC should cooperate to conduct 
research studies on the effectiveness of the new system, as well as the public knowledge of 
bushfire policy. 
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 Fire Authorities should create advancement opportunities for volunteer firefighters in order to 
strengthen the structure and implementation of volunteer programs 
 Fire Authorities should implement exchange programs to strengthen relationships and spread 
ideas between states 
 
In general, there are many studies underway to analyze the effectiveness of the new warning system, 
but little assessment has been completed. Without the results of these investigations, it is difficult to 
qualitatively or quantitatively assess the success of many of the new programs and warning systems under the 
‗Prepare, Act, Survive‘ policy. The majority of our recommendations are based on anecdotal evidence, but 
should provide a basis for how the states and territories can improve the effectiveness and implementation of 
the new warning system. More studies about public knowledge and opinions should be conducted to gain a 
better understanding of how the warning system is working, and we recommend that the fire authorities 
conduct detailed analytical research into the success of the current programs before any major changes are 
made.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Wildfires present serious threats to man-made and natural environments across the globe. While 
some wildfires are easily contained, others last for days or even weeks, incurring extensive amounts of 
damage to land and property and forcing people to evacuate their homes In 2008 alone over 7,000 wildfires 
were reported in the United States, destroying nearly 2 million acres of land, an area approximately ten times 
the size of New York City (NIFC, 2010). During the summer of 2009, wildfires in Greece fueled by winds 
with an average speed of over 30 mph caused damage to more than 30,000 acres of land in only four days 
(Carassava, 2009). The South African fires of September 2008 lasted for three days, killed 45 people, 
destroyed over 180 homes, and caused nearly forty million dollars in damages (MGO, 2008).  As a result of 
these effects, countries around the world have implemented wildfire warning systems on national and local 
levels as a means of providing their residents with information about approaching fires, and crisis preparation 
advice should a contact fire become imminent. 
Because of its climate, Australia is extremely prone to bushfires. The country‘s southern states and 
territories are extremely dry, and with strong winds providing a steady source of oxygen, a single spark can 
ignite a roaring wildfire, burning land and homes, and causing severe injuries and death. Since weather 
conditions can vary with wind strength and temperature, the danger of fires happening in a certain area can 
be difficult to forecast, and once a fire has started, its projection across the landscape can be equally difficult 
to predict. To help keep residents safe, warning systems have been placed in each state and territory to alert 
residents when they are in danger from bushfires, how much danger they are in given the conditions, and 
what they should do if a fire occurs in their area. Traditionally, when a fire warning is issued, fire officials 
either encourage people to stay and defend their homes if possible or, in the case of a potentially 
uncontrollable fire, residents are urged to evacuate and save themselves and their families. However, 
predictions can often be over or under exaggerated, often resulting in residents finding themselves 
unprepared to fight against the fires or having fled their homes, leaving them to burn when they might have 
been saved. This confusion has led to widespread controversy with respect to how warnings are issued, and 
what action people should take. 
In the past, the Stay or Go policy, which was implemented throughout Australia, strongly encouraged 
homeowners to stay and prepare to defend their property in the event of a wildfire. Evacuation was regarded 
as a last resort, or recommended only for those who would not be capable of defending their homes. This 
approach was based on historical evidence which showed that the majority of fatalities incurred during 
wildfires were the result of residents either insufficiently preparing to defend their homes or attempting to 
evacuate at the last minute. However, despite the historical efficacy of the Stay or Go policy, on February 7th, 
2009, later dubbed ―Black Saturday‖, a series of severe fires killed 173 people and destroyed 2,000 properties, 
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61 businesses, and numerous community facilities. The destruction spread across nearly 430,000 hectares of 
land and directly impacted 78 communities, many of which were unrecognizable after the fires (DSE, 2009). 
The majority of deaths occurred when the fires became too intense for even well-defended homes to survive 
and the homeowners were forced to attempt last minute evacuations. The devastation of Black Saturday has 
given rise to a heated debate over the effectiveness of the Stay or Go policy, and whether or not a stronger 
emphasis should be placed on early evacuation. 
Australia‘s current wildfire warning system varies between the different states and territories 
depending on the views and necessities of each. In general each state or territory‘s system is marked 
simultaneously by successful elements and areas needing improvement. The Victorian Bushfires Royal 
Commission, established in 2009 in the wake of Black Saturday, has published two interim reports with 
recommendations that have influenced the changes in policy. Some issues that still remain in the national 
wildfire warning strategy include the reluctance of all states and territories to follow a uniform system and the 
inability of any one warning system to reach every person. For example, the text-message warning system has 
created multiple opinions and points of discussion. Fire Emergency Services Authorities‘ (FESA) Chief of 
Operations, Craig Hynes, warns that ―you just can't rely on getting a message straight away‖ (AAP, 2010). 
One objective of this project is to identify each warning system‘s flaws, and strategically attempt to minimize 
the risks these flaws present. In order to fulfil this objective, our research must address the specifics of each 
state and territory system as well and the potential and willingness of each state and territory to enact changes 
in their policy. 
This project is designed to contribute to an improved bushfire response policy in Australia by 
investigating the integration of the enhanced Fire Danger Warning System into the state and territory fire 
control policies and the policy shift from ‗Stay or Go‘ to ‗Prepare, Act, Survive‘ while finding areas of 
possible improvement. We have examined the integration of the new Fire Danger Rating Scale into 
established state and territory systems and we will explore the ways in which the specific objectives of state 
and territory organizations affect this implementation. We also consider the effect of the new warning scale 
on the policy of early evacuation as opposed to active defense, and the social implications that have arisen as 
a result of the change in policy.  This report highlights areas of strength within the policies of each state and 
territory as well as areas that require improvement and devise recommendations to improve these areas. 
Using these recommendations it is our expectation that the Australasian Fire and Emergency Services 
Authorities Council can work to improve problem areas that are hindering the effectiveness of the new 
system and thereby reduce the amount of damage caused by wildfires.1 
  
                                                          
1
 A broad overview of the graphic can be found in Appendix A 
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
Killing 173 people and destroying more than 2000 houses leaving thousands homeless, the ―Black 
Saturday‖ (February 7th 2009) fires truly represented ―hell in all its fury‖ (Tedmanson, 2010).  After this fire a 
need for change became apparent and the Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission was established to 
investigate the causes of the fire and changes in policy that needed to be made for the following seasons to 
prevent such a catastrophe from occurring again. 
This chapter first explains the behavior of bushfires and how the difficulty in forecasting these 
incidents has increased the dangers presented by bushfires. It then describes various wild fire response 
policies, specifically those pertaining to the United States, Greece, and Scotland, and how these policies relate 
to the policy in Australia. A short look at the bushfire risks in Australia with regard to the demographics and 
bushfire prone areas is then introduced to gain a better understanding of the current situation. Next it reports 
on various major fires in Australia‘s history and how they significantly affected the development of fire 
response policies. We then describe the current organization of the fire authorities within Australia and the 
role that AFAC plays in developing a national policy. A description of the ‗Stay or Go‘ policy is included, as 
well as how it developed, and what issues developed during its implementation. This is followed by a 
summary of the transition from the ‗Stay or Go‘ policy to the current ‗Prepare, Act, Survive‘ policy, and the 
influences the Royal Commission, Bushfire CRC, and AFAC have had in this change. Finally, we describe the 
current policies and systems being implemented, and the social implications that are present due to the shift 
in policy and increasing bushfire risk. Check Outline 
 
 
2.1 Bushfire Dynamics 
 
Several major factors play a role in the severity and likelihood of a bushfire: fuel load, fuel moisture, 
wind speed, ambient temperature, and relative humidity. Fuel load refers to the type and amount of 
combustible materials available. Brush, which is usually comprised of small twigs and vegetation, is one of the 
best fuel sources for bushfires because it contains a lot of open space that promotes airflow and allows it to 
burn quickly and easily. Dead trees tend to be more solid, do not allow for as much airflow, and usually burn 
slowly for a long time. Fuel moisture pertains to the water content contained in the fuel for the fire. Plants 
that are dead and dry, or otherwise contain less water, burn much easier than plants that have absorbed a lot 
of water. Rain is a key factor in fuel moisture because even dead plants or other organic material can absorb 
water making them less likely to burn, and naturally areas with long periods of no rain generally have lower 
fuel moisture. Wind speed plays an important role in how large a fire will be and how it will move. Higher 
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winds bring more oxygen to the fire, which allows the fire to burn at higher temperature and more easily 
ignite other material. Winds can also blow embers from a current fire to other land areas, starting new fires 
well ahead of the main front. Ambient temperature refers to the air temperature of a given area. The risk of 
fire is greater in an area of higher ambient temperature because the fuel load is closer to the ignition 
temperature and therefore takes less additional heat to ignite than in an area with cooler temperatures. The 
last major fire factor, relative humidity, relates to the amount of moisture in the air. In drier areas, the air 
absorbs moisture more easily than in more humid areas. This means that in drier areas the moisture plants is 
more readily released and the plants become much drier. These fire factors are a direct result of the climate of 
a particular area. In general, the drier the climate the more likely it is for bushfires to occur (GA, 2010). 
These factors that contribute to a fire are often measured through use of a Fire Danger Index (FDI) 
which ranks the likelihood of a fire and how devastating it could be. Australia currently uses the McArthur 
Forest Fire Danger Index, developed by A. G. McArthur in the 1960s this rating system is based on the 
difficulty of suppressing a fire 40 minutes after ignition (McArthur, 1958). Since then the Fire Danger Rating 
Scales have been broken up into sections by this index. In general a rating of anything higher than twenty was 
considered very high and difficult to suppress. Since then these base numbers have changed and fire 
authorities around the world have had to revise how they deal with the bushfire threat. 
 
 
2.2 Wildfire Management in Other Countries 
 
Because wildfires are a global natural occurrence, many countries have had to implement policies 
regarding how they will deal with wildfires. Wildfires occur in many areas of the U.S., and certain states and 
territories have implemented fire warning systems to help ensure residents‘ safety. California‘s Orange 
County, for example, is affected by wildfires every year, and uses a warning system called AlertOC. This 
system can send thousands of messages very quickly using communications such as phones, emails, and texts. 
Residents are automatically sent phone messages without specifically registering for the system, but are 
encouraged to sign up online to receive the other types of messages offered in order to have access to crucial 
information. These messages are issued to update residents on wildfire incidents and what areas have been 
issued an evacuation. Local news stations also report on the dangers and alerts for the wildfires. As a national 
standard, the U.S. implements mandatory evacuation procedures if residents are seriously threatened by 
wildfires. For this reason, residents do not necessarily have to pay as close attention to a fire warning since if 
the state believes they are in danger, residents will be told what to do, and when to do it. This method differs 
from the Australian system in which residents are not able to rely on a directed evacuation, and must decide 
for themselves when it is too dangerous to stay and defend their homes (BOS, 2010). 
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Outside of the U.S., many countries are developing or have implemented fire warning systems as 
well. Greece is regularly affected by wildfire and has a similar policy to the U.S. in that it forces residents to 
evacuate from their homes (BBC, 2009).  During times of increased fire risk Greek officials use sirens and 
loud speakers to sound alerts and implement evacuations. Even though residents are issued mandatory 
evacuation orders, volunteers are allowed to stay and help fight the approaching fire. However, one of the 
reasons the Greek wildfires of 2009 were so devastating was because there is a lack of an official warning 
system specifically designed to direct volunteers where to focus their efforts (Forbes, 2009). Such a system 
may have allowed volunteers to concentrate on areas that were more affected by the wildfires and reduce 
wasted efforts. Scotland is also beginning to implement a system similar to the Australian warning system, 
although it is still in the developing stages. One part of the warning system is a report form that can be filled 
out online by residents who have observed a wildfire in their area (FireBeaters, 2010). This can help quickly 
alert fire authorities to a wildfire and allow for a better chance to contain it. 
Educational programs also play an important role in wildfire safety. In the U.S., children grow up 
with the renowned Smokey the Bear, a character dedicated to protecting the land from wildfires. It is not 
uncommon to see a Smokey the Bear television commercial during both child and adult programming 
delivering a quick message about fire safety, such as how to properly put out or contain a campfire, and then 
ending with the renowned phrase, ―only you can prevent wildfires.‖ Smokey‘s fire education tips can also be 
found at smokeybear.com, a website with information about preventing wildfires complete with a children‘s 
section which includes games, campfire information, and stories, providing a fun way to learn about fire 
safety. Local fire departments also hold state fire protection programs that help educate residents. 
Wrightwood, California, holds an annual Wildfire and Disaster Awareness Day in which residents are 
educated about wildfires through fun events, workshops, exhibits, and speakers (WFSC, 2010). Such 
educational programs can help residents to prevent wildfires in the first place and have a better knowledge to 
prepare for wildfire should one occur in their area. 
 
 
2.3 Bushfire Risk in Australia 
 
Due to the extensive size of Australia, the individual states and territories experience many variations 
in the times and severity of their bushfire seasons. In this section we analyze the demographics throughout 
Australia, as well as the environmental factors that contribute to bushfires in Australia and how both 
determine the overall bushfire risk of an area. 
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2.3.1 Demographics of Australia 
 
Throughout Australia there is a variety in the population density from region to region. Part of what 
determines bushfire risk is the extent of human presence in an area. If there is a substantial human population 
in an area then the bushfire risk in an area is high. Thus it is essential to note the demographics of an area in 
order to properly assess the danger presented by bushfires.  
Table 1, reported by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, shows the different populations and average 
growths seen throughout Australia in 2009. It can be seen that New South Wales has the largest population, 
while the Northern territories has the smallest population. At the same time Western Australia has the largest 
increase in population while Tasmania has had the smallest change in population, over the last year. 
 
State/ Territory Population at end 
Sept qtr 2009
Change over 
previous year (%)
New South Wales 7,165,400 1.7
Victoria 5,473,300 2.2
Queensland 4,450,400 2.7
South Australia 1,629,500 1.3
Western Australia 2,259,500 2.9
Tasmania 504,400 1
Northern Territory 227,000 2.3
Australian Capital Territory 353,600 1.9
Australia(a) 22,065,700 2.1
(a) Includes Other Territories comprising Jervis Bay Territory, Christmas 
Island and the Cocos (Keeling) Islands.
 
Table 1: Populations of Australia, by each state and territory (ABS, 2009). 
Figure 1 shows the approximate current population density (left) and the projected population 
changes (right). These maps show that very few people live in the central region of Australia and in the future 
this population is expected to decrease as people move toward the shores. At the same time there is a 
noticeable population decrease in Tasmania but a large increase in many of the major cities of Victoria, New 
South Wales, and Western Australia. These changes could be attributed to the decrease in farmers and other 
residents who wish to remove themselves from rural areas that are often subject to bushfires. 
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Figure 1: (Left) Population density (# of people/km2). (Right) Projected pop. changes (ASEC, 2001) 
Figure 2 shows the average ages (left) and sex ratios (right) in the various states and territories of 
Australia. The most significant observation is that there is a vast difference in gender and age ratios between 
the Northern territories and the rest of the states and territories. In general the population of the Northern 
Territories contains more men than women and the average age is significantly lower than most other states 
and territories. 
 
 
Figure 2: (Left) Average ages. (Right) Sex ratio, number of men per 100 women (ABS, 2009). 
Table 2 shows the Indigenous populations throughout Australia, the percentage of the Indigenous 
population in a state or territory over the total Indigenous population of Australia, and the percentage of the 
Indigenous population over the total population, in that state or territory. Interestingly the largest number of 
Indigenous people resides within New South Wales yet the Northern Territories have the greatest ratio of 
Indigenous to non-Indigenous residents by a large margin. This can be attributed mainly to the low 
population of residents in the Northern Territories. 
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State/Territory Indigenous population
Proportion of Australian 
Indigenous population 
(%)
Proportion of 
state/territory population 
(%)
NSW 161,910 29.4 2.3
Vic 35,894 6.5 0.7
Qld 156,454 28.4 3.6
WA 74,859 13.6 3.4
SA 29,775 5.4 1.8
Tas 19,641 3.6 3.9
ACT 4,599 0.8 1.2
NT 67,441 12.3 30.2
Australia 550,818 100 2.5
 
Table 2: Estimated Indigenous population of Australia by state and territory, 2009 (Thomson, 2009). 
From this general information about the populations and population densities we can infer that the 
areas of bushfire-urban interface near major cities are the most prone to devastating bushfires. While more 
rural areas may have larger fires, these fires typically cause less damage due to the lower number of people.  
 
2.3.2 Bushfire Prone Areas 
 
With the exception of Antarctica, Australia is the driest continent in the world with an average 
rainfall of less than 24 inches (600mm) a year (GA, 2010). As shown in Figure 3, the northern areas of the 
continent experience a wet climate with ample rainfall in the summer and a moderate to dry climate in the 
winter. Despite the low humidity, bushfires are less likely to occur up north during the winter, due to the 
lower temperatures. In contrast, the central states and territories of the continent experience an arid climate 
all year round while the southern states and territories experience wet winters and extremely dry summers. 
These dry conditions are due to a pressure belt in the northern area of the continent that prevents moisture 
from traveling down to the middle and southern states and territories. The combination of the high ambient 
temperature and the dry climate make the middle and southern states and territories of Australia more prone 
to large wildfires. When high winds are added to the mix, bushfires become extremely dangerous because of 
their increased size and the speed with which they travel. The combination of these variables contributes to 
making Australia one of the most bushfire prone continents in the world. 
Figure 3 shows the seasonal rainfall zones throughout Australia (left) as well as the Bushfire seasons 
that take place across Australia (right). From the first figure you can tell that the north gets the majority of  its 
rain during the summer while the south would get its rain during the winter. Thus the fire seasons would be 
during the winter for the north and during the summer for the south as proved in the second figure. The 
middle area then is a mix of  both and the bushfire season appears early summer, late spring. 
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Figure 3: (Left) Map of Seasonal rainfall zones (GA, 2010). (Right) Bushfire seasons (Gould, 2005). 
Figure 4 provides the potential of a disastrous bushfire (left) and the different habitats (right). From these 
maps, it is easy to see that the regions that have the most risk for major bushfires are in the sclerophyll forest 
zone. This zone is heavily comprised of eucalyptus trees, whose leaves contain oil that has flash point of 53 
°C (127.4 °F). The average rate of heat transfer for a bushfire is around 100 kW/m², and is more than capable 
of igniting the oil in the eucalyptus leaves (Clode, 2010). However, what separates this type of forest from 
others is that the canopy is closed and very dense, making it easy for the bushfire to spread. The combination 
of these two characteristics makes the sclerophyll regions high bushfire risk areas. 
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Figure 4: (Left) Potential for Disastrous Bushfires (Gould, 2005). (Right) Habitat zones (CSIRO, 2010). 
From these two facets we see that the areas at risk seem to coincide with the major cities and where 
people are currently headed. This is interesting because it seems to be counter intuitive that people are 
moving towards more dangerous areas. So the question then becomes do the humans follow the fire or is the 
potential for fires increasing with the human population density? One factor that could be considered good is 
now the fire authorities would be able to focus more on these smaller areas and not waste expenses and man 
power on large areas of  land. 
 
2.4 Fire Response and the Development of Fire Safety Institutions 
 
Australia‘s fires have strongly impacted the country physically, socially, and psychologically (UA, 
2003). The fires described below are considered some of  the most devastating and destructive fires in the 
history of  Australia and a myriad of  social and judicial policies have been formed as a result of  these fires 
(DSE, 2009).  
 
2.4.1 “Black Thursday” (February 6th 1851) - Victoria 
 
Australia‘s earliest recorded major incident of  the nineteenth century was ―Black Thursday,‖ 
occurring on February 6, 1851. During this period of  history firefighters were either volunteers or brigades 
financed by the local insurance companies. If  a resident was not on their insurance plan, the insurance 
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company would let their house burn and advise them then to buy insurance. Without any formal fire response 
system, ―Black Thursday‖ marked a destructive day that took approximately five million hectares, one million 
sheep, and thousands of  cattle. Yet, surprisingly for that amount of  damage, only twelve human casualties 
were recorded (Romsey Australia, 2010). Following this intense fire, the awareness of  the need for local fire 
brigades was recognized by local residents. After Black Thursday there was an increase in the number of  
company, town, volunteer, and insurance fire brigades, but disputes over territories, water, and compensation 
jeopardized their effectiveness. With the concurrent increase of  population and wildfires, the need for an 
organized group was acknowledged, and in 1891 the Metropolitan Fire Brigade in Victoria was formed, 
becoming the first organized brigade of  this kind in the country (Wilde, 1991). 
 
2.4.2 The Great Fire of Melbourne and Red Tuesday (1897 – 1898) - Victoria 
 
During the fire season of  1897 – 1898 two major fires took place in Victoria, the Great Fire of  
Melbourne and Red Tuesday. These fires caused a large amount of  panic and destroyed nearly 2000 buildings, 
leaving thousands homeless (Wilde, 1991). The main outcome of  these fires was a substantial increase in the 
number of  fire brigades and personnel. In the years to come many more extreme fires were recorded that 
caused extensive damage.  As a result newly organized fire brigades continued to increase in number and 
collaborate with each other more frequently. 
 
2.4.3 “Black Friday” (January 13th 1939) - Victoria 
 
Following a long drought that lasted several years, the summer of  1938 – 1939 was extremely hot and 
dry resulting in a massive bushfire that became known as ―Black Friday‖. Starting off  as small separate fires, 
numerous fires combined to create a massive fire front killing 71 people, and destroying over 2 million 
hectares, 650 buildings and the township of  Narbethong. Following these fires, a Royal Commission was 
convened to determine the causes of  the fire. The report showed that the fires seemed to result from 
humans, primarily farmers, campers, forest workers and many others who  lost control of  their  ―controlled‖ 
burns or campfires, or were operating sawmills under inappropriate conditions. The writer of  the 
commission, Judge Leonard Stretton, offered many proposals and policies that could be implemented to 
prevent such catastrophes. The Forest Act of  1939 gave the Forests Commission (now known as the 
Department of  Sustainability and Environment) full authority for fire control on public land in Victoria. 
Other recommendations suggested the use of  fire breaks to be made during the spring and autumn, fire 
towers to be placed in strategic locations and the continual development of  firefighting equipment. For the 
many years following this, fires were still commonplace yet considered to be less of  a threat due to the 
continuous precautions (DSE, 2009). 
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2.4.4 “Ash Wednesday” (February 16th 1983) – Victoria / South Australia 
 
The Ash Wednesday fires of  1983 have become known as one of  the worst natural disasters in 
Australia‘s history. Australia had been suffering a 10 month drought and another hot, dry summer.  On the 
morning of  Ash Wednesday a cold front off  the coast of  Australia created a hot and dry northerly wind over 
Victoria and South Australia. Fire officials were aware of  the conditions and did their best to prepare for 
what might come. Subsequent investigations indicated the fires were caused primarily by sparks from power 
lines arcing with trees and other wires. Initially the fires were thought to be under control until a change of  
the wind direction at night caused the fires to increase dramatically and merged with one another to create a 
massive front (DSE, 2009). Altogether there were 100 fires which caused 75 deaths, burned 418,000 hectares 
of  land, destroyed 3,700 buildings, and ultimately cost approximately A$400 million, or A$1.3 billion in 
damages in 2007 equivalent terms (EMA, 2006). 
Besides these physical losses, many Australians suffered psychologically due to the intense situation. 
Following the fire, Paul Valent conducted research analyzing the reactions of  victims of  the fire: ―Victims of  
the bushfires were seen to have reacted during the various phases of  the experience in a predictable way: 
during the acute danger, when survival was paramount, and immediately afterward, the usual patterns of  
hierarchical structure within families and in the wider community broke down and new social structures 
emerged‖ (Valent, 1984). This collapse of  structure was evidence enough to show the need for more 
organized public responses during fires. To do this, more effective public warning systems were needed and 
the public needed better education about fire behavior and policy. 
The Ash Wednesday fires were a prime example of  this need, as could be seen by a particular 
incident in Macedone. Many fire officials never thought that the area of  Macedone was in danger, yet with the 
sudden wind change, the area was suddenly straight in the path of  the fire. Meanwhile the residents of  
Macedone were waiting by the phone for evacuation orders while watching the fire gradually grow closer 
(Murray, 1995). If  there had been a stronger warning system in place, this town may have been spared and 
many deaths may have been avoided. However, this system may not have been fully at fault. The fire 
authorities may have failed to properly educate people on the appropriate actions to take during a period of  
heightened fire risk, and thus they became too dependent on advice from emergency response departments, 
which never reached them. Therefore, having proper public education programs may have made a difference 
in the response to the warning. 
Following Ash Wednesday, the Country Fire Authority (CFA) began to focus on fire prevention 
through warning systems and public education programs, such as the Community Fireguard program which 
teaches communities how to prepare and plan for fire emergencies (Stafford, 2003). Newer technologies were 
utilized to disperse crucial information and enhance preparedness such as the Government Radio Network 
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system, and collaboration with the Bureau of  Meteorology to rate the likelihood of  a fire. The last major 
impact of  the Ash Wednesday fires was the eventual adoption of  the ‗Stay or Go‘ Policy in the early 1990‘s. 
 
2.4.5 “Black Saturday” (February 7th 2009) - Victoria 
 
Preceded by a nearly decade-long drought, a general warming trend over the past 50 years believed to 
be due to greenhouse emissions, intense heat waves and strong winds over 100 km/h, Black Saturday held 
the perfect conditions for a ―killer fire.‖ Based on the McArthur Forest Fire Danger Index (FFDI), in which 
rankings of 12 -25 are considered ―high‖, Black Saturday was rated an FFDI of 189.  The majority of the 
Black Saturday fires were attributed to fallen power lines, lightening, and various human sources; altogether 
numbering over 400 individual fires. These Fires, causing 173 deaths, leaving thousands homeless, and 
burning over 450,000 hectares were the primary reason for the new changes that have been adopted (Teague, 
2009). Satellite imaging from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) on the Black 
Saturday Fires can be seen in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5: Black Saturday Bushfires in Victoria (NASA FIRMS) 
14 | P a g e  
 
 
2.5 Organization of Fire Authorities 
 
The organization of the fire authorities and the respective departments vary from state to state. In 
general the state government is broken up into many parts which normally include the Department of Justice 
which incorporates the fire officials and police, and the Department of Environment which is in charge of 
maintaining and protecting the land, among various other departments. The fire officials are normally also 
divided into two groups, rural and metropolitan services. These groups work with the DSE to make the land 
safer and less prone to bushfires. A graph of how this system works from state to state can be seen in Figure 
6 below  
 
Figure 6: Organization of State and Territory Fire Authorities 
 
 
2.6 AFAC 
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The Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council was formed in 1993 and is now 
the peak industry body for fire, land management, and emergency service organizations throughout Australia 
and New Zealand. AFAC was established by its member organizations2 to cooperate on matters of state and 
territory, national, and international importance. AFAC‘s vision is to strengthen the emergency services of 
Australia and New Zealand through collaboration, sharing, and innovation. This vision can be expressed in 
five main goals: to provide a leadership figure with enough visibility, credibility, and influence to have a 
significant impact on the development of policy and member relationships, while reducing barriers and 
increasing the availability of funding; to promote and encourage environmentally sustainable fire and 
emergency services and practices; to consistently and effectively approach service management such that 
integrated planning is based on risk assessment and is adaptable in all environments, and where such systems 
are interoperable; to provide easy access to detailed information contributed by all states and territories to 
create a cooperative information sharing environment; and to ensure that volunteers, staff, and contractors 
are safe, competent, and funded so that they can provide the infrastructure needed to provide emergency 
services to the community. (AFAC, 2010) 
AFAC primarily works through a group structure in which senior representatives of member 
agencies collaborate to shape research and policy, develop national and state and territory positions, and 
cooperate to solve issues that cannot be solved individually. These groups produce positions3 guidelines and 
policies to be adopted by the Council and provide means to increase synergy amongst members and 
community safety. AFAC is also involved with special research programs aimed at development of efficient 
training and education resources, and collaborative resource management and contract arrangements. 
 
 
2.7 „Stay or Go‟ Policy 
 
The ‗Stay or Go‘ policy states that if  a fire warning is issued, citizens should either leave their homes 
early on the day for which the warning is issued, or prepare to stay and actively defend their homes. The 
position held by AFAC stated that, assuming proper preparations have been made, it is a better idea to stay 
and defend a home rather than relocate to an evacuation location (AFAC Position, 2005). The ‗Stay or Go‘ 
policy was designed to educate and advise the public on how to respond during periods of  heightened fire 
activity. Because fires are a natural and necessary part of  the ecology, there is no practical or ethical method 
for preventing all bushfire risk to communities. Thus it is the responsibility of  the government, land 
managers, and householders to reduce the risks and losses caused by bushfires. In most cases, the decision to 
stay or leave was left to the homeowners. However, forced evacuations were occasionally considered by fire 
                                                          
2
 See Appendix B for list of member organizations 
3
 See Appendix C for index of terminology used by AFAC 
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response authorities if  the homes or residence did not seem adequately prepared. In these cases, forceful 
removal of  residents was only conducted at the discretion of  the lead fire combat authority, and only if  the 
effort did not put firefighters or other citizens who still needed to be warned at risk (AFAC Position, 2005). 
 
2.7.1 Development of the „Stay or Go‟ Policy 
 
Beginning in the early 1990s the ‗Stay or Go‘ policy was gradually developed and embraced by 
multiple fire authorities as a result of  historical evidence supporting this type of  response. After numerous 
incidents occurred, in which the unnecessary loss of  lives or property might have been avoided if  the 
homeowners had not attempted to evacuate at the last minute and instead prepared to fight off  the fire, many 
fire authorities began to emphasize the idea of  staying and defending homes. These assessments were based 
on the fact that many homes abandoned by residents, some of  whom lost their lives during last minute 
evacuations, were not destroyed or could have been easily preserved had the owners remained.  The AFAC 
eventually developed the slogan ―houses protect people and people protect houses‖, to spread the message 
that the best chance of  survival consisted of  staying and defending (Handmer, 2005). 
The policy was developed on the basis of  historical evidence that there had been a higher rate of  
survival for those who remained in their homes as opposed to those who had attempted to evacuate at the 
last minute. However all of  that evidence referenced residents who had actively defended their homes during 
the fire (Handmer, 2005). The majority of  houses destroyed in wildfires are the results of  embers becoming 
lodged in cracks and starting small fires that accumulate and grow to engulf  the structure. The emphasis of  
the stay portion of  the ‗Stay or Go‘ policy concerns these scenarios, as the defenders will be fighting these 
ember storms which can occur long before and after the fire front arrives. 
There is always the possibility that a house will be destroyed despite preparations. However, in many 
cases it is safer to seek shelter within the house than attempt to make a last-minute evacuation. In these cases, 
it is important to be proactive in case it is necessary to leave the shelter or continue to defend against the 
persistent ember storms. It is possible to survive outside after the front passes, and in most cases it is safer to 
wait out the front indoors and then escape afterwards if  the house catches fire from ember storms. By 
educating the public on how best to act during a fire, the ‗Stay or Go‘ policy attempted to minimize casualties 
and property damage by emphasizing the success of  properly defended homes. 
 
2.7.2 Issues with the „Stay or Go‟ Policy 
 
One of  the main issues with the ‗Stay or Go‘ policy was that it called for the difficult decision of  
committing to active defense or the abandonment of  one‘s home. Since bushfires are by nature difficult to 
accurately forecast, there is a certain amount of  risk involved in either decision. Either residents must 
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thoroughly prepare themselves to fight the fight, which is oftentimes physically and emotionally exhausting, 
or put their lives on hold and abandon their homes. Most cases of  late evacuations stem from residents who 
do not commit to either course of  action and plan to simply leave as soon as they feel threatened (Handmer, 
2005). 
Although the catastrophe that occurred on Black Saturday led to a major investigation of  the ‗Stay or 
Go‘ Policy; there had been many issues with the policy that stemmed from other incidents in the past. The 
emphasis on staying behind to defend as the safest option prompted many people to stay who were 
unprepared to defend their homes safely and effectively, and had poor understanding of  the risks involved in 
staying. This led to many cases in which people attempted to simply take shelter in their homes, and were 
forced to evacuate at the last minute when their homes caught fire. In one case, an incident in the Dandenong 
Ranges in 1997 left three people dead while they were sheltering from the fire in their garage. Reports stated 
that they did not intend to stay and defend but ran out of  time to evacuate when the fire reached their home 
only fifteen minutes after igniting. Neighbors claimed that the emphasis of  staying and taking shelter is what 
doomed them, as none of  the neighbors perished during their last minute evacuations (Handmer, 2005). In 
this case the fire‘s victims did not plan to actively defend, but also did not leave early enough because of  the 
strong warnings against last minute evacuations they thought the safest option would be to simply take 
shelter. The proper course of  action would have been for the residents to have prepared their home, or to 
have left before a fire started, although it is likely they would have survived if  they had left, it is equally likely 
that they, and possibly all of  their neighbors could have perished instead. This and many other similar cases in 
later years led to a need to re-evaluate the ‗Stay or Go‘ policy, in order to encourage people to adopt a more 
active strategy and clarify that early relocation, before a fire starts, is often the safest option.    
Even before the 2009 Black Saturday fires, studies found that a large number of  people who stayed 
to defend their homes either had no planned response strategy or only a lax strategy and planned to leave if  
they felt immediately threatened. This is exactly the type of  behavior the policy was designed to discourage 
(Handmer, 2005). During the fires on Black Saturday many homes and lives were lost despite preparations, 
and it became more apparent that the policy needed to be re-evaluated. The policy led to an over-estimation 
of  people's ability to defend their homes, and a sense that they could wait out the fires if  necessary. The 
policy needed to be revised in order to emphasize the importance of  active defense, and the physical and 
mental trials that would be required to provide an effective defense. Additionally the sheer intensity of  the 
Black Saturday fires raised awareness of  the need for revisions to the Fire Danger Rating Scale to account for 
fires that are too intense to be defended against. 
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2.8 Transition from „Stay or Go‟ to „Prepare, Act, Survive‟ 
 
After the Black Saturday Fires, it was obvious that the ‗Stay or Go‘ policy was not as effective in 
preparing communities for bushfires as it needed to be. In response to the incident many organizations, 
including the Bushfire CRC, began working towards revising the ‗Stay or Go‘ policy and the Victorian 
Bushfire Royal Commission was established in order to investigate the event. The research conducted by the  
Bushfire CRC and the recommendations set forth by the Royal Commission had a great influence on the 
designshop held in August of  2009 that developed the ‗Prepare, Act Survive‘ policy. The following section 
explains the role the Royal Commission and Bushfire CRC held in the development of  the nationally 
accepted ‗Prepare, Act, Survive‘ policy, and the main objectives of  the designshop that developed the policy. 
 
 
2.8.1 The Role of the Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission 
 
In 2009, shortly after the Black Saturday catastrophe, the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission was 
established to investigate the fires in Victoria, namely how they were caused, what preparations were made for 
them, and how the local fire authorities responded to them (Royal Commission, 2009). The Commission has 
acquired data through a combination of  community consultations, online submissions, hearings and 
background research. The main goal of  the Commission is to acquire local knowledge on how severely and in 
what ways the fires have impacted the community, what strategies the local fire authorities implemented and 
which of  those strategies worked well, and what improvements could be made to these strategies. So far the 
Commission has filed two interim reports making fifty-eight recommendations4 for improvements in warning 
systems, information management, relocation/evacuation policy, Stay or Go policy, risk and refuge 
information, incident management, emergency management, Commonwealth response, and emergency calls. 
Of  particular note are the recommendations concerning clarifications of  the principles of  the ‗Stay 
or Go‘ policy. The commission recommended that the CFA revise its programs to convey the following key 
principles; 
 the safest option is always to leave early, 
  not all houses are defendable, 
  if  a property is not defendable it is advised to leave early, 
  householders should factor in topography, fire weather and fire intensity when determining 
whether to defend,  
 staying and defending includes risks of  physical injury or death,  
                                                          
4
 See Appendix E for full list of Royal Commission recommendations 
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 contingency plans are advised, 
  preparations for defenders to leave should be made as last resort options, 
  and families with children, the elderly, or physically impaired should prepare to evacuate 
early and be aware of  the dangers of  leaving late, keeping in mind that a warning may not be 
received (Royal Commission, 2009). 
The Commission also recommended the addition of  a fire danger rating beyond extreme, and an 
extension of  the Fire Danger Index to account for this new level (Royal Commission, 2009). These 
recommendations have led to the majority of  the current changes in policy and a shift towards a more 
efficient evacuation model may be in the near future. 
 
2.8.2 The Role of the Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre 
 
The Bushfire CRC is an organization conducting many research projects designed to enhance the 
management of  bushfire risks in communities in an ecologically and economically sustainable manner. The 
main objectives of  the Bushfire CRC are to develop a world-renowned research center for Australia that will 
provide a research framework designed to support bushfire management agencies and help communities 
become increasingly self  sufficient when dealing with bushfire threats. 
The Bushfire CRC is currently conducting five research programs designed to achieve these 
objectives. The first of  these is entitled Safe Prevention, Preparation and Suppression, and is designed to 
prevent uncontrolled bushfires from occurring, to prepare communities for instances when uncontrolled fires 
do occur, to suppress the fires when they endanger communities, and to help expedite the recovery process 
after a bushfire incident. This program has acquired a wealth of  information on fire behavior and the 
effectiveness on various fire fighting techniques. The second program is the Management of  Prescribed Fire 
in the Landscape, which is designed to examine the role of  wildfires on the environment and the importance 
of  implementing them in land management (Bushfire CRC, 2010). 
The next two programs are more concerned with the general public. The Community Self  
Sufficiency for Fire Safety program is designed to help communities manage the risks of  living in fire prone 
areas by analyzing the varying fire risks among territories and the psychological response of  the public during 
and after a fire. The Protection, People and Property program is investigating the relationship between 
people, their property, and the environment. The final program is aimed at integrating the research conducted 
in the previous programs into varying levels of  higher education in order to expand the public and expert 
knowledge of  bushfire threats (Bushfire CRC, 2010). 
Many state and territory fire authorities have been working with the programs established by the 
bushfire CRC to develop sound strategies for handling bushfire incidents. The research produced by the 
20 | P a g e  
 
Bushfire CRC has greatly influenced the past and current strategies implemented by the state and territory fire 
departments and continue to influence the changes made in correspondence to the recommendations of  the 
Royal Commission. 
 
2.8.3 The Role of the National Design Shop 
 
During August 3-5 2009, AFAC held a conference in Melbourne entitled National Design Shop: 
Scaled Bushfire Advice and Warning. Sixty-three groups participated in the event, which had several major 
objectives: 
  Revise the Fire Danger Ratings so that they better describe the nature and potential impact 
of a fire, under any conditions, and in a way that is relevant to the community and agencies.  
 Develop key messages and terms relating to each level of warning, to be adopted by all 
agencies for public use.  
 Identify the language that will align the key messages with the Common Alerting Protocol 
(CAP) of Australia. 
 Identify a set of criteria that determine trigger points for alerting the public during existing 
fires 
 Develop common descriptions and key messages for existing fires 
 Design a model that incorporates all the previous objectives, to be used by all agencies and 
partners in communicating with the public.  
o Determine aspects of this model that can be expanded to other hazards 
 Develop an implementation and communication plan to deliver the results of the 
designshop, along with a key media phrase, to the agencies 
 
The conference led to the development of the new FDRS that incorporates the rating of ―catastrophic‖ and 
revised strategies for the other warning levels. The designshop also led to the development of the new policy 
and the replacement of the phrase ‗Stay or Go‘ with ‗Prepare, Act, Survive‘. The participants at the 
designshop also developed an implementation and communications plan to deliver their results to the state 
and territory organizations (AFAC, 2010). 
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2.9 Implementation of „Prepare, Act, Survive‟ Policy 
 
In response to the Black Saturday tragedy, fire officials have enhanced the Fire Danger Rating Scale5, 
a warning system to help educate people on the danger of an approaching fire and how to decide when to 
leave their homes if a fire is too intense to handle. 
The scale does not rate how a current fire is behaving, but rather how it might behave should a fire 
occur given the current conditions. The scale is composed of three parts: Potential Fire Behavior, Impact 
Potential, and Your Action. The Potential Fire Behavior section describes the fire and how it might move, 
should it start given the rating, including how difficult the fire may be to control and how far embers may be 
blown ahead of it, which indicates how fast the fire can move. The Impact Potential explains the type of 
damage that may result should a fire of the predicted severity occur, and includes information such as 
potential loss of life, material damages, and the quality of home construction required to survive the fire. The 
final section, Your Action, explains the actions residents should take when a warning is issued with respect to 
the current rating, more specifically whether residents should stay to defend their homes from the fires or 
evacuate depending on their level of preparation to fight fires. 
 
2.9.1 Potential Fire Behavior 
 
The scale is based on six different ratings of the severity of a potential fire, each with its own 
description in each of the three sections. The first rating is a low/moderate rating, which indicates that while 
there may be a threat of bushfires, the fire should be easy to control and extinguish. The scale continues with 
a rating of high, indicating that fires may be easily controlled, but can be spread easily due to embers blown 
about by the wind. A rating of very high indicates that the fire may be difficult to control given that embers 
may be blown as far ahead as 2km. A newly added rating called severe indicates that fires will most likely be 
uncontrollable, and will spread very quickly with embers traveling up to 4 km ahead of the fires (RFS, 2010). 
Extreme is the second to last warning, and indicates that the fires will be uncontrollable and extremely fast 
moving, and embers will most likely be blown nearly 6 km ahead of the fire. The last rating, catastrophic, is 
also a new addition to the rating scale. This rating indicates fires will be uncontrollable and devastating. 
Embers will be blown over 20 km ahead of the fire, making the fires spread at an alarming rate (RFS, 2010). 
 
2.9.2 Impact Potential 
 
                                                          
5
 See Appendix F 
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In addition to describing the type and severity of the fire, the ratings indicate the potential damages a 
state and territory may experience in terms of loss of life and structures due to the fire once it has started. The 
first three ratings represent minimal property damages, and that loss of life is very unlikely. Low to moderate 
warnings have a very small chance of creating injuries or causing damages to property and buildings. A high 
fire rating may result in minimal property damages, but loss of life will be extremely unlikely. Homes that are 
properly prepared to fight against the fires should be able to handle the fires without much difficulty. Very 
high ratings indicate that fires can become threatening quickly, and could be very difficult to defend against. 
Properties may sustain severe damages if not properly prepared, but loss of life is unlikely. Properly prepared 
buildings will most likely offer shelter, but utilities may fail, and fire fighting agencies may not be able to assist 
residents in defense of the fires (RFS, 2010). 
The more severe portion of the scale indicates that fires will be extremely dangerous, and will likely 
result in property loss, injury, and loss of life, and fire services will most likely not be available for aid. Severe 
ratings indicate that fires will threaten suddenly with little or no warning, and will be extremely difficult to 
control. Property damage is almost certain, and there is a definite chance that lives will be lost. Well prepared 
homes may offer some shelter, but it is likely that utility services will be lost. Extreme ratings will involves 
fires that are uncontrollable, and people caught in the path of the fire will most likely die. Injuries will 
definitely occur, and property will most certainly be destroyed. Only the very best and well-built buildings will 
offer protection, but utilities will definitely fail (RFS, 2010). In a catastrophic rating, any fire started will sweep 
across the area and destroy everything in its path. People will die if caught in the path of the fire, and even the 
best built buildings will not offer any shelter. 
 
2.9.3 Your Action 
 
The last part of the warning system provides instruction on what individuals should do if a fire starts 
within a given rating. It is important that whatever the risk for bushfires, residents should have a survival plan 
in place and be ready in case of an emergency. Residents can easily create a plan of action to properly prepare 
for bushfires and to maximize survival, by consulting the Bush Fire Survival Plan, a publication found on 
most fire authorities‘ websites. For ratings low through high, authorities advise residents to review their 
bushfire survival plan since a fire may occur in their area. After reviewing their plan, residents should monitor 
the fire updates via news sources, and determine what warnings have been issued. When a very high warning 
is issued, residents need to be prepared to implement their survival plan since it is likely that a fire will occur 
in their area. Live fire report sources such as news, websites, and information lines should be well monitored 
so that residents can be properly informed about fire activity in their area. Homes should also be properly 
prepared to fight against a bushfire should it reach their area, meaning that the home is structurally sound 
enough to withstand a fire and that the home owner is able to actively defend it (RFS, 2010). 
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For ratings on the second half of the scale there are specific instructions that residents should follow 
in addition to following their Bushfire Survival Plans. If a severe warning is issued, residents should 
implement their survival plans, and if they are to evacuate, they should be prepared to do so a few hours 
before the fire to ensure they have enough time escape from the fire (RFS, 2010). It is recommended that 
residents stay and defend their homes only if their homes are well prepared to be defended. If an extreme 
rating is issued, residents are strongly advised to evacuate their homes at least a few hours before a bushfire is 
expected to hit. Residents should only stay and defend if their home is specifically designed to withstand 
bushfires and residents are capable of defending it (RFS, 2010). If a catastrophic rating is issued, residents are 
strongly urged to evacuate their homes many hours or even a day in advance to fully ensure their safety. At 
this level of intensity, no home will be successfully defended no matter how well it was built, and since death 
is a serious risk, all residents should be prepared to evacuate should this warning be issued (RFS, 2010). 
 
 
2.10 Social Implications and National Policy 
 
The wild land-urban interface can be defined as the interaction between two traditional land uses, 
forestry and land development (Ewert, 1993). Rural communities in Australia are constantly at risk from 
bushfires, and this risk is increasing as more of these communities develop and expand. Using statistical data 
from past incidents, it has been found that the maximum distance from forest boundaries at which homes are 
destroyed is no more than seven hundred meters (Chen, 2004). Even so, many communities are so densely 
populated that fires can travel between houses, and ember storms can stretch well beyond the forest 
boundary. As long as communities continue to be built on the borders of bush land, they will be at risk from 
wildfires. The only way to completely nullify this threat would be to remove all possible sources of bushfire 
fuel from the areas surrounding the community (AFAC Position, 2005). This is neither practical nor ethically 
or ecologically acceptable, and so the threat of bushfires can only be reduced, never removed. It is a choice of 
the residents to live in a fire-prone area, and with this choice comes certain risks that must be addressed. 
Residents of fire-prone areas must be prepared to either fight for their homes and put themselves at risk for 
injury or death, or abandon their homes and possessions to possible destruction. While it is still the 
responsibility of residents to make this choice, it is also the responsibility of the local fire authorities to assist 
in this decision by educating the public on proper preparation. This task is made easier if local brigades 
cooperate to reach larger areas of the ever growing wild land-urban interface. 
AFAC‘s main objective revolves around the collaboration of  its member organizations under one 
nationally-accepted fire-response policy. The Commonwealth of  Australia, Australia‘s formal name, comprises 
six states united under the Commonwealth Government.  Section 51 of  the Australian Constitution outlines 
the areas in which the Commonwealth Government has the right to make laws. Any matters not controlled by 
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the Commonwealth under Section 51 are left for the states and territories to determine their own laws and 
positions. The management and implementation of  fire and emergency response and policies is not included 
under Section 51. Thus it is the duty of  the states to individually determine their specific fire response 
policies and methods of  implementation (Australian Government, 2010). This has given rise to issues with 
collaboration between state and territory agencies that organizations like AFAC are trying to resolve. 
Australia‘s current form for fire management and the policies in place can be partly explained 
through the cultural idea of an Australian national identity. Many Australians say they have no national culture 
or identity, yet, as ironic as it may sound, saying that Australia has no identity is uniquely Australian 
(Australian Identity, 2000). Looking back on the history of Australia and the influences from other countries 
and varying political groups in Australia, this identity has been formed from the clashing of ideals and views. 
It has created an individualistic culture in which individuals are expected to be able to take care of themselves 
and should not need help from others. The impact on the fire system has been the formation of individual 
groups across Australia that wish to stay independent and free from federal and state governments. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
The ultimate goal of this project is to help reduce the number of deaths and property damage 
resulting from wildfires in Australia. Through collaboration with the Australasian Fire and Emergency Service 
Authorities Council (AFAC), we analyzed the integration of the Fire Danger Rating Scale into state and 
territory policies and assessed the extent of its implementation. Our first objectives were to identify the 
individual public warning objectives and policies of the state and territory fire authorities and agencies, and 
examine the changes in policy set forth by AFAC and the Royal Commission. Our next objectives were to 
examine the warning systems used in each state and territory, based on their methods of communication and 
the clarity, detail, and availability of information, and determine how these changes have been adopted by 
state and territory fire organizations. Our final objective was to assess the social implications that arose from 
these changes in policy, specifically how the adoption of the nationally agreed position by state and territory 
fire brigades will lead to a more effective nationally consistent system. The data we gathered to accomplish 
these objectives allowed us to make recommendations to AFAC and the fire authorities on potential 
improvements that could be made in the implementation of the policy changes.  
 
Figure 7 provides displays the methods we adopted to achieve each objective. 
 
Figure 7: Overview of Methodology 
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3. 1 Research Objective 1: Identify Objectives of State and Territory Fire Brigades 
 
The first objective of the project was to investigate the objectives of fire brigades within each state 
and territory, to determine how these objectives were developed, and to investigate how each brigade has 
fulfilled its specific objectives. We focused our examination on the state and territory fire authorities, 
including the Country Fire Authority (CFA), Country Fire Service (CFS), Fire Emergency Services Authority 
of Western Australia (FESA), Tasmanian Fire Service (TFS), New South Wales Fire Brigade (NSEFB), New 
South Wales Rural Fire Service (NSWRFS) Australian Capital Territory Emergency Services Agency (ACT 
ESA), Queensland Fire and Rescue Service, Bushfires NT, and the Northern Territories Fire and Rescue 
Service (NTFRS). A suggested list of interviewees was provided by our sponsor, and included the members 
Community Safety Group which advises AFAC on matters relating to ―cost effective prevention and 
protection of life and property from exposure to fire and emergency incidents (AFAC, 2010).In order to 
acquire this information we implemented three main methods: 
 Examination of websites and online resources pertaining to state and territory fire authorities and 
brigades 
 Interviews with officials of state and territory fire authorities and brigades to acquire more detailed 
information 
 Analysis of statistics and annual reports concerning fire activity in each state and territory 
 
We began by examining the websites and other online information pertaining to these organizations 
in order to gain a better understanding of their objectives and methods. The information we gathered from 
these sources provided background information to base specific interview questions on, and helped us in 
analyzing the information gained from interviews. In particular we considered specific organization goals and 
strategies, fire response policies, fire danger forecasts, incident logs, and educational materials concerning 
defense strategies, fire behavior, and risk management. 
We conducted interviews6 with the officials of the state and territory agencies in order to obtain more 
detailed information and an in depth understanding of their views and experiences. The information we 
acquired addresses the individual objectives of these agencies and how they relate to the objectives of the 
other state and territory fire agencies and AFAC. We then examined how and why these specific objectives 
were developed, what communities the agencies are trying to reach; what methods they use to communicate 
warnings; what information these warnings convey;  what their individual stance is concerning the new 
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 See Appendix D for sample interview script 
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‗Prepare, Act, Survive‘ policy, and whether they encourage staying or leaving early. We then determined what 
strategies each agency uses to achieve these objectives and used this information to analyze possible areas of 
improvement for the brigades and for the overall state and territory. During the interviews with the state and 
territory fire authorities we looked at how they manage their relationships and efforts to collaborate between 
other state and territory agencies. This specific information has allowed us to understand how the states are 
currently working together and what can be done to increase collaboration. 
Part of our assessment analyzes the effect that frequency of bushfires has on the policies of the fire 
brigades. This information was gathered during our interviews and through examining annual reports and 
other statistical information on fire incidents within each state and territory. These interviews were primarily 
conducted from the AFAC headquarters in Melbourne via conference calls or online Skype calls. Some in-
person interviews were conducted with fire authority figures where appropriate. An additional goal during 
these interviews was to nurture the relationship between AFAC and these organizations and between the 
organizations themselves such that further cooperation and more efficient collaboration can be made. Thus, it 
became important to ensure that these interviews maintain an unbiased, outside stance concerning the 
individual policies, methods, and viewpoints. The information acquired from interviews, websites, and annual 
reports were primarily gathered and analyzed within the first three weeks of our team‘s arrival. A sample 
script for the generic interview with the fire officials may be found in Appendix D. 
 
 
3.2 Research Objective 2: Assess Implementation of Fire Danger Rating Scale 
 
The second objective of the project was to assess how thoroughly the new ‗Prepare, Act, Survive‘ 
policy has been integrated into the fire and emergency programs of each State. This information was the 
starting point for examining possible deficiencies in state and territory warning systems and allowed us to 
determine other issues fire departments have had in implementing the changes in policy. We acquired this 
information through: 
 Examination of websites and online resources pertaining to state and territory fire authorities and 
brigades 
 Interviews with officials of state and territory fire authorities and brigades 
 
During our examination of the organizations‘ websites we also considered what aspects of the 
changes in policy each department has clearly adopted. We specifically determined whether the fire authorities 
and brigades have adopted the revised rating scale, and how the response strategies stated on their sites 
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related to the recommendations of the Royal Commission. As before, this online research was designed to 
give us a better understanding of the fire authorities and brigades before we conducted the interviews. 
Through the interviews with the state and territory fire authorities and brigades we collected 
information on how these organizations have responded to the changes in policy from the Royal Commission 
that resulted in the new warning system, and what resources they have expended to do so. We looked at what 
changes have been made to the policies in each state and territory since the recommendations put forth by 
the Royal Commission and how these policies compared to those held by AFAC. We also reviewed the 
opinions held by these organizations concerning whether the changes were needed or not, whether the new 
policies are an improvement over the old policy, and whether other policy changes need to be made. We 
identified the issues they have had in implementing the changes and the origins of these issues. Finally, we 
assessed the resources each state and territory has expended or lacks in order to accommodate these changes 
in terms of funds, man hours, and technology. By analyzing this information and the information on the 
objectives of each organization we identified reasons for differences among states and territories in the 
implementation of the new system. 
 
 
3.3 Research Objective 3: Assess Warning Systems 
 
The next objective was to investigate the warning messages provided by emergency organizations. 
Results of this assessment helped us identify problems in the new system that may have originated from a 
lack of knowledge whether it was because the information is not detailed enough, it is not reaching the people 
it needs to, or the recipients do not understand or value the information. To assess the content of warning 
messages we examined the websites of the state and territory fire authorities and other emergency 
organizations that are responsible for providing information for warnings, including the Bureau of 
Meteorology, and looked for areas where more detailed or specific information would be appropriate. In 
order to acquire information regarding public views and understanding of the information provided by these 
warnings we reviewed recent news articles and letters to the editor featuring fire incidents and community 
responses after these incidents. The information acquired from these articles was used to examine the 
effectiveness of the state and territory warning systems based on public reactions during and after fire 
emergencies. 
In order to understand the ability of each state and territory to effectively communicate a bushfire 
warning to local residents, we also evaluated the communications media used by the Australian states and 
territories, such as landline and mobile phones, radio, TV, internet and press; based on their accuracy, 
timeliness, and coverage. By investigating each of these mediums, we were able to determine which are most 
effective in each state and territory, as well as which methods are less effective and should not be used as a 
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primary method for communication of the warning system. We then identified additional warning methods 
that could be implemented, considering both their effectiveness and appropriateness in each state and 
territory, and effort required to implement the methods, both financially and logistically. These suggestions 
are in the recommendations section. 
The last part of our investigation consisted of examining each state and territory‘s efforts in 
educating the public about the new warning system. We determined how each system works, and what 
procedures the public should follow if a warning is issued. We examined each state and territory‘s website 
based on the information that is available for members of the public to research themselves. We also 
conducted an investigation of the fire education programs each state and territory provides for the public, 
which included who each program was designed for and each program‘s content. We focused on answering 
various open ended and specific questions about the site such as:  
 What information is available? 
 How easy is it to access this information?  
 Does the site display current state of warning of the state and territory? 
 Does it contain a complete explanation of each rating‘s meaning, potential danger and how to 
prepare appropriately? 
 Does the site include guides on how to prepare for bushfires? 
We also asked our interviewees what information they believe is important for the websites to 
include.  
 
3.4 Research Objective 4: Address Social Implications 
 
In addition to increasing community awareness and safety during periods of intense bushfire activity, 
the changes in policy are designed to encourage fire authorities and brigades to work together by providing a 
national policy that each member organization is expected to adopt. We evaluated the implications of these 
social issues by: 
 Interviewing state and territory fire authorities and brigades 
 Examining newspaper articles and letters to the editor to determine public opinions and responses to 
the changes in policy 
 Explore the psychological aspects of how people are responding to warning systems 
 
During our interviews we explored why some organizations have not adopted the changes in policy, 
the reasons behind their decisions, and how these decisions affect the collaboration of fire and emergency 
organizations within states and territories and on a national scale. 
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We also investigated the general public responses to and opinions of the change in policy throughout 
Australia, and how the public affects the implementation of the changes by the fire and emergency 
organizations. To do this we examined recent news articles pertaining to fire incidents that have occurred 
since the Black Saturday fires, specifically those that concern public responses to these incidents and opinions 
on local fire response policy. We also examined letters to editors that have been published after fire incidents 
to gain a more in depth view of the public opinion. We used our analysis of these articles and letters to assess 
how well the public is adjusting to the change from the ‗Stay or Go‘ policy to the ‗Prepare, Act, Survive‘ 
policy, and their views on what still needs to be done. By comparing this information to data gathered from 
our interviews and examination of state and territory fire authority websites, we have identified gaps in 
communications between the fire response agencies and the public concerning how effective the changes in 
policy and their implementation are in increasing community safety and awareness during bushfires. 
 
 
3.5 Research Objective 5: Recommend Improvements 
 
The final objective was to formulate and propose effective, realistic improvements to the problems 
we identified in how the new warning system is being implemented in each state or territory. This information 
was organized and analyzed by state and territory and as a whole in order to determine the scope and 
common origins of problems. We looked at relevant resources which provided starting points for possible 
solutions including the recommendations of the Royal Commission and past research projects concerning the 
Australian fire warning systems. 
During the interviews we inquired into the specific needs of each organization, as well as their 
availability of resources. With this information we devised a set of recommendations to help the state and 
territory fire authorities work together to reduce the effects of bushfires on communities. Our 
recommendations are designed to accomplish the following:  
 To create a more effective response policy based on the collaboration of different state and territory 
fire agencies in support of the goals of AFAC and the Royal Commission 
 To improve strategies for conveying timely, extensive, and informative warnings 
 To resolve social issues that have arisen that hinder the effectiveness of these policies in creating safe 
communities. 
 
We also analyzed the perceptions of these organizations regarding the changes in the policy and 
recorded their recommendations for improvements based on their experiences before and after the changes.  
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND ANALYSES 
 
Our analyses of the information gained from interviews7 and websites8 showed many discrepancies between 
states on the nature of their legislature and bushfire threat, and how these discrepancies affected the bushfire 
policies and warning systems of the states. The main issues that seemed to arise concerned the quantity and 
nature of the information that was being provided to the public, as well as the public‘s view of personal 
responsibility. During the examination of education programs9 we found several key programs that would be 
very beneficial if implemented on national scale. Our investigation of media reports before and after Black 
Saturday and the change in policy has provided us with insight on the views and expectations of the public.10  
Our final analyses of the data allowed us to identify the social issues that arise from the warning methods and 
policies, and the nature and views of the public. 
 
 
4.1 Objectives and Policies of Fire Authorities 
 
Although there are differences among the states on the exact nature and extent of their programs, 
there are a few major objectives that encompass the main goal of these organizations.  The main goal is first 
and foremost ―to protect life and property from fire‖ (Karen Enbom, Personal Communication). This is 
accomplished by providing timely and effective warnings, and assistance when possible, to residents during 
emergency situations and by educating the public on the dangers of bushfires and the proper precautions to 
take to defend against them. 
The type of programs the agencies implement to accomplish these goals depend greatly on the 
geographical and political nature of their jurisdiction. One factor is whether the location is primarily rural, or 
includes a combination of urban, suburban, or rural areas. Another is the availability of resources and size of 
the population in these areas. Finally the frequency and severity of bushfires in the region are also important. 
Together these features make up the general bushfire risk, or danger that bushfires present to people, in an 
area. The level of bushfire risk is part of what determines the appropriate actions that must be taken by the 
emergency services. Another consideration is the public view of fires and the responsibilities of fire agencies, 
and how it relates to the fire agency‘s expectations of the public. These factors, along with some smaller 
discrepancies between states and the varying legislation of the states cause some major differences in the way 
the fire agencies perform. 
                                                          
7
 A full summary of the interviews can be found in appendix G 
8
 A Full analysis of the Websites can be found in Appendix H 
9
 A full analysis of the Education programs can be found in Appendix I 
10
  A full summary of the media reports can be found in Appendix J 
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The government structure of the states differs greatly and has a strong influence on what programs 
are implemented by the fire agencies and how these programs are carried out. In many states the various 
actions that need to be taken before, during, or after an incident are split among many departments. In 
Victoria for example, Karen Enbom of the CFA reported that the majority of bushfire prevention and 
response programs are handled by the CFA, except for the planned burning and fuel reduction programs 
which are handled by the DSE. If the CFA wants to conduct a planned burn, they must first gain the 
approval of the DSE, which delays the project and makes it difficult for the CFA to plan strategic fuel 
reduction burns. The exact distribution of authority varies between states, but in many cases the distribution 
creates unnecessary complications in the bushfire prevention policy. In states where there is a distribution of 
authority among multiple organizations, the most effective programs seem to be those that implement a tight-
knit collective of the emergency organizations. For example, Damien Killalea of the TFS states that in 
Tasmania there is only one fire service, one park service, and one forestry service, and that these services 
collaborate in an inter-agency fuel reduction program. According to David Caporn of FESA of Western 
Australia, FESA controls all emergency response services except the police and ambulance services, and has 
legislative control over all major fires. In South Australia the CFS does not conduct planned burnings, but 
works closely and supports the burnings of the Forestry SA. These types of arrangements make it easier for 
emergency response and land management to operate by helping them keep in contact and collaborate efforts 
during incidents. Leigh Miller of the CFS claims that this joint approach has been very good for South 
Australia, and Karen Enbom of the CFA states that the combination of all emergency services would be good 
for Victoria but may be difficult to initially establish. 
The closer emergency services work together and the more they collaborate on issues the less effort, 
resources, and time will be required for programs to be more successful. Memorandums of Understanding 
(MOU‘s) and other agreements between fire agencies have helped to create a more collective system, but 
there are still many discrepancies. These MOU‘s are often between fire agencies within a state, between fire 
agencies and police services, or between fire agencies from different states. One of the main issues addressed 
by these agreements is the determination of which agency is granted control of a given situation. This can be 
determined based on the location, type, or severity of the incident. 
Another topic often covered by these agreements is that of forced evacuations and roadblocks, 
which the police are typically responsible for implementing. In cases where these methods are employed there 
is typically an MOU between the police services and fire agencies stating that the police will perform these 
actions as directed by the incident controller designated to handle the incident. In most cases this is a senior 
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fire officer designated by the commissioner of the fire authority in charge of the incident. The actual 
legislation governing when forced evacuations can be authorized and by whom, varies between the states.11 
There are two main types of evacuation models in place in Australia (Loh, 2007). The first is the 
pecuniary interest evacuation model in which residents have the right to refuse to relocate if they have a 
pecuniary, or financial interest in the area. This interest can correspond to the land, buildings, or goods in an 
area, and is based on the fact that historically a person who is not a felon, or suspected of acting unlawfully, is 
free to enjoy their property rights. (Loh, 2007) The other type is the mandatory evacuation model, which is 
present in most states and territories of Australia to some degree. In the mandatory evacuation model, the 
common right of property described above is overridden by other legislation that determines when 
emergency organizations or other authorized personnel can lawfully force residents to leave. 
In general the pecuniary interest evacuation model is implemented in Victoria, except when 
individual conditions limiting people‘s right to stay are breached, in which case it is unclear if force is allowed 
(Loh, 2007). Forced evacuations are allowed in all other states, although mostly under certain conditions. For 
example in New South Wales, and the Northern Territory forced evacuations are allowed only during a state 
of emergency or disaster. In Tasmania the authority to conduct forced evacuations is held primarily by the 
police and the state controller or regional controller. It is only in South Australia, Western Australia and the 
majority of situations in Queensland that forced evacuations are clearly allowed. Outside of these situations it 
is often unclear when the mandatory evacuation model applies. In most cases the legislature gives emergency 
workers the ability to direct people to leave, and occasionally makes it an offense to disregard these 
directions, but does not explicitly say if force is allowed. However the power to use force is almost always 
granted allowed when people are interfering in the activities of the emergency workers. 
The public‘s expectations for the fire agencies and vice versa differ slightly between states and 
agencies, for various reason, and has a major impact on what stances the agencies take on bushfire policy. In 
the Northern Territory a strong emphasis is placed on the personal responsibility of residents during 
bushfires. This strong emphasis is also reflected in the TFS‘s triage policy. According to Damien Killalea of 
the TFS the triage policy states the priorities the TFS will follow during an incident, part of which states that 
homes that are prepared to survive a bushfire will be more likely receive support from the TFS than will 
homes with no preparation. These assessments are made by the TFS and can usually only be made a short 
time before the fire impacts, and thus change frequently over time. Although all agencies educate the public 
and encourage them to make their own preparations, few are as direct as the TFS in this effort and a more 
explicit policy may be required in many states to get this message to sink in. Damien Killalea also states that 
the TFS and Bushfire CRC examined four different communities in Tasmania and determined that 
communities are still not doing enough to prepare. Similar anecdotal evidence has been seen by David 
                                                          
11
 A  Full summary of the powers of Evacuation held by each state can be found in Appendix L 
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Caporn of FESA. The personal responsibility of the public for their own lives and property must be 
maintained in order to prevent the public from developing a blame mentality (discussed in Section 4.4) and 
because it is physically impossible for the fire agencies to protect every resident from the bushfire threat. 
According to members of Bushfires NT and NT Fire and Rescue large scale bushfires such as those that 
occurred on Black Saturday should be considered natural disasters and thus emergency response 
organizations should not be held accountable for not being able to control the incident. In every state or 
territory there is a certain amount of responsibility placed on the public for their own protection. However all 
organizations make an effort to educate the public to better prepare them for what must be done (discussed 
in Section 4.3). 
The extent to which the public is held responsible, and is considered actually capable, for their own 
protection varies between the agencies depending on the density of population and resources available. The 
extreme cases would be where residents are required to take little responsibility for their own protection 
because of the close proximity of emergency services and resources, and where residents are almost solely 
responsible due to their distance from emergency services, or a lack of resources. The Melbourne 
metropolitan district, under the protection of the MFB, and the Northern Territories, under the protection of 
Bushfires NT and NT Fire and Rescue exemplify theses extreme cases. In the Northern Territories, the 
Bushfires NT and NT Fire and Rescue place a large emphasis on the public‘s personal responsibility and 
preparation. The MFB on the other hand often advises residents not to relocate and in some situation to take 
shelter and wait for fire personnel (Keith Adamson, 2010). The difference is that for the Northern Territory 
the at-risk population is often more spread out, and there are not enough resources or emergency response 
personnel to completely handle the incidents. On the other hand, in the urban districts that the MFB covers, 
the bushfire risk is not as great, the at-risk area is smaller, and the urban area provides plenty of resources for 
the MFB to effectively fight the fire. While all residents need to have some personal responsibility for their 
own safety and emergency preparedness, agencies in all states deal with a different set of conditions that 
influence how their individual policies toward public response develop. 
The extent to which fire agencies focus on the bushfire threat also depends on multiple factors. The 
MFB for example primarily deals with structural fires due to its mainly urban jurisdiction (Keith Adamson, 
personal communication). Although the MFB does have programs to fight bushfires and to assist the CFA 
during times of heightened activity, the CFA is responsible for the majority of bushfire preparedness and 
control programs (Karen Enbom, personal communication) in Victoria. Likewise in Queensland where 
bushfire threats are not as severe as in the other states, education and awareness programs emphasize 
preparation for cyclones, and bushfire awareness has only recently become an issue (Gary Gilby, personal 
communication).  
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The methods used to implement these programs also depend heavily on the factors that determine 
the authority‘s objectives. In all states there is some form of public education designed to spread awareness of 
the bushfire threat (discussed in Section 4.3). During incidents, emergency response varies but typically 
includes, volunteer or career firefighters responding to an incident to either stop the spread of a fire or 
defend a community, while residents are advised to follow their individual Bushfire Survival Plans. The 
priorities of the agencies during incidents also differ from state to state. Some agencies have made special 
preparations for Neighborhood Safer Places (NSP‘s) and areas of refuge, while others have left it to the 
residents or unofficial community programs to determine. Also many agencies have made special 
preparations for vulnerable groups such as the elderly and very young, while other agencies have left this to 
be determined in community preparedness plans. These discrepancies often result from differences in 
funding or legislation, and result in varying degrees of community involvement in bushfire preparedness. 
Overall, the individual policies of state and territories, and even agencies within those state and 
territories are, and in most cases will remain, very different. This is necessary to ensure that the specific needs 
of these agencies are met.  However the closer states and territories can get to creating a unified national 
policy, the more effective all emergency response programs will be. . While flexibility is important the 
presence of a national policy is essential because it provides a link between the states and allows for a more 
cooperative approach to bushfire management. Just as the individual states have benefitted from cooperative 
arrangements of emergency and land management services, the country will benefit from a collective 
approach to bushfire issues. A national policy will create a standard for how warnings are issued and what 
type of information is presented. This is especially important near state borders where residents may receive 
mixed messages if the fire authorities do not follow the same protocols. For example, in the Australian 
Capital Territory, the warning signs on roads display the FDRI for the day as well as the warning level. 
However in New South Wales the warning signs only display the warning level. Inconsistencies like these can 
lead to confusion among the public. It is important for all states and territories to implement the FDRS and 
assess fires in the same manner otherwise a single fire may be rated at one warning level in one state, and 
another warning level in a different state. If both of these states also have very different approaches to 
handling the fire, based on these ratings, then efforts to control it will be impeded. The adoption of a national 
policy also has significant social implications which will be discussed in more detail in section 4.4. 
 
 
4.2 Implementation of the New Fire Danger Rating Scale 
 
The new ‗Prepare, Act, Survive‘ policy and the accompanying revisions to the FDRS were developed 
late last year which made it difficult for most, and nearly impossible for some, states to implement before the 
next fire season. Gary Gilby of Queensland Fire and Rescue Service and members of the NT Fire and Rescue 
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and Bushfires NT pointed out that these states were already well into their fire danger season when the new 
policy came out and both decided it would be more practical to wait until the next fire season to address the 
changes. For the other states, the change in policy came right before the current fire season, and the rush to 
implement the changes caused many problems with resourcing. In most cases appropriate funding was 
allotted by the various state governments or other sponsors of the organizations, and most if not all of the 
current changes have been implemented. However some states have either not implemented all of the 
changes due to time constraints, or changed the policies slightly to better reflect their situation such as the 
removal of code red by the TFS. 
Generally the policy has had a good response from the fire agencies and the general public. The fire 
agencies believe that the new policy will be more effective in gaining the public‘s attention and spreading 
awareness of the bushfire threat. All states agree that the development of a national standard for bushfire 
policy and warnings is a good move However many believe that whatever policy is eventually developed after 
the final recommendations by the Royal Commission and evaluations by the states, it should be flexible and 
allow for states to modify it according to their own needs, while still maintaining a national standard that will 
eliminate some of the main discrepancies between state policies.  The main issues with the policy that have 
arisen so far mostly concern specific details. The language used for the higher level warnings is very powerful, 
which is one of the reasons the new warnings are influencing so many more people. However many agencies 
fear that the language may be too strong and is causing undue panic in communities. Some states have 
adjusted the warnings already, For example the TFS dropped the reference to code red in the catastrophic 
level and changed the color scheme to solid black (Killalea, personal communication). In general use of the 
catastrophic warning level has met some resistance due to fears that it will lead to exaggerated expectations of 
both the bushfire threat and the capabilities of emergency response organizations. One point that many states 
and territories make is that the new policy must, stress the need for personal preparation of residents before 
and during incidents. This includes physical preparedness of self, home, and property, as well as emotional 
and psychological preparedness (discussed in section 4.4.2). Another issue that has arisen is the proper 
emphasis to be placed on staying or relocating. After Black Saturday the number of residents choosing to 
relocate has dramatically increased, which leads to an increased number of destroyed houses that could have 
been saved (Bachelard, 2010). There have been many cases where a home survived the passing of the bushfire 
front, but later burned down due to ember storms because it was undefended (Clode, 2010). The new policy 
states that the safest option during a bushfire is to relocate early, this option is most likely to preserve human 
lives but this comes at a potential cost in loss of property. Many officials, including Rob Rogers of the 
NSWRFS believe that the policy should more strongly emphasize the benefits of staying to defend, but be 
more explicit in the limitations of this strategy. 
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4.2.1 Website Implementation 
 
This section focuses on how the states and territories of Australia have implemented the new 
warning system on their websites by analyzing what information is available on the warning system, whether 
or not the website uses the new Prepare Act Survive campaign, and how accessible this information is. Table 
3 shows a state-by -state analysis of the fire authorities‘ websites based on information available for the new 
warning system. The table shows how many web links were used to access information with 0 meaning that 
the information was on the home page and N/A meaning that the information could not be found. The one 
exception is for languages available in which case the number indicates how many foreign languages the 
bushfire information is in. The authorities that are mentioned deal with bushfires in their respective states or 
territories. 
 
Authorities FDR Incident Reports Weather Fire Ban Languages P.A.S
CFA (VIC) 0 1 1 1 18 0
CFS (SA) 1 0 1 1 0 1
FESA (WA) 1 1 2 2 0 0
TFS (TAS) 1 1 1 3 0 1
NSWRFS (NSW) 1 1 N/A 1 22 1
ESA (ACT) 0 2 3 0 0 2
QLRFS (QL) 4 N/A 3 1 0 N/A
NTFRS (NT) N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A  
Table 3: Website information. 
In general, the southern states and territories (NSW, ACT, VIC, Tas, and SA) have fully adopted new 
warning system and have changed their websites to be within the guidelines of the new policies. They have 
thorough information explaining how the new warning system works, what warnings mean, and how 
residents should act when a warning is issued, and also have the new Prepare Act Survive survival plan 
available to be downloaded in a PDF format. This information is relatively easy to access with clear links 
posted directly on the home pages. FESA of WA has accepted the new warning system and is in the process 
of building a new website that will better incorporate it. Their current website has extensive information on 
the new warning system and Prepare Act Survive, and the new website will make that information easily 
accessible.  The RFS of QL does have some information on the new warning system, but does not have 
information on the new Prepare Act Survive campaign. The information available for the new warning system 
takes a few links to get to and does not advertise the system‘s information on their home page. The FRS of 
NT has done very little to implement the new warning system and is still using the previous policy of ―Stay or 
Go.‖ When interviewing the NTFRS, one fire official said that the reason for not implementing the new 
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system was because the changes in policy were released during the middle of their bushfire season, and thus 
changing to a new policy would have caused much confusion and may prove ineffective especially since the 
―Stay or Go‖ policy has been working very well for them. NTFRS and QLRFS are waiting to see how other 
states and territories decide to implement the new warning system and will then decide how to implement it 
in NT. This is primarily because the recommendations of the Royal Commission were released when 
Queensland and Northern Territory were in there bushfire seasons, and they were concerned that changing 
the warning system midseason would cause confusion with the public. 
 
 
4.3 Bushfire Warning Systems 
 
This section investigates the methods used for warning residents about bushfires in each state or 
territory. It includes how residents are educated about bushfire warnings, how warnings are distributed, and 
what information is available to residents online. 
 
4.3.1 Analysis of State and Territories Educational Programs 
 
As with changes to any new system, the educational aspect of the new fire warning system is crucial 
to its implementation and success. In order for the new system to be successful, residents must understand all 
of its aspects, including the fire danger rating index, how to appropriately prepare for a bushfire if one should 
occur, the appropriate action to take when a warning is issued, and how to react when a bushfire actually 
starts. A fair amount of the warning system‘s success also depends on residents‘ making proper preparations 
before the bushfire season starts, such as ember-proofing their homes to help prevent embers from bushfires 
causing their house to ignite. As such, it is important for bushfire preparation education to be readily available 
so residents are empowered to learn what precautions must be taken to help make their home more likely to 
survive a bushfire. To achieve this, each state or territory has its own community educational programs that 
help residents learn the details of the new system and how to prepare for an upcoming bushfire season. This 
section describes each state‘s or territory‘s methods for educating their residents in bushfire safety. 
There are many community education programs that are common to the states and territories of 
Australia. Many states and territories have had issues with for the continuous expense of educating residents 
about the new warning system. In order to solve this problem, volunteers are trained in bushfire education so 
that they may continue educating their communities about how to prepare for bushfire season, and how to 
form an effective bushfire survival plan as well as education about the new warning system. Public education 
meetings are another popular program. These are informal meetings usually put on by the fire authorities in a 
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public place such as a town hall or street corner, and are designed to give residents information about 
bushfire safety. Juvenile intervention programs are very common, and are intended to stop children playing 
with fire. The programs are taught by fire officials and teach children to have a healthy respect for fire and the 
dangers and hazards of playing with fire. All states and territories have school education programs in which 
fire authorities visit schools and teach a fire education class, which includes information about bushfires. 
Other teacher information is available in most states and territories. 
Besides these common programs, many of the states and territories have unique programs that work 
particularly well in their states. The Fiery Women‘s program of the CFS in Victoria recognizes the need the 
need to direct more education toward women so that if their spouses have done much or all of the planning 
for bushfire safety and are not home when the fire occurs, the women will be prepared to handle the situation 
themselves. Fired Up English, also administered by the CFA, goes beyond educating people who are native to 
Australia and speak English to people who do not use English as their first language, and addresses the social 
issue of preparing everyone in the state or territory for bushfires, not just the general public. Project Wakeup 
is a program administered by the TFS of Tasmania. This program is not specifically designed for bushfires, 
but it addresses the need to specially prepare people who are disabled or elderly for emergency situations. 
Being involved school education get children started on fire safety early and is effective in teaching children 
about the dangers fire can pose, but getting the parents involved is a new approach that helps parents 
understand what their child is learning in the fire courses to help them understand their child‘s knowledge of 
fire safety. 
Beyond active educational programs like these, there are many ways that educational material is 
distributed to the public, or is publically accessible. Some states and territories have started distributing 
bushfire DVDs which contain a lot of specific information about bushfire safety. These have been 
particularly useful because the recipient does not have to leave his or her home or go online to find the 
information. Targeting high risk areas with this information has worked well because people who are in 
danger of bushfires are much more likely to be receptive to the information that is being distributed. Another 
approach to this in home education method is the Smart Sparx education pack. This pack can be taken out on 
loan from a local fire station and contains a great deal of useful information about fire safety, and puts the 
responsibility of fire education on the resident by allowing residents to be more self reliant. Some states and 
territories have bushfire museums, such as the Emergency Services Education & Heritage Centre of Western 
Australia. This method allows the public to explore the history of bushfires and provides hands on education 
about bushfire safety, allowing residents to come away with a better understanding of how bushfires are 
fought and how they can take measures to prepare themselves. These unique programs provide an alternative 
means for fire education. 
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4.3.2 Communication Media 
 
Having an effective warning system is important, but utilizing the proper communication mediums 
to convey that warning is crucial to the warning system‘s success. Residents‘ decisions about bushfire safety 
depend on receiving bushfire warning in a timely and understandable way, and not being able to receive a 
warning could result in residents acting on misinformed decisions. There are many available mediums to use 
to distribute the warnings including radio, television, the internet, the press, and both landline and mobile 
phones. However, not all of these mediums are available to every resident, which can make choosing the 
proper medium difficult. Instead of trying to find one medium that works best for everyone, most states and 
territories have decided to use a variety of mediums to distribute the bushfire warnings instead, making sure 
every resident has at least one way to receive the warnings. This section analyses the strengths and weaknesses 
of the various communication mediums that have been used by the states and territories. 
Emergency Alert is a nationally implemented messaging system that sends out messages to both 
landline and mobile phones if an emergency occurs in the area where the phones are registered.  The system 
became operational in December of 2009, and has been adopted by almost all of the states and territories. 
Although the system is a national system, it is up to each states or territories‘ emergency services to operate 
and manage it. The system works by issuing one of three warnings (Advice, Watch and Act, and Emergency 
Warning) during an emergency. These messages can be used for many emergencies, such as cyclones or 
floods. In a bushfire context, an Advice message means that there is a fire incident in the area but residents 
are not in danger yet. A Watch and Act message is sent when a fire is becoming more severe and residents 
may be threatened. When this message is sent, residents are advised to start paying more attention to the fire 
and start preparing to initiate their bushfire survival plan. If an Emergency Warning message is sent, residents 
are in danger and should take action immediately or their lives might be threatened. Since the system has been 
activated, it has been used over 30 times and over 100,000 messages have been sent. States have had mixed 
results when using this system, but overall the system has the potential to effectively be used to warn 
residents about emergency. One mobile phone issue with the system is it sends warnings only to residents 
registered in a certain area rather than all the mobiles in that area. This means that if residents are away on 
holiday and a bushfire occurs near their home, they will receive messages about the incident, even though 
they are not in any danger. It also means that if residents who are on holiday are in an area where there is a 
bushfire, they will not receive messages on their phones, but are potentially in danger. Efforts are now being 
made to create a system that is based on the location of the phone rather than where the phone is registered, 
but it could be several years before the system is fully developed. One other issue with the messaging system, 
specifically with text messages, is that the information provided is very limited because of message space 
issues but also because bushfires can move through an area in a matter of minutes sometimes making 
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information outdated by the time it reaches the recipients. Residents can also call an information hotline in 
most states and territories which will give them automated messages about the current bushfire outlook. 
The Standard Emergency Warning Signal (SEWS) is used by the states‘ and territories‘ emergency 
services to broadcast radio or TV warnings. A siren is played on station and then is followed by a warning 
message. This system is used for extreme emergencies for which residents could possibly be in serious danger. 
Residents are advised that if they were this warning to immediately take appropriate action, which will depend 
on what the warning advises. These warnings are usually played every 15 min for 2 hours, or until a new 
warning message is updated. This system is adopted by all the states and territories, and has worked relatively 
well. Because radio messages have been around for such a long time, people are comfortable with them and 
experienced with receiving information through this medium. However, in a recent study, residents say that a 
warning heard over the radio is one of the least likely ways to prompt them to leave their home in an 
emergency. The Northern Territory fire services commented that if warnings are issued all the time, residents 
will get used to them and not take them as seriously. This could explain resident‘s responses to the warnings 
provided by radios. 
The press is used in some states and territories to alert residents by posting warnings in newspapers, 
similar to the daily weather forecast. This method can be an effective means for reaching people who read the 
paper, but with changes in technology and with more people starting to use the internet for their news 
purposes, this method could soon be outdated. The Internet is a popular communications medium because it 
allows fire services to upload information very quickly to their website, and allows residents to access a large 
amount of information. Some states and territories also use the internet to send email alerts, which can be 
useful even if the resident is not home because many people can access their email through their mobile 
phones. However, this is more of passive system because if the residents do not actively check their email 
account, they will not receive the warning. Furthermore, these warnings are limited by the internet‘s 
infrastructure, and residents cannot access this information if they do not have access to internet. 
 
 
4.3.3 Website Warnings 
 
Each website is unique and has different methods for posting information and warnings that have 
worked well in that state or territory. The most important feature of a website, no matter what information is 
posted, is that it must be user friendly and the information must be easy to access. In our research, we have 
found two main attributes that makes finding information easy on the fire authorities‘ websites. The first is 
having a link to key pieces of information, such as a fire danger rating, right on the home page and near the 
top of the page so that it is easy to find. The second is making the links large so they are easy to see and also 
designed so they stick out from the page, whether it is isolated so nothing else is near it or brightly colored. 
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We also looked at what information is needed in order to make good decisions in a bushfire situation. Key 
pieces that were often contained on a website were: the fire danger rating for certain area, fire incident 
reports, fire weather outlook, and current fire bans. 
 
 
4.4 Social Implications  
 
Because the new policy influences the interactions of the state and territory fire agencies with each 
other and the general public, nearly every aspect of the policy includes significant social concerns. The topic 
of personal preparedness is a major concern because of its association with a ―blame mentality‖. This is a 
great concern for many states especially the Northern Territory, as stated by members of Bushfires NT and 
NT Fire and Rescue. The consensus among most fire authorities is that in most cases emergency response 
organizations cannot protect every resident that is in danger from a bushfire, there are simply too many 
people at risk, and not enough resources to protect every house while trying to contain the fire. Unfortunately 
many residents do not understand the extent to which they are at risk or, perhaps more unfortunately, choose 
not to heed the advice and make the proper preparations. There are increasing numbers of residents who feel 
they can wait for directions, or support from emergency services, which may never arrive depending on the 
situation. These residents then blame the fire agencies for not properly handling the situation. According to 
the NT this issue has been growing in the southern states and territories, and the best course of action for all 
states and territories is to eliminate this mentality before it become too popular.  It is this way of thinking that 
the states and territories are trying to discourage, in order to create more self sufficient communities. 
Bushfires are a natural occurrence in rural parts of Australia, and residents who choose to live in these areas 
are making a conscious decision to put themselves at risk. Thus part of the responsibility for their safety must 
lie with the residents. 
There are many social implications inherited in the warning systems used and the frequency with 
which each system is used. The most frequently used warning systems are the radio and television broadcasts 
sent out through ABC and local broadcasting companies. Less frequently used are the telephone and text 
message warning systems such as Emergency Alert and State Alert. One of the issues that arose with the 
telephone warning systems that has been described by multiple officers of fire authorities, including Rob 
Rogers of the NSWRFS, is that residents received them on a few occasions, and then expected to receive 
them for all emergencies. Because of this it may become necessary for fire agencies to provide more details 
about when a certain type of warning will be issued, or even more strongly emphasize the fact that warnings 
will not always be available. 
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The development of a national policy does more for the states and territories than provide a standard 
for all of them to adopt. The more closely related the policies of each state are the stronger their relationships 
will be, creating a more effective system across the country. A strong relationship is more important in some 
situations, such as the ACT and NSW, than it may be in others, such as the NT and Tasmania. However a 
strong relationship between all states will help the policy grow and allow for more opportunities for cross 
border collaborations. While a national policy is very beneficial, it is important that the policy account for 
differences among states and allow for variations to be developed. These variations are what will help the 
policy evolve in the future, as more options are tested for different situations, thus benefitting the country as 
a whole. This process has already begun as reflected in the changes made by Tasmania, and the examination 
of other state‘s policies by WA, the NT, and QL.  
 
 
4.4.1 Resident‟s Bushfire Safety Decision Making Process  
 
In order to gain a perspective of resident‘s opinions, understanding, and actions taken with respect to 
the new bushfire warning system, we have researched a document called, ―Where Are They Going?,‖12. This 
study, conducted by the Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner of Victoria, looked specifically at 
the reasons why, when, and how people leave their homes, and whether they incorporate leaving into their 
bushfire survival plan. The study involved 616 households in 54 areas deemed to be high risk for bushfires, 
and surveys were conducted by telephone interviews with one member from each household. A workshop 
with representatives from the emergency management sector was also used to help verify the results of the 
study and give their own personal experiences with the warning system and issues they have experienced. The 
following sections analyze the study‘s results, statistics, and key findings (Betts, 2009). 
Residents were asked up until what point they plan to leave before a bushfire occurred. A total of 
32.8% replied that they wait for emergency services to tell them when to leave, and 32.6% replied they would 
wait until a fire occurred in their area. This type of behavior can be dangerous because emergency services 
only specifically advise residents to leave under very extreme circumstances, such as when a community is 
under imminent threat of a bushfire, and may not advise residents to leave when they should with regards to 
their preparedness. What is more worrisome is that over 14% replied they would wait until threatened by a 
bushfire, and by this time it may well be too late to leave their homes and be able to get to safety. When asked 
whether or not residents would leave on a day when the new code red (catastrophic level) warning was issued, 
only 45% said they would plan to leave their homes. However, about 60% of these respondents replied they 
would leave well in advance, meaning the night before or morning of the day for which the catastrophic 
                                                          
12
 A full summary of the report can be found in Appendix K 
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warning was issued. Discussions form the focus group suggested that people‘s behavior with respect to a 
catastrophic warning being could influenced by their work schedules and that people would be more likely to 
stay in the bushfire risk so they could go to work. Figure 8 shows resident‘s decision to stay and defend, 
leave, or leave early on a day when a catastrophic warning was issued. 
 
 
Figure 8: Resident's Decisions When a Catastrophic Warning Is Issued (Betts, 2009). 
The study asked residents to choose among various prompts for deciding to leave their homes. The 
most effective prompts were found to be when they felt their family was threatened (83.4%), when they were 
told to leave by emergency services (83.1%), and when they could see the smoke and flames (60%). Again, 
waiting until the bushfire is so close is dangerous because of the speed a bushfire can travel and makes the 
option of leaving risky at best. If people were prompted by a fire reported on the radio, only 35% said they 
would definitely leave which is not good because in most states, radio is the primary way to communicate 
warnings to the public.  Residents were then asked to choose the places they would go should they decide to 
leave their homes. The top three places people would go if a bushfire occurred were relative and friends 
outside of the local area (29.3%), a public place inside the local area (20.1%), and Melbourne or the provincial 
city (11.9%). Overall, 26% residents chose an option that was specifically inside their local area, and only 
37.3% chose an option that was specifically outside the area, which is the proper place to go when leaving.  
Not leaving the local area means that although residents have left their homes, they are still in danger of the 
bushfire. Places of last resort are meant to be used only if residents fail to defend their homes and must leave 
at the last minute. However, when asked about how residents would utilize these places, 20% of residents 
said they would not use these places under any circumstances. What is more concerning is 20% of residents 
55%
27%
18%
Catastrophic Warning
Stay Leave Leave Early
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said that would use these places as a first resort. In fact, only 20% of residents said they would use these 
places in the manner they were intended to be used. 
When a Code Red (Catastrophic) warning has been issued, residents were asked what they are most 
likely to do or have done in the past. Only 25% responded with an answer of having left in a timely manner, 
and 40% leave their homes when a fire occurs in their area and go to a place outside the fire area.  This means 
that on a day that has the potential to create bushfires like the ones on Black Saturday, a large number of 
people are staying in their local area even after a bushfire has started. An additional 20% leave their homes 
when a fire occurs in their area and intend to stay within the fire zone. The result of the study for this 
question‘s feedback means that 75% of the study‘s population is not taking the proper actions during a 
catastrophic warning day.  Not only are these residents not properly prepared, but 30% of the study‘s 
population intends to make risky decisions on a catastrophic warning day.  Even on days when a catastrophic 
warning is not issued, 50% of these residents said they will be leaving at various times during the day. The 
difference in responses for catastrophic warning days and non-catastrophic days could be evidence that there 
is too much focus on the catastrophic warning. Because there is so much emphasis on the catastrophic 
warning, residents may feel that this warning is the only one they must really worry about, even though a 
rating of extreme can still mean that a devastating bushfire could form. 
The study also examined how demographics can influence decisions to leave during a bushfire. Men 
showed a strong intention to stay and defend their homes even if the warning forecast was a catastrophic 
warning.  Men also felt strongly about returning to their homes as soon as possible to try and defend it 
against any residual fires resulting from bushfire embers. Women on the other hand were much more likely to 
exercise caution and leave their homes rather than stay and defend them, and were also more likely to go to 
places of friends or relatives outside the bushfire danger zone.  Of the elderly group, many residents identified 
places of last resort as their first place to go in case of a bushfire. The study also notes that elderly people may 
not have beneficiaries such as younger members of their family living with them or close by, which would 
make public areas possibly their only place to go if a bushfire occurred in their area. According to the study, 
this age group‘s responses indicate they would be making risky decisions concerning their bushfire survival 
plans which could endanger their lives. 
Because people have a tendency to leave their homes at the last minute, there is too much traffic for 
the roads to handle and causes residents to become trapped in traffic jams when the bushfire reaches them. 
This is one aspect of why it is so risky to leave as a bushfire is nearing the area. When it comes to acting 
during a bushfire, residents want to be told what to do and when to do it right down to the decision of 
staying or going. The fact the residents have come to have high expectations of the fire authorities and have 
become less self reliant is clear. Also, many residents who chose to leave are not going beyond their local area. 
This becomes a problem because the bushfire zone can cover a large area, not just an individual community. 
Staying in the local area means that residents have not fully removed themselves from danger even though 
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they have left their homes. There is also a concern about where elderly people would go to if they decided to 
leave their homes since many would not be likely to have family to stay with, or may not leave at all if they are 
not physically able to do so. In general much of the public is still making risky decisions about bushfire safety. 
 
4.4.2 Psychological Preparedness 
 
Living in a bushfire-prone area carries certain risks, many of which can be mitigated by being 
properly prepared. Physical preparation of homes and property is essential for survival during a bushfire, but 
perhaps more, or at least equally, important is emotional and psychological preparation. 
In most cases the majority of deaths caused by bushfires result from late or last minute evacuations 
which typically result from one of two dangerous decisions residents make in response to the fear of fire 
threat. In one case the resident has prepared to defend their home, but panics in the face of the fire and 
attempts to escape. In another case the resident planned all along to leave but only when they felt threatened 
and in many cases residents either do not realize, or rationalize away, a threat until it is too late (Clode, 2010). 
In the first case, residents tend to have a well-prepared home and bushfire survival plan, but are 
lacking the mental conditioning needed to enact the plan under extreme conditions. During periods of intense 
anxiety the primitive, survival-oriented part of the brain takes over, adjusting the body‘s behavior and 
redirecting blood to increase the efficiency of the organs necessary for immediate survival such as the heart 
lungs and muscles. Unfortunately this part of the brain tends to overrule other parts of the brain that are 
essential when defending against a bushfire, specifically the problem-solving capabilities (Clode 2010). When 
this occurs residents become panicked and lose the ability to consciously follow their Bushfire Survival Plans 
and typically try to flee their homes. It is this reaction that is causing residents with well prepared homes to 
abandon their property in the face of a fire, even if they know it is unsafe to do so.  
In the second case, residents do not prepare their homes to be defended, and have every intention of 
leaving, but not unless they are directly threatened. The problem with this strategy is that in many cases 
human nature prevents them from feeling threatened until it is too late. Many residents will see signs of an 
approaching fire, most often the smoke or floating embers, but try convince themselves that they are not 
threatened, that perhaps the fire is heading somewhere else, or that it is a planned burn of some sort. People 
have a tendency to not want to believe bad things will happen to them, and once they begin to prepare they 
have admitted that there is a good probability they are in danger. Thus many residents wait until the last 
minute, when the fire threat is undeniable, to prepare. In some cases, even when danger is at their doorstep 
residents have a tendency to freeze and become paralyzed. This is a natural reaction, as their minds to 
convince them that this is not happening. It often takes some other event or person to shake them out of this 
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stupor so they can properly react to the situation (Clode 2010). This is a very dangerous reaction during a 
bushfire, and it is behaviors like these that are putting so many residents at risk, and need to be eliminated. 
Humans are social creatures by nature, and thus it is no surprise that during periods of high tension, 
anxiety, and confusion, we turn to others to see what course of action we should take. It is during these times 
that residents with experience and even training dealing with fires, take control of the situation and direct 
people on what to do. The problem with this scenario is that in most cases these individuals are not present 
because they are needed elsewhere. Thus, the general public is left to make their own decisions, which can be 
difficult in their panicked state. 
The best way to combat this is to train and condition the general public to be able to deal with the 
anxiety of defending their homes during a bushfire. The Australia Psychological Society has a number of 
published documents designed to mentally prepare residents to respond to bushfire threats. One form of 
advice they give is to ―AIM‖ for psychological preparedness. AIM includes the three focus points of 
psychological preparation; Anticipation, Identification, and Management. In order for residents to be properly 
prepared they must anticipate the behaviors and feelings they will exhibit. The feelings residents are expected 
to experience usually include stress, panic, apprehension, anxiety, and fear. These feelings are dangerous 
because they are what cause people to become paralyzed, preventing them from accomplishing what needs to 
be done to protect their homes. If these feelings are to be properly managed residents must understand that 
they will experience these feelings during an incident and that they will impede the residents‘ ability to survive. 
In order to manage these emotions the residents must learn to identify these emotions based off of bodily 
response, such as dry mouth or butterflies in the stomach from anxiety, and understanding the types of 
thinking that result from these feelings. In the event a resident must defend their home from a bushfire it is 
important to remain calm and collected, which can become difficult or impossible if they let their emotions 
control them. Conversely, the behaviors that must be anticipated are the behaviors that the residents must 
exhibit to survive. These behaviors must be part of the residents‘ bushfire survival plan, and must be 
rehearsed if they are to be performed properly under the stress of a bushfire attack. The final step is to 
actually manage these emotions and behaviors in order to properly enact the survival plan. To do this it is 
important to practice techniques designed to help remain calm during these situations such as relaxing the 
body, breathing slowly, and behaving in a focused and direct manner (APS, 2009). 
The only way to remain in control during a high tension situation is to learn to expect the involuntary 
reactions the mind and body will undergo and practice techniques to control these reactions. This is the 
essence of psychological preparation for bushfires, and ultimately any emergency situation. Because 
psychological preparedness is so essential to bushfire preparedness, it needs to be given equal weight to 
physical preparedness, and in some cases special attention depending on the targeted groups. 
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CHAPTER 5: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The ‗Prepare, Act Survive‘ policy and revised Fire Danger Rating Scale were developed late in 2009 
and so far there has not been sufficient time for the states and territories completely implement the new 
policy. For Queensland and the Northern Territories the change in policy came in the middle of the bushfire 
season, making it impractical, and in many cases impossible for the changes to be made immediately. All of 
the other states have put forth a strong effort to implement the new changes and ensure that the warning and 
educational materials are up to date. However, little assessment has been completed on the effects of the new 
policy. Without the results of these investigations it is difficult to qualitatively or quantitatively asses the 
success of many of the new programs and warning systems under the ‗Prepare, Act, Survive‘ policy. The 
majority of the conclusions in this section are based on anecdotal evidence and we recommend that the fire 
authorities conduct detailed analytical research into the success of the current programs before any major 
changes are made. However there are several cases where immediate revisions by the fire authorities may be 
beneficial. 
The following recommendations address specific warning systems or education programs that have 
shown areas of promise or needed improvement, as well as areas that should be investigated further. These 
recommendations also address the development of a national policy and its importance in developing a strong 
bushfire response for all states. Furthermore there are specific details of the newly developed ‗Prepare, Act, 
Survive‘ policy that have been modified or questioned by individual states, such as the type of language used 
in warnings. These changes have been investigated to determine the factors that caused them and whether or 
not they are applicable for national implementation.  Lastly we have made recommendations designed to 
improve bushfire education and warning systems through analysis of social issues, such as the blame 
mentality and psychological preparedness, and examination of technical solutions, such as fire potential 
mapping, and usage of fire retardant plants. 
 
5.1 Recommendations to changes in Educational Programs 
Fire authorities should strive to create and expand volunteer bushfire education programs. This 
kind of program provides education on a personal level and allows volunteers to make sure people in their 
communities are properly prepared for bushfires. If properly trained, volunteers can educate residents from 
their own communities about bushfire safety, and be a resource for residents seeking more information. If 
Firefighters know that communities are being educated, it will let them focus on fighting fires. It will also give 
them some peace of mind knowing that residents will have a better idea of how to respond in an emergency 
situation. Also since the educators are volunteers, fire authorities will not have to spend as much money on 
bushfire education and will be able to allocate those funds elsewhere in the department. 
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Fire authorities should distribute educational bushfire DVD’s because they can provide more 
information than is normally distributed in a pamphlet, through a more convenient and appealing medium. 
Residents do not have to worry about trying to make it to a public meeting, or going online to try and 
research the information. All of the information can be accessed in one place whenever a resident has time to 
view it. It also means that the information can easily be accessed if a resident needs to refresh their memory at 
the beginning of the fire season about what to do in a bushfire situation or if a particular warning is issued 
and they forget what it means. Currently the TFS and FESA implement the use of DVD‘s as educational 
materials, primarily distributing them to communities in bushfire risk areas, but also making them available 
for any resident who requests them. The DVD‘s distributed in Tasmania are approximately 30 minutes in 
length and focus on the meaning of the new Fire Danger Rating Scale and the importance of developing and 
following a Bushfire Survival Plan. (Killalea, personal communication) We recommend that the emergency 
organizations of other states consider the distribution of DVD‘s prior to the beginning of each bushfire 
season. 
Fire authorities should put an emphasis on complete family bushfire training. All members of 
the household should be educated on what to do if a bushfire warning is issued, or if a bushfire occurs in the 
area. Specialty programs for women, children and the elderly would ensure that in the event the main decision 
maker of the household is separated from the family, the family still understands the proper course of action 
to take with respect to their bushfire plans. In South Australia, the CFS implements the Fiery Women 
program, which is designed to educate women to make decisions independently in order to reduce the 
reliance many families have on the leading male figure (CFS website, 2010). The elderly especially need help 
preparing for bushfires because they often do not have the strength to stay and defend their homes, and may 
not have family or friends nearby that they can stay with should they decide to leave. Furthermore, some 
elderly people may have health issues that prevent them from leaving their home, or require them to have 
special accommodations should they need to relocate to a shelter. 
We recommend Emergency Services and other agencies such as the Bureau of Meteorology provide 
more information on how warning levels are determined, and how bushfire risk is assessed in 
communities. If more information is provided to the public on how warning levels, particularly higher level 
warnings, are forecast it may result in more action by residents, and a better response from the public when 
higher level warnings are announced without incident 
 
 
5.2 Recommendations to changes in the „Prepare, Act, Survive‟ policy and other 
State and National policies 
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AFAC and the fire authorities should consider the development of a master national website to 
display some or all of the bushfire information. It would display all the information in one place and would 
require that all states and territories use a similar system for the fire danger rating scale. This would be 
important for residents traveling to another state or territory during a bushfire season, as they would know 
exactly where to get bushfire information for the areas they are visiting. It would also be helpful to other fire 
authorities, especially for states or territories that border each other. Each authority can easily monitor 
incidents that occur near the boundary and quickly decide if they need to be prepared to fight a bushfire, 
which would also allow fire authorities to coordinate better with each other. Another option would be to 
incorporate some or all of this information on the AFAC website possibly on their knowledge web. 
The specific language used in some of warnings has also received mixed feelings during the 
implementation of the new policy. AFAC and the fire authorities should revise the specific terminology 
used in higher level warnings, specifically the use of the term catastrophic.. Although the strong language 
has been successful in reaching more residents, it may be having a negative effect on their behavior. The 
language must be strong enough to gain the public‘s attention but not so strong as to incite panic or a loss of 
faith in emergency response organizations. The use of ―catastrophic‖ as a warning level may be too extreme 
and leave the impression that total destruction is unavoidable. If this term is to be used in the future it may be 
necessary to explain in more detail exactly what residents are to expect from the fire, and emergency services 
and why the conditions are as dangerous as predicted. 
In the ‗Prepare, Act, Survive‘ policy the direction to leave early is not explicit on whether to leave 
before or after a fire starts. Most states advise this direction, although the specific wording is vague in most 
cases. We recommend that AFAC and the fire authorities revise the directions to leave early given as part 
of the ‘Prepare, Act, Survive’ policy. The policy and fire authorities should clearly state whether residents 
are advised to leave before or after a fire has started. If residents are advised to leave only in the event of an 
active fire, they should be clearly warned that depending on the location and size of the fire it may be unsafe 
to evacuate and preparations should be made in case they are forced to stay. 
Due to the lack of resources needed to protect all communities during the most intense bushfires, 
fire authorities need a set of priorities that determine where they will focus their efforts. The TFS has 
implemented a triage policy that determines what aspects of a community are protected first, and whether or 
not an undefended home will be protected by the fire authorities depending on how well it is prepared. We 
recommend that all state and territory fire authorities develop a triage policy, that clearly explains what the 
goals of the fire authority are during an incident, the priority of each of those goals, and how homes and 
other community structures are assessed for defensibility.     
In some states and territories, bushfires are much more of a threat than in others. Because of this 
fact, a national policy should allow for flexibility among states and territories in order to accommodate 
the individual characteristics of each. Although the aspects of the national policy should be followed it is 
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understandable that some states and territories will need to mold the system to their own needs in accordance 
with how their state functions. However, specific aspects of the policy, such as how warnings are determined 
and what information they convey, should be consistent throughout the states.   
The manner in which some state governments are structured seems to be causing problems in 
situations where agencies need to cooperate. It may be beneficial for states to assess the way in which 
emergency services are structured, and rework legislation to create more efficient inter-agency approaches 
to major issues. 
 
In order to prevent residents from becoming too lax in preparations and developing a blame 
mentality with respect to emergency services, fire authorities should emphasize the personal 
responsibilities of the public during an emergency. Putting an emphasis on the fact that it is the 
resident‘s responsibility to prepare properly and take proper action during a bushfire has worked well in NT. 
Residents are aware that they need to be self reliant and cannot expect the fire authorities to defend personal 
property when they are trying to fight a bushfire. This self reliant attitude has led to residents being well 
prepared during the bushfire season. 
Fire authorities should also encourage the public to treat large scale, disastrous bushfires as 
natural disasters. This will help emphasize the fact that the public cannot explicitly rely on the assistance of 
emergency services which will usually not have the resources or time to assist every person in these types of 
conditions. 
Within the United States and various other countries it has been proven that national symbols hold a 
stronger significance and meaning to the public. For this reason we advise AFAC and the fire authorities to 
develop a national mascot to be used for promoting bushfire, and possibly other hazard, awareness. For 
the United States the use of Smokey the Bear has impacted young children across America for years, and this 
form of advertisement for fire safety may be well received and useful in Australia. 
In some states and territories boundaries between emergency service jurisdictions are outdated and in 
many cases are ignored when considering bushfire threat. We recommend that the state and territory 
governments revise the operational boundaries of different emergency response services in a state in 
order to create a more efficient system. 
 
5.3 Recommendations to changes in the National and State warning systems 
 
To reach as many communities and individuals as possible, fire authorities should continue using, 
and improve, current technologies that have been around for a while, such as radio broadcasting, as part of 
the warning system. Residents are used to these means of communications and comfortable using them. It is 
unrealistic to try to get every resident to switch to a new communication method and learn how to use it 
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because not everyone is able to learn about new technology quickly. In addition, the infrastructure for older 
communications is usually much further along, which means that these media will be able to reach people that 
new ones will not.  
Fire Authorities should continue to add new media to the warning system. Younger generations 
are used to watching television, using the internet and social networking sites, and having a mobile phone on 
them at all times. Utilizing these media will be much more effective in warning younger people than using the 
radio. Fire authorities should also invest in improvements in communication technology as they allow for 
faster and better communication. This is key for warning against a fast moving bushfire. Investing in new 
communication infrastructure now means that states and territories will be more prepared when better 
communication technologies become available. It is important to use as many communication mediums as 
possible because it ensures that residents will have the best chance of receiving information. 
Emergency Service and Land Management websites should promote and expand their web 
resources ensuring they include important warning web links leading to the fire danger rating for specific 
areas, incident reports, bushfire weather outlook, current fire bans, and information on Prepare Act Survive. 
These links should be on the homepage of fire authorities‘ websites and should be, large, and easy to see. This 
will make finding information easy, and make it much more likely for people to spend time looking up 
information. Websites should also have information available in other commonly spoken languages of 
Australia, not just English. All warnings that are issued by a fire authority should be posted on the website 
because it is a quick way to update bushfire information. A system where a desktop alert can be downloaded 
to a computer so that the resident doesn‘t have to monitor the website all the time would be very useful as 
well. 
Until the technology is available to send messages to mobile phones based off of current location 
rather than billing address, fire authorities should expand the Emergency Alert telephone systems to be 
more inclusive. The implementation of the Emergency Alert system on a national scale is a positive step 
towards more inclusive and direct warning methods. However it does contain some problems. The current 
system sends messages to landlines and mobile phones based on billing address, and does not account for 
mobile phones away from the billing address. While technology is in the development to target mobile 
phones in an area at the time of an incident regardless of billing address, there is an option to help resolve this 
issue now. The State Alert system implemented in Western Australia gives the option to register up to three 
additional addresses in addition to the billing address. Implemented on a larger scale this would help warnings 
reach residents who may spend time away from home during the fire season at locations that do not have 
landlines. 
Because websites have been found to be an effective means to issue warnings quickly, fire authorities 
should develop a mobile version of their website and expand the information provided on RSS feeds. 
Full websites, though accessible by some mobile phones, take long time to download and can use up a fair 
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amount of data. A specific mobile site only displays certain information and is much quicker to download. 
This way, if residents are not at home, they can still check bushfire warnings on the websites. These mobile 
websites, and additional RSS feeds, can also provide basic bushfire survival information to residents who may 
need to review information but cannot access a computer.  
Signs which specifically give the days warning in an area are a valuable warning system. They are the 
primary way to warn people who may be traveling or exploring an area. If the sign just states to go online or 
call to find info, it may not be worth the passerby‘s time to investigate and they may put themselves at risk. 
We recommend that fire authorities and local park and forestry organizations post Fire Danger Rating 
signs at the entrances to cities, towns and national parks, outside of local fire houses, and other fire prone 
areas that are easily accessible to officials. These signs should include the current warning level for the day, 
the current Fire Danger Index rating, and the basic considerations corresponding to each warning level as 
detailed in the ‗Prepare, Act, Survive‘ policy. The signs should also include any other considerations specific 
to the area, as well as suggestions for resources to find more information. 
 
 
5.4 Other Recommendations 
 
When the fire authorities advise people to leave, many residents expect to be told where to go. In 
order to avoid confusion and improve the efficiency and safety of residents who choose to relocate early, 
emergency services should suggest places for residents to relocate. This can be a broad description but 
should be included in either the scale or warning itself. They should be told which direction they should be 
headed (i.e. North, South, etc.) and if possible be given example such as head into the city, go to the mall, 
visit the beach, etc. Without such examples in a state of panic it is easy for the public to become irritated and 
frantic. 
The use of Fire Retardant plants has only started appearing through forums and plant guides online. 
If these could be incorporated into the education programs and advised to be used around the house instead 
of plants such as the Eucalyptus which are very prone to fire, the dangers bushfires pose to resident‘s 
property could be lessened. We recommend that fire authorities encourage the use of fire retardant plants 
for homeowners in bushfire prone areas. 
Whenever an owner or buyer is examining property in a bushfire risk area, it is important that they 
understand the extent of the bushfire risk in that area. We recommend that fire authorities work with local 
governments to ensure that bushfire incident information is available for new residence; specifically a 
brief history of the bushfire activity in the area and a report on what should be considered during an incident 
should be available. With this info the new owner will be able to gain some knowledge of the area and what 
to be prepared for during an emergency. 
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Emergency services should train major officials and incident controllers to interact with the 
media in order for them to be prepared to give full and correct information during an incident. The training 
should also focus on ways to improve relationships with the media and strengthen the public‘s faith in 
Emergency Response Agencies. 
We recommend that fire authorities and other emergency organizations work with AFAC and the 
Bushfire CRC to conduct research studies to gain a better understanding on public knowledge and 
opinions about the new warning systems. In conducting our research, finding information about public 
opinions was very difficult because there were very few studies on the subject that were available. In our 
interviews, we were about to gain some information about the opinions of the new warning system, but these 
statements, although useful, were based on speculation, not on actual public response. Conducting this 
research would help the fire authorities identify areas of the system which could be improved in order to 
reach more of the public, and use education programs to target areas of the warning system that are not fully 
understood. 
Throughout most of Australia, volunteer firefighters comprise a majority of the fire fighting power. 
Based from the media reports there has been some discontent from the volunteers and a lack of 
acknowledgement of individuals skills. Many of the volunteers are highly trained and yet their skills are not 
recognized because they are still volunteers. To create a more efficient and welcoming environment we 
recommend that fire authorities create advancement opportunities for volunteer firefighters in which the 
volunteers would gain recognition and be put into leadership roles where their skills could be utilized to their 
fullest extent. 
To nurture the idea of camaraderie between the different fire authorities, we would recommend that 
the fire authorities implement exchange programs to create stronger connections and communications 
between fire authorities. In these programs a member of a fire authority or other emergency organization 
would spend time working at a different agency to learn how that agency works, and to exchange ideas and 
solutions to problems that they may have seen elsewhere. By implementing this program fire authorities 
would have more opportunities to learn from one another, create deeper connections and relationships, and 
provide unique learning opportunities for the involved members. 
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APPENDIX A: PROJECT OVERVIEW 
 
 
Figure 3 Project Overview 
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APPENDIX B: AFAC AFFILIATIONS 
 
AFAC Member Organizations 
AirServices Australia 
Australian Capital Territory Emergency Services Agency 
ACT Parks, Conservation and Lands 
Attorney General's Department National Security Capability Division 
Australian Council of State Emergency Services 
Bushfires NT 
Country Fire Authority, Victoria 
Country Fire Service, South Australia 
Department of Community Safety Queensland Government - Queensland Fire and Rescue 
Service 
Department of Environment Climate Change and Water, NSW 
Department of Environment & Conservation, Western Australia 
Department for Environment & Heritage, SA 
Department of Sustainability & Environment, Victoria 
Fire & Emergency Services Authority of Western Australia 
Forests New South Wales 
Forestry Plantations - Queensland 
Forestry Tasmania 
Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board, Melbourne 
New South Wales Fire Brigades 
New South Wales Rural Fire Service 
New Zealand Fire Service 
New Zealand National Rural Fire Authority 
Northern Territory Fire and Rescue Service 
Parks Victoria 
Parks & Wildlife, Tasmania 
Queensland Parks and Wildlife Services 
South Australian Metropolitan Fire Service 
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Tasmania Fire Service 
 
Affiliate members whose interests are consistent with AFAC's Goals and 
Objectives are: 
 
Bureau of Meteorology 
CSIRO Forestry & Forest Products 
Hong Kong Fire Services Department 
Melbourne Water 
Pacific Islands Fire Service Association (PIFSA) 
New Zealand Department of Conservation 
Papua New Guinea Fire Service 
Australasian Road Rescue Organisation (ARRO) 
South Australian Fire and Emergency Services Commission (SAFECOM) 
  
64 | P a g e  
 
APPENDIX C: AFAC DEFINITION OF TERMS 
 
Position: A Position is an agreed statement of opinion, a way of viewing a matter, a stand. If a 
Position is approved there is an expectation member agencies will support it, for example the 
Bushfires and Community Safety position; Gamba Grass; Smoke Alarms in Residential 
Accommodation. 
 
Policy: A Policy is a statement of a course of action decided upon as necessary. If a Policy is 
approved there would be an expectation that member agencies will implement it.  Policy in this 
context would apply to AFAC business, for example, the Information Sharing and Management 
of Intellectual Property Policy. 
 
Approach: A method of how an outcome can be achieved; to deal with a particular problem; or a 
way of doing things.  For example, AFAC Leadership Capability Framework. 
 
Guideline: A preferred or advisable course of action; a statement of desired, good or best 
practice.  For example, Class A Recycled Water; Guidelines for People in Cars. 
Discussion Paper: A Discussion Paper is intended to alert the reader to an issue, explain the 
background, contributing factors and subject matter and to prompt and inform debate.  It 
provides evidentiary support to the resolution of Policy and Position statements. 
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APPENDIX D: AFAC INTERVIEW SCRIPT 
 
Name of Interviewee                  Date/Time of interview                          Interview type/place 
 
 
Office held                                             State/Territory                      Fire Department / Brigade 
 
 
 
What do you consider to be the major objectives and goals with respect to warning systems in your 
state or territory? 
 
 
What forms of communication for warning the public does your state or territory provide? 
 
 
 Which appear to be the most effective? Least effective? Reasons? 
 
 
Under what circumstances and how often do emergency services advise residents to leave? 
 
 
What precautions are taken when a Catastrophic Rating is issued? (Close schools, work, etc.) 
 
 
What Shelters are recommended/available to receive people who have left their homes? 
 
 
 For 65+? 
 
 
What is the overall presence and success of bushfire bunkers? 
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 Have there been any efforts to establish or operate interim regulations for bushfire bunkers? 
 
 
Do you have specific evacuation plans in place? If so, how are they implemented? 
 
 
 Do they account for heavy volumes of traffic? 
 
 
Do you have any public educational programs? If so, what information is provided? 
 
 
How do you view the changes in policy recommended by the Royal Commission, specifically the 
addition of the catastrophic warning level? 
 
 
What resources have you expended in order to accommodate the changes in policy recommended by 
the Royal Commission?  
 
 
 Have you had any issues in adjusting to these changes? (funding, resources, time 
management, public response) 
 
 
Are there any noticeable affects seen in this past season due to the changes to new warning system? 
 
 
Have you conducted any research since the implementation to the new warning system? 
 
 
Are there any other areas of improvement you are currently focusing on or would wish to implement 
besides the ones you’ve mentioned? 
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Any views, opinions or suggestions for AFAC? 
 
 
For any of the other major state or territory fire authorities? 
 
 
Other information 
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APPENDIX E: ROYAL COMMISSION INTERIM RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
E.1 Royal Commission Interim Report I Recommendations - August 17th 2009 
 
 
Chapter 4 Warnings 
  
RECOMMENDATION 4.1 
The State ensure that bushfire warnings issued in Victoria: 
•   are founded on the principle of maximising the potential to save human lives; 
•   embody the principles encapsulated in Recommendation 8.5 of the Council of Australian Governments 
report, the National Inquiry on Bushfire Mitigation and Management (2004); 
•   embody the principles endorsed in the Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council Draft 
Discussion Paper, A National Systems Approach to Community Warning (May 2009); and 
•   incorporate the use of the Common Alerting Protocol, as adapted for the Australian context. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 4.2 
The State ensure that the content of bushfire warnings issued in Victoria reflects the principles set out in the 
Commonwealth policy paper Emergency Warnings — Choosing Your Words (2008). In particular, all bushfire 
warnings issued in Victoria must use clear language, avoid euphemisms, and contain explicit information in 
relation to: 
•   the severity, location, predicted direction and likely time of impact of bushfires on specific communities 
and locations; and 
•   the predicted severity of impact of the bushfire and whether a specific fire poses a threat to human life.  
 
RECOMMENDATION 4.3 
The State commission research into the development of a new fire severity scale that denotes the risk posed 
by dangerous and extremely dangerous bushfires (similar to the cyclone categories 1 to 5).  
 
RECOMMENDATION 4.4 
The State ensure bushfire warnings in Victoria are confined to two categories or stages:  
•   Bushfire Information — a message providing information to the community on a bushfire that is ‗going‘  
and has the potential to threaten public safety; and 
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•   Bushfire Warning — a warning to the community about any dangerous or extremely dangerous bushfire, 
particularly one that is burning out of control and poses a threat to human life.  
 
RECOMMENDATION 4.5 
The State ensure that the Standard Emergency Warning Signal (SEWS) be used in Victoria to precede each 
bushfire warning or group of warnings for bushfires that are dangerous or extremely dangerous, particularly 
for a fire that is burning out of control and poses a threat to human life, subject to appropriate limits on the 
maximum frequency of use.  
 
RECOMMENDATION 4.6 
The State invite commercial operators to enter into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), similar to its 
MOU with the ABC, on the dissemination of bushfire warning messages and the use of the Standard 
Emergency Warning Signal by those operators.  
  
RECOMMENDATION 4.7 
The Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner and the CFA develop guidelines for the use of sirens in 
communities that decide to use a siren as part of their response to bushfires. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 4.8 
The Australian Government, Council of Australian Governments and the State determine whether it is 
technically possible to implement the second phase of the national telephony-based warning system  
(that is, the delivery of warning messages to mobile phones based on the physical location of a handset at the 
time of the emergency) with a view to implementation for the 2009–10 bushfire season.  
  
 
Chapter 5 Information  
  
RECOMMENDATION 5.1 
The Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council and the Bureau of Meteorology collaborate 
with researchers to explore options for the fire danger indices and fire danger ratings including: 
•   an additional fire danger rating beyond ‗Extreme‘; 
•   adjusting the existing fire danger ratings to correspond to higher Fire Danger Index values; and 
•   developing a revised fire severity scale for use in bushfire warnings based on new fire danger ratings.  
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RECOMMENDATION 5.2 
The Bureau of Meteorology include the Forest Fire Danger Index and the Grass Fire Danger Index in its fire 
weather warnings and general weather forecasts on its website and in material distributed to the media. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 5.3 
The State ensure that a single, multi-agency portal for bushfire information be established that uploads 
information simultaneously to both CFA and DSE websites.  
 
RECOMMENDATION 5.4 
The State ensure that the single multi-agency portal for bushfire information be designed to allow Incident 
Control Centres to directly post information and warnings. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 5.5 
The State ensure the Victorian Bushfire Information Line is funded to enable it to provide greater surge 
capacity during extreme events and to improve the efficiency of its internal information function. 
  
 
Chapter 6 Relocation 
  
RECOMMENDATION 6.1 
The State amend the State Emergency Response Plan so that the word relocation is used in preference  
to the word evacuation (except in cases where evacuation is clearly more appropriate). 
 
RECOMMENDATION 6.2 
The CFA amend its policy Advice to the Community Before and During Wildfire to enable trained CFA personnel to 
recommend to particular households, communities or locations that they plan to leave early, based on an 
assessment of defendability, the vulnerabilities of the people there, and the degree of ease with which people 
are able to leave the area in relative safety. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 6.3 
The CFA and DSE amend operational policies to require the Incident Controller to assess whether relocation 
should occur and to recommend relocation when warranted.  
 
RECOMMENDATION 6.4 
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Municipal councils review their Municipal Emergency Management Plans to ensure there is appropriate 
provision for relocation during bushfires, in particular, to indicate the location and arrangements associated 
with designated emergency relief centres.  
  
 
Chapter 7 Stay or Go  
  
RECOMMENDATION 7.1 
The CFA revise the publications and programs by which it communicates with the community about 
preparing for bushfires and what to do in the event of a bushfire to: 
•   reinforce existing advice that community members should prepare, and decide, well before a fire occurs, 
whether to leave early or stay and defend their homes; and  
•   clearly convey the following principles: 
•    the safest option is always to leave early rather than to stay and defend, 
•    not all homes are defendable in all circumstances and householders are advised to undertake  
an individual assessment of defendability, 
•    unless a property is defendable the advice is to leave early, 
•    the impact of topography, fire weather and fire intensity on defendability should be factored  
into household assessments, 
•    the risks of staying to defend include the risk of physical injury and death, 
•    contingencies are needed as the best-made plans may fail, 
•    even if a plan is to stay, preparations to enable leaving should also be made, including the  
preparation of a ‗relocation‘ kit specifying the location of designated community fire refuges, 
•    there could be psychological impacts of staying to defend a property, it is inadvisable for children to be 
present during the defence of properties, practical steps are needed to protect the vulnerable. Families with 
young children, older people, and disabled people are advised to plan for early relocation, advice on triggers 
for when to leave to incorporate the need for flexibility, the dangers of leaving late and the undertaking that a 
warning may not be received, and advice in relation to the policy specifically targeted to urban communities 
on the urban/rural interface. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 7.2 
The CFA consider the means of providing individual advice to residents in bushfire prone areas, as to the 
defendability of their homes.  
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RECOMMENDATION 7.3 
The CFA ensure its members are fully trained as to the changes to the advice to the community set out  
in Recommendation 7.1. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 7.4 
The CFA train facilitators and educators and ensure manuals, brochures and other materials are enhanced to 
incorporate changes to the advice to the community in relation to the ‗stay or go‘ policy and the changes 
recommended elsewhere in this report. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 7.5 
The State and its agencies implement an advertising and awareness campaign on the changes to policy and 
practices as set out in this report, such as the Standard Emergency Warning Signal, telephony-based warning 
system, use of sirens by local communities, refuges and relocation. 
 
 
Chapter 8 Risk and Refuge  
 
RECOMMENDATION 8.1 
The CFA report to the Commission on the outcome of the trials of the Victorian Fire Risk Register and 
progress with its implementation.  
 
RECOMMENDATION 8.2 
The Municipal Association of Victoria report to the Commission on the progress of amendments to 
Municipal Emergency Management Plans by those municipal councils trialling the Victorian Fire Risk 
Register. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 8.3 
The CFA give priority where possible to provide resources to assist in the defence of designated community 
fire refuges and neighbourhood safer places at times when they are likely to be in use.  
 
RECOMMENDATION 8.4 
The State replace the 2005 Fire Refuges in Victoria: Policy and Practice following its current review  
by the Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 8.5 
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The State promulgate criteria for the identification and operation of neighbourhood safer places,  
and involve councils and local communities in their development and implementation as appropriate.  
 
RECOMMENDATION 8.6 
The State to have commenced progressively identifying, establishing and advertising designated community 
refuges and neighbourhood safer places, giving priority to areas where bushfire risk is identified as high.  
 
RECOMMENDATION 8.7 
Municipal councils record the location of designated community fire refuges and neighbourhood safer places 
in Municipal Fire Prevention Plans and Municipal Emergency Management Plans, and inform residents and 
visitors about their use and location. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 8.8 
The State to have developed uniform signs for designated community fire refuges and neighbourhood safer 
places in Victoria.  
 
RECOMMENDATION 8.9 
The CFA maintain an up to date, state-wide list showing the precise location of all designated community fire 
refuges and neighbourhood safer places, and provide the list to DSE, Victoria Police, the State Emergency 
Service, the Municipal Association of Victoria, the Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner, and the 
Victorian Bushfire Information Line.  
 
RECOMMENDATION 8.10 
The State report to the Commission on the results of the implementation and effectiveness of its township 
protection plan program and neighbourhood safer places program.  
 
RECOMMENDATION 8.11 
The Department of Education and Early Childhood Development complete a review of all refuges in all 
schools in areas at risk of bushfire. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 8.12 
The Department of Education and Early Childhood Development give priority to rectification works to 
refuges identified in the Victorian Managed Insurance Authority report.  
 
RECOMMENDATION 8.13 
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The Department of Education and Early Childhood Development review the adequacy of bushfire fire 
protection measures in children‘s services facilities including kindergartens, child care centres, preschools and 
early learning centres. 
  
  
Chapter 9 Incident Management: a Case Study  
  
RECOMMENDATION 9.1 
The State ensure that State Duty Officers of the CFA and DSE be given direct responsibility for ensuring 
pre-designated level 3 Incident Control Centres within their respective control are properly staffed and 
equipped to enable immediate operation in the case of a fire on high fire risk days. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 9.2 
The CFA and DSE agree procedures to ensure the most experienced, qualified and competent person 
is appointed as Incident Controller for each fire, irrespective of the point of ignition of the fire. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 9.3 
The CFA and DSE ensure that where a level 3 Incident Controller or officer of equivalent ranking  
is satisfied that a bushfire warning is required, then such Incident Controller is authorised to release  
a warning where the designated Incident Controller is temporarily unavailable. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 9.4 
The State amend the Country Fire Authority Act 1958 to provide that the Chief Officer has responsibility  
to issue warnings and provide information to the community concerning the risk of bushfires.  
 
RECOMMENDATION 9.5 
The CFA effect a standing delegation of the responsibility for providing information and issuing warnings to 
the DSE Chief Fire Officer where a fire is directed to be under the control of a DSE  
Incident Controller. 
   
  
 
Chapter 10 Emergency Management 
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RECOMMENDATION 10.1 
The State amend the State Emergency Response Plan: 
so the control agency for a fire is responsible for issuing and communicating warnings; and to remove from 
emergency response coordinators the responsibility of ensuring the control agency gives consideration to 
alerting the public to dangers and potential dangers arising from an emergency. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 10.2 
The State revise the Emergency Management Manual Victoria consistent with the interim report recommendations 
in relation to the ‗stay or go‘ policy, warnings and relocations. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 10.3 
The State settle the higher level emergency management and coordination arrangements that will apply during 
the bushfire season, noting that the Commission intends to take evidence on longer-term arrangements 
during its 2010 public hearings. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 10.4 
The State report to the Commission on the outcome of the current review by Victoria Police of the  
State Emergency Response Plan.  
 
RECOMMENDATION 10.5 
Victoria Police, in consultation with CFA and DSE, review the guidelines for the operation of roadblocks 
during bushfires, including how to: 
formulate the terms of a discretion to police on roadblocks to allow entry to: 
residents returning to their homes; 
people delivering relief and aid to residents and to animals;   
essential services crews; and 
expedite the exercise of the discretion in favour of persons able to establish their bona fides. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 10.6 
The CFA and DSE amend operating protocols to ensure that when an Incident Controller requests Victoria 
Police establish a roadblock to an area threatened by a bushfire, the Incident Controller simultaneously issues 
a bushfire warning to residents of that area. 
Chapter 11 Commonwealth Response  
  
RECOMMENDATION 11.1 
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The Commonwealth facilitate discussions between relevant Commonwealth agencies (including Emergency 
Management Australia, Defence, Defence Imagery Geospatial Organisation and Geoscience Australia) and 
state and territory fire services to identify ways in which Commonwealth resources might be applied more 
rapidly and effectively during extremely dangerous bushfires, including investigating the potential for these 
resources to be used for detecting, tracking and suppressing bushfires. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 11.2 
The Commonwealth, through Emergency Management Australia, provide briefings at least once a year to 
state and territory agencies regarding arrangements available (including through Defence) to support 
jurisdictions during disasters and emergencies, including bushfires. State and territory representatives should 
advise relevant Ministers and the Chief Officers of emergency services (including fire services)  
of the outcomes of these briefings. 
  
  
Chapter 12 Emergency Calls  
  
RECOMMENDATION 12.1 
The Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner formally advise the Emergency Services 
Telecommunications Authority and Telstra Triple Zero of forecast severe fire risk days and particularly  
days where there is a risk of extremely dangerous bushfires. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 12.2 
The State ensure the Emergency Services Telecommunications Authority (ESTA) is funded to provide 
greater surge capacity during extreme events, including establishing additional work stations for fire  
calls at ESTA centres.  
 
RECOMMENDATION 12.3 
The State further promote, through the Council of Australian Governments, more effective emergency  
call service arrangements throughout Australia. 
 
 
E.2 Royal Commission Interim Report II Recommendations - November 24th  2009 
 
RECOMMEN DATION 1 
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The Australian Building Codes Board continue to progress the development of a standard for bushfire 
bunkers, that addresses matters including, but not limited to, fire resistance, structural strength, 
resistance to high winds, maintenance of tenable conditions, minimum functional size, maximum period 
of occupancy, visual communication with outside, siting, access and egress and signage, and make it 
publicly available no later than 30 April 2010. 
 
RECOMMEN DATION 2 
The Australian Building Codes Board amend the Building Code of Australia (BCA) to include bunkers in 
the classes of building regulated by the BCA. This amendment should take effect with the publication of 
the 2010 edition of the BCA. 
 
RECOMMEN DATION 3 
The Australian Building Codes Board reference the national standard for bushfire bunkers in the Building 
Code of Australia (BCA) as soon as possible, ideally in the 2010 edition of the BCA. 
 
RECOMMEN DATION 4 
The Commonwealth, through the Building Ministers‘ Forum, encourage all jurisdictions to adopt the 
standard for bushfire bunkers as soon as practicable once it is developed and/or referenced in the 
Building Code of Australia. 
 
RECOMMEN DATION 5 
The Victorian Government prescribe the national standard for bushfire bunkers as a minimum standard 
for Victoria by amending the Building Regulations 2006, no later than 31 May 2010. 
 
RECOMMEN DATION 6 
Standards Australia, no later than 31 March 2010: 
 publish amendments to AS3959-2009 that address inclusion of unmanaged grassland in the 
vegetation types and classifications, and use of sarking as a secondary ember protection measure; and 
 report to the Commission on progress of amendments to AS3959-2009 to increase ember protection 
measures at lower Bushfire Attack Levels, in particular in relation to subfloor requirements and 
materials prescribed for doors, windows and wall barriers. 
 
RECOMMEN DATION 7 
Standards Australia publish a fully revised Handbook to replace HB-36 – Building in Bushfire Prone Areas, 
for use as a companion to AS3959-2009, no later than 31 December 2009. 
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APPENDIX F: FIRE DANGER RATING SCALE 
 
 
Figure 9: Fire Danger Rating Scale (CFS, 2010) 
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APPENDIX G: INTERVIEWS 
 
Overall, we conducted 10 interviews with various organizations from each of the Australian States 
and Territories. The interviews were conducted with the following members of these organizations: 
Karen Enbom- CFA 
Keith Adamson- MFB 
Darren Cutrupi- ACT 
David Caporn- FESA 
Leigh Miller- CFS 
Damien Killalea- TFS 
Rob Rogers- NSWRFS 
Steven Pearce- NSWFB 
Glenda Rammage - NT Fire and Rescue 
Mick Ayer- NT Fire and Rescue 
Paul Herrick- NT Fire and Rescue 
Steve Sutton- Bushfires NT 
Gary Gilby- QL Fire and Rescue Service 
 
 These interviews provided detailed answers to many questions we had concerning the individual 
policies and objectives of each organization, as well as a better understanding on how each organization 
works in the state government. These interviews also led to more questions and topics of study, which were 
investigated, and provided us with access to some reports conducted by the individual organizations 
concerning the implementation and effects of the policy changes. The interviews also provided a better 
understanding of how specific factors in each state, such as weather, demographic distribution, and 
communications availability, affect the implementation of the changes in policy.  
 
 
G.1 New South Wales 
 
Two interviews were conducted for organizations within New South Wales, one for the New South 
Wales Rural Fire Service (NSWRFS), and one for the New South Wales Fire Brigades (NSWFB). Both of 
these agencies operate under the New South Wales Police and Emergency Services, which in turn operates 
under the Parliament of NSW. The NSWFB maintains over 340 stations throughout NSW and covers over 
90% of the population. This area includes a significant amount of bushland-urban interface and thus it is 
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often NSWFB that initially responds to the majority of bushfires. There is a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) between the NSWFB and NSWRFS about how to coordinate efforts during a bushfire, it states that 
during a large fire (class two) or bushfire emergency (class three) typically when the fire is out of control of 
local authorities or requires multiple aircraft support, the Commissioner of the NSWRFS takes command and 
appoints an incident controller to handle the situation. 
 
The main objectives of the NSWRFS and NSWFB in respect to bushfire incidents is to educate 
residents on what to expect during a fire, in terms of emergency response and warnings, fire behavior and 
impact, and necessary precautions essential for surviving a fire. Losses in the past have been caused by an 
incomplete understanding of bushfire impacts and warning systems by the residents, and the consequences of 
ignoring warnings and encouragements to prepare. The NSWRFS believes that the new policy, specifically the 
strong implications of consequences if caught unprepared, will provided a context for bushfires that more 
residents will understand and recognize the implications of. 
 
In NSW the main forms of communication for public warnings are the radio and television 
broadcasts sent out through the Australian Broadcasting Corporation and local radio stations. These messages 
are primarily fed to the media through RSS feeds sent out by the NSWRFS. During bushfire incidents in 
which the NSWFB is in control and needs to send messages to the public, they contact the NSWRFS which 
then relays the messages to the media. In rare and urgent circumstances the Standard Emergency Warning 
Signal is broadcast prior to messages which are then repeated until the NSWRFS updates or cancels the 
messages. There are also other forms of communication implemented in distributing warnings and 
information, such as the Emergency Alert telephone system and community meetings held by fire authorities 
to provide direct information on fires. There are also more informal methods of communicating warnings in 
place in individual communities such as phone and email trees.  
 
Currently the radio and television broadcasts are considered the most effective because they are well 
known and encompass the majority of the populated area. The other forms of communication seem to be 
well received since their implementation, except for the Emergency Alert system because there has been 
some confusion among the public on how often this warning method will be used. As of now not enough 
data have been gathered on the newer forms of warning systems to make a qualitative assessment of them. 
 
During an incident residents are advised to act according to the directions in the new fire Danger 
Rating Scale, and their individual Bushfire Survival Plans. So far there have only been a few cases in which 
residents were advised to completely evacuate and these were small, localized incidents. Typically residents are 
not told specifically when to leave, however they are advised to not be within an area that is at risk on a day 
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that is forecast for catastrophic conditions. All schools in NSW have been assessed and those deemed at risk 
under certain circumstances are evacuated and the students are relocated to schools outside of the fire danger 
zone. The NSWRFS employs grip officers who transmit situational reports from the fire front to the 
NSWRFS central headquarters in order to update current and predicted fire behavior information.  
 
The NSWRFS advises residents to nominate their own neighborhood safer place (NSP) as part of 
their Bushfire Survival Plan. These areas are advised to be open spaces the residents can retreat to in the 
event they can no longer defend their home and cannot go anywhere else. There is a list of the NSP‘s that 
have been verified by the NSWRFS on the NSWRFS site, as well as details about what to expect from these 
places. The NSWRFS and NSWFB do not have any specific plans for elderly or vulnerable residents. 
However local police keep records of these groups for special consideration during emergencies. In most 
cases it is the task of these groups and the rest of the community to develop emergency plans for these 
groups. Also neither the NSWRFS nor the NSWFB advises the use of bushfire bunkers as there are no 
national standards for bushfire bunker building regulations. The NSWRFS states that there are contingency 
plans in place in communities for evacuations, should enough time and resources be available, however these 
plans are not implemented very often as the NSWRFS and NSWFB would rather residents prepare 
themselves for early departure or defense. One issue the NSWFB has had during incidents is the increased 
flow of traffic into bushfire prone areas caused by residents attempting to return to defend their homes.  
 
The educational programs of NSW revolve around community engagement strategies designed to 
educate residents on fire behavior and how to reduce the danger presented by fires, as well as Community 
Fire Units (CFU) which are fire wise groups designed to help members of their community prepare for 
bushfire incidents. There is also an Aboriginal Communities Program, in development that is not yet being 
implemented. These programs will be explained in more detail in section 4.3.  
 
In response to the recommendations set forth by the Royal Commission and the nationally agreed 
upon policy changes, the NSWRFS and NSWFB agree that the changes have provided a better level of 
understanding and awareness throughout the community. They believe that the new policy has given 
communities a better focus on the potential extent and impact of fires and the consequences they will face if 
they do not prepare themselves. After black Saturday, more and more residents were electing to leave their 
homes rather than stay and defend, even if the houses could have been easily defended. This and intense 
scrutiny from the media on days forecast for catastrophic conditions that did not result in any significant 
incident have led to a need to stress the benefits of staying to defend, but with a strong consideration of the 
dangers and limitations inherit in this course of action. The NSWRFS also believes that the language used in 
the new Fire Danger Rating Scale needs to be revised, and it may be too extreme and cause undue panic or 
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unwanted impressions during bushfires. If this language is changed it should be done so on a national scale in 
order to avoid discrepancies among states. The NSWFB supports the campaigns designed to educated 
women and children on how to make decisions during a fire in the event that the men of the household are 
away fighting the fire, and believes that fire authorities should include an assessment of the effectiveness of 
the warning and information management methods used during an incident in the debrief of the incident.   
 
Although all of the policies are nationally accepted it has been difficult to adopt them all in such a 
short time period. The NSWRFS is still undergoing an internal campaign to adopt all of the changes, and has 
spent millions of dollars on media campaigns to spread bushfire awareness and survival information. This has 
led to an increased funding provided to the NSWRFS from the State Government in order to accommodate 
these changes. As part of their campaign the NSWRFS hired a well known Australian actor for commercials 
advertising the importance of having a bushfire survival plan. The NSWFB has also required an increase in 
funding in order to adopt the changes in warning system and internal protocol.  So far these campaigns have 
had a positive response as more residents seem to be aware of the bushfire danger and necessary 
preparations; however they have not reached the entirety of the public yet. For now the NSWRFS plans to 
review the changes that have been made, and assess the public understanding of the new policy and bushfire 
danger in general to determine what still needs to be done to increase public understanding of these issues. 
The NSWFB which has primarily held a supportive role for the NSWRFS during this process will continue to 
support the NSWRFS during its investigation and future campaigns. 
 
The NSWRFS regularly cooperates with the fire services of Victoria and Queensland during incidents 
to control fires near or across borders. There are local arrangements in place near state borders and there is 
an annual meeting held at the beginning of the fire season between Victoria and NSW in order to discuss 
cross border strategies. NSW fire authorities also employ a Static Water Supply program in which residents 
are encouraged to post SWS plates on the front of their property that identify nearby static water supplies that 
can be used as a last resort in firefighting.  
 
 
G.2 Victoria 
 
Bushfires, and land management issues concerning bushfires, in Victoria are primarily handled by the 
CFA, MFB and Department of Sustainability and Environment (DSE). The MFB has jurisdiction over the 
metropolitan area of Melbourne, while the CFA controls the majority of Victoria, including all rural 
settlements. The boundary between the MFB and CFA territory is historical and is not always practical; 
sometimes one block of a neighborhood is considered CFA territory while the next block is under the MFB. 
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The main goals of the CFA and MFB with respect to bushfires are to provide timely warnings and assistance 
to residents who are at risk. The MFB and CFA operate under the Department of Justice which itself 
operates under one ministry. Control over a given incident is determined by the Emergency Management Act, 
which typically gives control of the incident to the authority in whose jurisdiction the incident occurs. The 
DSE works under a different ministry, the State Cooperation Center, which handles the majority of large land 
management issues.  Because the MFB works primarily within the city limits they have less direct 
confrontation with bushfires, and due to the increased water availability in the city, they have a much 
different approach for handling bushfires. If a bushfire threatens a metropolitan area the MFB advises 
residents to stay and defend their homes, and in some case to simply take shelter while the MFB fights the 
fire and uses the city‘s extensive water resources to prepare the areas at risk. There is an MOU in place 
between the CFA and MFB detailing how each authority will respond in a given situation. The computer 
dispatching system implemented by both authorities determines which station responds based on proximity 
to the incident, regardless of jurisdiction. The MFB states that the boundary separating the jurisdictions is 
solely historical and not always practical. Every year before the fire season begins the MFB and CFA have a 
meeting to determine how the MFB can best support the CFA during incidents. The MFB implements strike 
teams and task forces that are sent to ten stations beyond the boundary between jurisdictions to cover CFA 
stations while CFA units are out handling bushfires. These units are trained to defend against bushfires and 
are typically implemented in the protection of important community assets.  
 
At the beginning of the bushfire Season the CFA implements the CFA Connect program, which 
consists of a series of vehicles that travel the state in order to spread bushfire information and awareness. 
During an incident the CFA and MFB both make use of the nationally adopted radio and television 
broadcasted warnings, and the CFA has recently added 137 new broadcasting companies including Sky News. 
These messages are transmitted to the media via email, RSS feeds, or through the CFA website. There is also 
the Victorian Bushfire Information line that provides recorded messages and live operators for residents 
seeking more information on current bushfires, health information, and fire ready kit information. The CFA 
also uses the National Early Warning System, which consists of recorded phone messages and text messages 
sent out to residents considered by the CFA to be in immediate danger. The MFB also implements these 
types of warnings, although the MFB typically has less than 15 minutes to respond to an incident. Because of 
the short time frame, radio and television broadcasts are usually poor methods of communication, especially 
in the middle of the night. The MFB usually focuses on telephone and text messages, as well as door 
knocking in order to alert citizens of an emergency and the proper course of action to take. The MFB is also 
currently developing the One Source One Message (OSOM) program that will collect data concerning an 
incident at one location, and send out an accurate message based on the collected reports. In order to get 
information from the field to residents the CFA implements Situation Units who collect and analyze data that 
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is then sent back to headquarters to be released as warnings and fire behavior predictions. It typically takes 15 
to 20 minutes for this information to be gathered and processed for the public‘s use.   
 
The CFA has had success with the website resources, as they provide residents with an opportunity 
to check on incidents and find more details on warnings sent through other forms of media. The MFB also 
provides information via their website, and as part of the OSOM program, all websites will display 
standardized warnings and reports in order to eliminate discrepancies between messages.  
 
During an incident residents are usually advised to follow the instructions set forth by the new Fire 
Danger Rating Scale and their personal Bushfire Survival Plans. The CFA and Police can recommend that 
people relocate during dangerous conditions however the CFA does not have the authority to force 
evacuations. The police can set up roadblocks to prevent residents from returning during dangerous 
conditions, and there is an agreement between the CFA and police that the police will follow the directions of 
the incident controller during bushfire threats. If the incident controller decides that an area needs to be 
evacuated it is the responsibility of the police to organize and direct the evacuation plans. The MFB rarely 
conducts evacuations during bushfire incidents because they have the resources to defend the residents, and 
they are often working in a very small time frame. In other cases such as chemical or gas leaks, small scale 
evacuations have been conducted through phone messages or emergency personnel going door to door. 
 
During Catastrophic conditions certain schools and other public facilities may be closed according to 
the Department of Justice and Department of Education. Endangered schools will be closed on catastrophic 
days, and residents are advised to follow their Bushfire Survival Plans. There are currently fifty two township 
protection plans maintained by the CFA and Department of Justice that include maps of nearby water 
sources and bushland areas. These plans are provided to the MFB strike teams when they are assisting the 
CFA with bushfire incidents.  
 
The CFA does not maintain any NSP‘s but does provide information for communities and residents 
to determine their own NSP‘s. There has been some issue with this in areas where NSP‘s could not be found, 
mostly due to a lack of open space, and the CFA does not have the authority to clear land. There is currently 
no legislation or funding to cater toward vulnerable groups, however the CFA provides information to 
communities and residents on how to properly prepare these groups for an emergency. The MFB is also in 
the process of training carers who will assist vulnerable people during emergencies. The MFB has determined 
some NSP‘s to be used as last resort location, but is currently having problems with residents using these as 
first resort locations and causing traffic problems.  
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Bushfire bunkers were generally not recommended or supported by the CFA or MFB due to the lack 
of standard regulations for them. However one bunker has recently been certified, is in place, and is now 
accepted by the MFB. Both authorities still believe that bushfire bunkers should be used as a last resort, and 
not as an alternative to actively defending a home or leaving early.  
 
The CFA provides fire authority facilitators to help communities prepare for bushfires and hold 
presentations and community meetings as part of the Fire Ready program to spread information and 
awareness. There are also partnership with local CFA brigades and schools to provide fire education 
programs. The MFB also has educational programs for students twice during primary school. The MFB‘s 
other educational programs typically target high risk or vulnerable groups. Last year the MFB distributes 
20,000 leaflets to residents in high risk areas to provide information on the risks and necessary preparations 
for bushfires. Some areas of especially high risk were advised to relocate during certain conditions. These 
educational methods are explained in more detail in section 4.3. 
 
Overall the CFA and MFB response to the changes in policy have been good. The changes have 
provided a means for the CFA to enact a massive change in a short amount of time. There was some internal 
struggle at first but adjustments have become easier as more and more positive changes have been seen. The 
MFB was heavily involved in the creation of the new policy and had already begun assessing and correcting 
problems within its policy after Black Saturday and is using this to compliment the recommendations of the 
Royal Commission. The MFB believes that the use of the word catastrophic may be too extreme and create 
unwanted impressions of bushfires or fire service capabilities, and advises residents to be aware that once the 
FDI reaches above 50 it is not an exact scale and variations may occur.  
 
Every year the Operations Improvements Department of the MFB investigates areas where MFB can 
improve its operations during bushfires and other emergencies. The equipment used by the MFB, including 
equipment used to fight bushfires, is also revised and improved every year. Due to the fact that the MFB has 
less to do with bushfires than the CFA little public knowledge has been spread about the MFB‘s changes, 
except to those in high risk areas. The CFA required a lot of additional resources which were provided by the 
State despite the short time frame, and an increase and relocation of staff has occurred, one case being the 
Community Development Department which increased from a membership of 6 to 30.  
 
The CFA and MFB have noticed varying effects of the changes in the public‘s response and 
behavior. Although many of the changes were rushed and hindered by politics overall the changes look 
positive as more information is being provided to the public, and the public seems to have a better 
understanding of the issues. There has also been a shift in the objectives of the incident controllers set by the 
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CFA who now have a bigger hand in contributing to the information sent out during incidents. During the 
last year the CFA conducted research to determine the level of understanding held by the public on bushfire 
warnings and precautions, and there is other research currently being conducted on the effects of the 
changes. The Bushfire CRC also has conducted some research on the effects of the changes in policy (We are 
currently trying to get a copy of this research and determine if we can officially use it).  
 
For future improvements the CFA is looking into using the new warning systems for other types of 
emergencies, and working with the DSE to solve public communications problems concerning planned 
burns. The MFB is currently working on other improvements determined by its self examination and is also 
putting a lot of effort in public education, and setting realistic expectations for the public. The CFA believes 
that the collective emergency services operations in Western Australia, discussed in section M.6, are a good 
idea and hopefully will take effect in Victoria soon, although the transition will be difficult. Like other 
organizations, the MFB feels that the public needs to be more aware of their personal responsibilities during a 
bushfire, and cannot explicitly rely on emergency services.  
 
 
G.3 Northern Territories 
 
The Northern Territories have two major emergency authorities that deal with bushfires, NT Fire 
and Rescue, and Bushfires NT. The climate of NT is unique, experiencing two separate but overlapping 
bushfire seasons for the ―Top End‖ and the southern parts of the territory. This causes NT to be in a fire 
danger season for 8-9 months of the year. According to a risk assessment conducted by the Department of 
the Chief Minister, about 150,000 square kilometers of land is burned every year, this is about 17% of the 
jurisdiction covered by Bushfires NT and NT Fire and Rescue. The return periods, the time between fire 
incidents in an area, for fires was found to be about one year and in some cases less than 7 months.  Both 
bushfires NT and NT Fire and Rescue are government funded departments and NT Fire and Rescue is part 
of the police and Emergency Services organization, which in turn is governed by one ministry. The CEO for 
NT Fire and Rescue is actually the Commissioner of Police. Bushfires NT is governed by a separate piece of 
legislation called the Bushfires Act, and is actually part of the conservation department. Both organizations 
work according to the Bushfire Management plan, which is revised every year, where NT Fire and Rescue 
covers most of the large urban areas, while Bushfires NT works with the environment department to manage 
the large areas of rural land. The main objectives of both organizations is to provide information and 
warnings in order to give the residents the ability to make informed decisions on how best to protect 
themselves before and during a fire. They are also trying to ensure that all residents are physically and 
psychologically prepared to defend against fires. 
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One of the other major goals of Bushfires NT is to produce such a knowledgeable and prepared 
community that emergency warnings are not needed. Bushfires NT believes that warning systems alone are a 
poor way to protect people, and that proper protection comes from public knowledge, preparation, and 
action. Most of the communications methods Bushfires NT and NT fire and rescue are designed to spread 
knowledge throughout the population, most of who are of working age however there are a number of 
warning systems in place. NT currently uses radio and television broadcasts as their main form of 
communicating warnings, and has developed the capabilities for telephone and text message warning systems. 
However due to the lack of internet and mobile service access in many areas, they expect the dominant form 
of warnings to remain radio broadcasts. There is a Standard Emergency Warning System (SEWS) in place 
however it is rarely used and only for cyclone warnings. During a fire warnings are sent out thorough radio 
broadcasts or by door to door visits by police or volunteers. Residents can call 000 to report an emergency, 
which is the national standard, and Bushfires NT also has a direct line that residents can call. Volunteers are 
typically sent first, before career firefighters, unless conditions are especially bad in which case one or two 
stations will be dispatched to the fire.  
 
There are a number of education programs conducted by NT Fire and Rescue and Bushfires NT, 
one of the most prominent being the Smart Sparx program. NT Fire and Rescue also has educational 
programs that explain how and where fire breaks are implemented and how to properly prepare ones 
property and determine safe areas. There are also media campaigns conducted before the beginning of the 
fire season in order to spread awareness of the upcoming fire risk. These programs will also be covered in 
more detail in section 4.3  
 
Currently the NT has not implemented the changes in policy and has not adopted the new Fire 
Danger Rating Scale. When the new policy was issued NT was in the middle of its fire danger period and it 
was impossible to conduct a change in policy at the time. Bushfires NT and NT Fire and Rescue believe that 
a movement toward a nationally consistent system is good, but that system must allow for some flexibility to 
account for the differences in government structure and bushfire activity among states. Both organizations 
believe that ‗Prepare, Act, Survive‘ is a better policy than ‗Stay or Go‘ which both had voted against when it 
was proposed. The reason for this opposition was the lack of emphasis of the ‗Stay or Go‘ policy on residents 
preparing their property as well as themselves and their homes. Bushfires NT and NT Fire and Rescue also 
believe that there should be a stronger emphasis on personal responsibility of residents in bushfire prone 
areas, and a need to stop residents from developing a ―blame mentality‖. According to these organizations 
events like Black Saturday should be considered natural disasters and often are unavoidable. They are also 
concerned that over-playing of catastrophic warnings will lead to warning fatigue and residents will become 
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unresponsive. NT Fire and Rescue and Bushfires NT are still looking at the recommendations of the Royal 
Commission and looking to see what future recommendations are published along with what methods 
adopted by the other states have worked before they adapt their own policy to the changes. They are 
specifically looking for more recommendations concerning fire and risk prevention strategies.  
 
In addition to the information provided for preparing people and homes for bushfires, NT Fire and 
Rescue and Bushfires NT have done a lot of work in the bushland-urban interface in educating residents on 
how to prepare their property, which in NT can extend for hundreds of kilometers. There has also been a lot 
of effort by both organizations to clear fire-safe areas for residents in these rural areas. Bushfires NT and NT 
fire and Rescue also provide landholders with maps of their property displaying fire activity in the past in 
order to help them prepare against future incidents. This and the fact that they do not require residents to 
report their last resort options as part of their bushfire survival plan shows the emphasis they have on 
personal responsibility. 
 
 
G.4 South Australia 
 
The majority of bushfires in South Australia are handled by the Country Fire Service (CFS). The 
main goals of the CFS‘s policy are to alert residents to the first instance of fire danger, specifically people who 
will be directly affected by an ongoing fire, and to educate the residents of SA on bushfires. 
 
For the past five years the CFS has been working on its bushfire warning system and it currently 
implements the nationally accepted radio broadcasts which project Advice, Watch and Act, and Emergency 
Warning messages. There is a MOU between the CFS and radio broadcasters under which messages will be 
read every 15 minutes for 2 hours at which point the message will be updated by the CFS. The CFS also 
implements the Alert SA program which follows the national standard for emergency telephone and text 
messaging alerts. Currently the MOU only extends to radio broadcasters, however messages are sent out to all 
forms of media. So far only anecdotal evidence is available, but the public seems satisfied so far with the 
telephone warning systems. Further investigations will be conducted by the CFS in the future, after the fire 
season, when there are more data to be analyzed. 
 
During an incident the CFS encourages the same course of action advised by the new Fire Danger 
Rating Scale. Risk ratings conducted on schools determined 20 schools which were rated at an extreme fire 
risk, which are evacuated on days with catastrophic conditions. This year the CFS has also introduced 
Neighborhood Safer Places and other forms of refuge. There are currently three types of refuges; Safer 
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Settlements, Bushfire Safer Precincts, and Refuges of Last Resort. The CFS has yet to officially determine any 
Refuges of Last Resort, instead focusing on Safer Settlements and Bushfire Safer Precincts which residents 
are more likely to relocate to. In order to assist vulnerable groups the CFS is working with them to determine 
what special precautions they should take, and has adopted EMA documents in order to assist with this goal. 
When considering Bushfire bunkers the CFS has remained cautious due to the lack of standardized 
regulations, and has implemented a task force to release a cautionary note to residents warning of false 
advertising for bunkers. In general the CFS is avoiding mass evacuations as it is better if they can stay and 
defend their homes during most situations. The Safer Settlements and Neighborhood Safer Precincts are 
designed to provide a safe place for residents to go to if they decide to leave early, and are mapped out for 
communities to avoid massive traffic jams. 
 
The educational programs provided by the CFS are similar to programs in other states, with two 
notable additions. The Fiery Women‘s program is designed specifically to educate women to make decisions 
on their own instead of relying on their husbands who may be unavailable when a fire occurs. The Volunteers 
in Community Education (VOICE) program is also a very effective program, which is training volunteers to 
spread bushfire knowledge and awareness throughout their communities. These programs will also be 
described in more detail in section 4.3. 
 
In general the changes in policy have been well received by the CFS and SA. For years the CFS has 
been looking for trigger points, or areas to peak the public interest, to expand community awareness and the 
new policy seems to have accomplished that. Already there has been an increase in the number of 
organizations and companies approaching the CFS in order to have their Bushfire Survival plans assessed, 
and the CFS believes that the longer the new policy is implemented the more educated the public will 
become. In order to accommodate these changes the CFS required an increase in funding, which was 
provided by the State government. The changes have yet to be fully implemented, there are currently 4 or 5 
recommendations that have not been adopted, and a change in legislation is still in the works. The CFS is also 
waiting for the Royal Commissions final report in order to see what further recommendations will be made. 
In the future an even more increased level of funding may be required for education programs; however the 
legislation will closely link emergency organizations creating a more cohesive system. Overall the CFS believes 
that a nationally accepted policy will be beneficial throughout Australia, and work towards these types of 
policies is a good example of how AFAC has helped create a more cooperative system. 
 
For the future the CFS is considering the development of controls for fire usage after the Fire 
Danger Period has passed, currently the issue can only be addressed through media warnings and community 
awareness programs. SA is primarily English speaking however the Metropolitan Brigade has identified 14 
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other primary languages and the CFS is currently working on providing information in these languages. The 
CFS also wants to stress the personal responsibility residents have for protecting their property and introduce 
changes to the native vegetation clearance legislature. A process has already been developed where a CFS 
official can organize clearance of vegetation, thereby making the fuel reduction programs in SA a more 
strategic process. Currently the CFS does not conduct planned burnings, which are under the authority of the 
Department of Environment and Heritage (DEH), however these organizations share government funding 
and the joint efforts by emergency organizations has provided good results for SA. 
 
 
G.5 Tasmania 
 
In Tasmania there is only one fire service, one forestry service, and one park service, all of which 
collaborate on the issue of bushfire threats. The Tasmanian Fire Service (TFS) receives the majority of its 
funding from insurance companies and property and vehicle owners and thus the TFS does not have to 
depend on government funding. So far there has been no push by these insurance companies to encourage 
citizens to stay and defend their property, and any attempts by the TFS to convince the insurance companies 
to create a policy benefitting those who stay have failed. The main goal of the TFS is to provide better 
warnings and information to residents, in order to resolve the issues caused by a lack of public knowledge in 
the past. The TFS has developed and published a Triage Policy which explains what buildings will be given 
priority when fire fighters are defending communities. Part of the policy states that a well prepared home that 
has been abandoned will be more likely to be protected than one that has not been prepared at all. In effect 
the TFS is trying to encourage citizens to develop a stronger personal responsibility for their homes during 
fire danger periods. 
 
The TFS implements the same standard warning messages as the rest of the country, focusing mainly 
on radio broadcasts and telephone and text message warnings. The TFS has a MOU with the Australian 
Broadcast Corporation (ABC) that states that ABC will routinely check the TFS website and broadcast 
messages. IF for some reason the website is down the TFS will forward warning directly to the media, and if 
this fails then the TFS is prepared to broadcast messages themselves. The TFS also advises residents and all 
forms of media to check the website regularly during an incident. The telephone warning system is available 
but is still in its early days and has not been used or assessed yet in Tasmania. The radio broadcasts remain 
the dominant form of releasing warnings, however during incidents there has been a noticeable increase in 
traffic on the TFS site, which has been revised in order to cope with the heavy traffic.  
 
92 | P a g e  
 
During an incident the TFS works according to a set of priorities established in its community 
protection plans. The first priority is the identification and protection of vulnerable people such as the elderly, 
very young, sick, or injured. Secondly is the protection of valuable public assets such as schools, large 
employers, communications facilities, bridges, and other public buildings. Thirdly is the prevention of the fire 
from spreading from building to building, followed by the protection of undefended homes. The last priority, 
which in particularly bad cases is unfeasible and not attempted, is the actual fighting of the fire. During 
catastrophic conditions the TFS does not require residents to leave, but encourages them to enact their 
Bushfire Survival Plan. Some properties in Tasmania have been assessed by the TFS and have been deemed 
safe to be defended during catastrophic conditions. Likewise the TFS has arranged for all but 2 out of 240 
schools in Tasmania to be safe for children up to a FDI of 120. 
 
The TFS has identified community refuges that are only opened outside of fire danger areas, and are 
used as a place for residents to relocate to if they want to leave early but have nowhere to go. These locations 
provide food, shelter, sanitation, and sleeping accommodations for the residents, but are only opened during 
incidents as directed by the TFS and are staffed by state emergency service and local government personnel. 
The TFS has also identified NSP‘s but advises residents that these do not provide any sort of services and are 
mostly large open spaces designed for a last resort. Also, until a national design standard is developed, the 
TFS strongly discourages the use of bushfire bunkers. In the event of an incident the TFS has an MOU with 
the Tasmanian Police on how and when evacuations should be conducted.  Evacuations rarely occur in 
Tasmania unless there is a group of vulnerable people who are not prepared to deal with a fire threat.  
 
One of the most influential bushfire education campaigns produced by TFs was the Bushfire Prepare 
to Survive DVD, which was mailed out for free to all residents in a bushfire risk area. This DVD was 
designed to spread information on the dangers of bushfires and necessity of having a Bushfire Survival Plan 
through a medium that required less effort by the residents in an attempt to reach more people. The DVD 
was supplemented by a media campaign running 6 weeks prior and 6 weeks after the DVD was sent out to 
encourage people to watch it. This and other forms of community education will be explained in more detail 
in section 4.3. 
 
The TFS strongly endorses the recommendations set forth by the Royal Commission and the 
nationally agreed changes in policy, however there have been a few minor changes specific to Tasmania. 
Firstly the catastrophic warning level is no longer referenced as code red, and the color scheme used in 
warning messages is now solid black instead of black and red stripes. The TFS has conducted huge marketing 
campaigns in order to spread awareness of bushfire dangers and the changes in policy. These messages began 
before the start of the bushfire season and are planned to continue beyond the end of the season in order to 
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ensure that the information is received. These change and campaigns required a drastic increase in funding, 
which was provided and will continue in the future. However more staff and resources may be needed in the 
future to accommodate the Community Protection Plans and Community Development Program.  
 
For the Future the TFS is working with the Bushfire CRC and University of Tasmania to develop a 
Community Development Program, and is also working on the Bushfire CRC‘s Communications project. 
Post-campaign research is also underway to determine how effective the media campaigns have been in 
educating the public. The TFS expects that this research will be completed within the next few weeks. The 
TFs is also working towards reducing fuel on privately owned property and encouraging residents to adopt a 
more self sufficient stance on bushfire management. Overall the TFs supports the changes in policy and new 
Fire Danger Rating Scale, but believes that it will require some tweaking, and that other states would benefit 
from coordinating their emergency services more closely with the parks and forestry services. The TFS also 
recommends that other states develop and publish their own Triage Policy and increase the Fire Authorities 
participation in community recovery.  
 
 
G.6 Western Australia 
 
In the state government of WA all state emergency organizations, except the ambulance and police, 
work under the Fire and Emergency Services Authority of Western Australia (FESA). FESA has legislative 
control over all major fires in the state. The main goals of FESA are to reduce the injuries, loss of life, and 
property damage throughout WA through proactive measures and emergency response. The warning systems 
in WA include the standard radio and television broadcasted messages, telephone and text message warnings, 
and website resources. FESA also has a Community Engagement program in which community meetings are 
held to determine and communicate the bushfire risk in local areas. The goal of FESA‘s information 
programs is to create a more self-sufficient community that does not need to rely on website information, 
community meetings, and the assistance of fire authorities to protect themselves during bushfires. FESA is 
also implementing a slightly different version of the Emergency Alert system, called Stat Alert. This system 
automatically registers landlines and billing addressed for mobile phones for the purposes of sending out 
localized warnings; however it also includes the option to register three additional addresses for which 
residents will receive warnings. There have been some issues with this system so far, mainly with the accuracy 
and speed of the warnings, and so far it has not been used very often.  
 
During an incident FESA advises residents to follow the guidelines set by the new Fire Danger Scale 
and their Bushfire Survival Plans. Evacuations are not mandatory and very rarely advised especially in 
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particularly remote areas, unless there is an ongoing fire that poses an immediate threat and there is ample 
time to relocate. There are general evacuation plans in places as well as detailed plans for specific instances 
and communities. FESA also provides advice and resources depending on the risk posed to areas for 
residents to consider, and directs a liaison group that provides specific advice and assessments for schools 
and medical centers. This group has worked with the education department to assess the risks of bushfires to 
schools in order to determine which facilities are vulnerable. Generally there is no detailed information 
provided concerning shelters for residents besides the information provided in the ‗Prepare, Act, Survive‘ 
policy, although FESA releases specific information during fires catering to the incident. FESA has also 
developed assistance plans for vulnerable groups to be implemented during incidents. Due to the lack of 
national standards FESA also does not recommend the use of bushfire bunkers, but believes that when 
national building codes do develop it is important for fire authorities to acknowledge them as part of Bushfire 
Survival Plans. 
 
As part of their educational programs FESA has distributed DVD‘s warning of bushfire danger 
through community meetings and other methods, and maintains an Education and Heritage center that 
provides educational material and activities to promote preparedness for all hazards. Additionally, FESA 
implements Bushfire Ready program where facilitators are trained to educate communities and help residents 
take action during fires. FESA also encourages residents to conduct winter burns to reduce fuel buildup 
during the summer and implements an educational program based around this. Overall these programs have 
been most effective when targeting high risk groups and their overall success has increased along with the 
public awareness of fires since Black Saturday. These programs will also be explained in more detail in section 
4.3. 
 
Overall FESA believes that the new policy is better because it is leading residents to be more aware 
of and prepared for bushfires. The new policy resolves some of the issues by using explicit language to clearly 
state warning messages and the actions residents are expected to perform. However one issue that still seems 
to persist is the gap in information concerning relocation plans, as many homes are still being abandoned that 
likely could be saved had the residents stayed. In order to accommodate these changes FESA had to expend 
more effort and resources than ever before, finalizing a complete framework by October and greatly 
increasing the amount of staff and administration aimed toward the spread of information. So far not all of 
the recommendations have been adopted yet; however the new warning system has been fully implemented. 
There has also been an increase in the demand and accountability concerning the distribution of timely and 
relevant information 
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Since Black Saturday there has been an increase in public interest and wariness of bushfires. This 
increased attention and the new policy has helped to explain the shared responsibility of fire agencies and the 
community in the community‘s protection, but the issue has not been resolved yet. Many residents are 
electing to simply leave their homes or only prepare in minor ways, ignoring some of the most vital 
preparations such as fuel reduction. This has increased the amount of property damage and FESA hopes to 
reduce this in the future by resolving issues with communicating information to communities. Currently there 
has not yet been any evaluation of the new system in WA.  However there is ongoing research at local 
universities designed to understand community behavior.  
 
For the future FESA is working on the issue of NSP‘s and other evacuation centers and refuges of 
last resort. There is a new committee that will bring the chief fire agencies and the local government together 
and to establish key sub-committees, such as the Fuel Load Management committee, to better deal with 
major issues. The Fuel Load Management committee is specifically designed to create more synergy between 
communities and agencies to reduce fuel buildup and the effort needed to manage it. Although the Royal 
Commission is still making recommendations, FESA will not be altering the current policy until another 
season has passed and the current changes can be assessed. FESA will also be examining the fire agencies of 
other states in order to acquire solid evidence on what methods did or did not work in order to make 
improvements to their own system.  
 
 
G.7 Australian Capital Territory 
 
In the ACT the ACT Emergency Services Agency (ACT ESA) works under the Department of 
Justice and Community Service and encompasses all emergency services except the police. One of the main 
objectives of the ACT ESA is to have consistent messaging systems throughout the country specifically with 
NSW which entirely surrounds the ACT. Because the ACT and NSW share the same media outlets, it is 
essential that their messaging systems are the same. Unfortunately inconsistencies are still occurring such as 
the issue with the FDI in which it is posted along with the FDRS in the ACT but not in NSW.  
 
In the past the ACT used a series of phone calls to inform the media of incidents so that warnings 
could be sent out. However a new system has recently been developed to inform the media more efficiently. 
In the new system information is sent to the on-call media officer who prepares a message to be sent as a text 
message and email to chiefs of staff for media outlets and the commissioner of the Minister‘s office. The text 
message is sent to media personnel who need to know immediately and can take immediate action, the email 
is sent to an extended group who will be responsible for responding to and dealing with the incident later. 
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The email system is used daily regardless of whether there is an incident in order to ensure the system is 
working and the media can rely on the ACT ESA. The email is also received by an account on the ESA 
website and the three most recent updates are posted on the site. During periods of intense activity the log 
can be manually extended to display more updates. Canberra Connect also operates a website and call center 
that can provide the latest information on updates or advice. This new system reduces the number of calls 
from the media allowing for more time to handle incidents and issue information. It has worked especially 
well during larger incidents in which a lot of media agencies would be trying to contact the ESA. The only 
issues so far are when the system needs to be shut down for 24 hours for routine maintenance. However 
there are two backup systems in place that are implemented during this time. The ESA has also provided 
NSW with a contact list for media groups  
 
During an incident the ACT ESA does not force evacuations and typically does not advise them 
although the idea of advising evacuations has been under discussion. The ESA has developed Recovery 
Centers that are predetermined locations which can facilitate support services during incidents. These 
facilities are typically public buildings that have the capabilities to support emergency services and thus are 
maintained on a daily basis for their own purposes. The locations of these facilities are not advertised until an 
incident occurs in order to prevent residents from automatically going to a facility that may be in the path of 
the fire. In general residents are advised to determine their own relocation point in the event of a fire and 
these locations are mostly implemented for residents who have nowhere else to go. The ACT Community 
Recovery Department is responsible for preparing and activating these facilities as directed by the ESA.  On 
catastrophic days schools between the urban and rural edge of Canberra, named the ember zone, are closed 
due to the high risk in the area. The topic of bushfire bunkers has not been a major issue in the ACT but the 
ACT is interested to see what national standards are developed. In the event of an overwhelming incident in 
which the current plans will not be sufficient the ACT Coordination Center is activated in which all 
government agencies and media groups come together to deal with communications issues during the 
incident. So far this has not been activated since it was developed in 2003 but has been exercised in the past 
and will be exercised in the future. 
 
The ACT implements a range of programs for public education, the most prominent being the Storm 
Safe and Bushfire Awareness programs. This bushfire awareness program typically begins in October but is 
most effective in November and December when the hot weather increases public awareness of bushfires. As 
part of this program the ESA distributed flyers to every mail box alerting residents to the change in policy 
and other bushfire information. The only complaints so far are from residents who for some reason did not 
receive the flyer, and it seems that most residents are willing to accept the changes and plan accordingly. 
Every year the ESA runs a Winter Home Fire Safety campaign with the Urban Fire Brigade. Last year the 
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campaign led to an 18% reduction in the number of house fires in Canberra due to additional advertising 
funds from insurers. The ESA also implements Community Fire Units and there are currently 44 
implemented throughout the ACT with six more to be added in the next year. These units are designed to 
train local residents to protect their homes and pass on knowledge to the rest of the community. These 
programs will be explained in more detail in section 4.3. 
 
One of the ACT ESA‘s primarily responsibilities is sending messages to the public and thus agrees 
with the Royal Commission‘s recommendations on timely and accurate warnings, and believes that these 
messages are just as important as handling the fire. Within a short time from the start of an incident the 
public wants to know what the smoke is from, where it is, how far away it is, where it is expected to go, what 
emergency services are doing, and what emergency services want the public to do. The ESA believes the 
Royal Commission has done a good job in highlighting the importance of providing this information to the 
public. The ESA has spent a lot of time preparing an analyzing materials sent to the community to ensure all 
public documents were up to date. By Christmas time the Fire Danger Rating Brochure, the ‗Prepare, Act, 
Survive‘ brochure, and the Bushfire Survival Plan document were developed and distributed. Many of these 
documents where adapted from NSW documents. So far the ACT has had a fairly quite fire season and has 
not conducted any research concerning the success of the new policies. There is an ongoing review of 
community education programs and an assessment of the Emergency Alert system was conducted before and 
after Christmas however funding for other investigations is limited. 
 
For the future the ESA is actively participating in the review of the changes, but currently is focusing 
on reinforcing the messages sent to the public and the specifics of what the messages mean. The ESA also 
believes that it is vital for processes to be in place to ensure that warning systems are properly in place and 
active. 
 
 
G.8 Queensland 
 
In QL the Department of Community Safety (DCS) heads all other emergency response 
organizations including the QL Fire and Rescue Service, QL Ambulance, and Emergency Management QL. 
The main objectives of the QL DCS concerning warning systems and bushfires are to warn residents of an 
impending incident and educate them on proper response. In the past QL has had a much lesser issue with 
bushfires than the other states and until 2004 bushfire preparedness was not a major concern. QL has 
recently recovered from a drought stretching from 2003 to 2008, and has now returned to its usual wet 
climate. However there has been an increase in bushfire activity over the past few years, most likely due to 
98 | P a g e  
 
climate change, and the commissioner of QL Fire and Rescue believes that QL will become hotter and drier 
in the future. One important note is the Public Safety Preservation Act that allows QL police to order 
residents to evacuate. Unlike in the other state where residents are allowed to stay if they have a financial 
interest in the building, any residents who remain during an ordered evacuation can be arrested. 
 
Until recently the warning systems for emergencies in QL consisted primarily of radio broadcasts 
through ABC and direct door knocking by emergency services. Recently the Emergency Alert telephone 
system has been developed and is now in place although it has only been used in a couple of instances. 
 
During an incident the fire fighters are the primary emergency response personnel weather the 
hazard be a fire, flood, or cyclone. Because bushfires are significantly less of an issue in QL, the programs 
implemented to combat them are somewhat less sophisticated. There is no liaison between incident 
controllers and the public for bushfires. This is partially because bushfires are not as serious a threat, and 
because bushfires in QL tend to begin and end quickly and information may not be able to be relayed to 
residents until the fire strikes.  Due to the recent changes in policy NSP‘s are being developed in QL, 
although these locations are currently only open spaces for use as a last resort, and do not offer any services 
to residents. However, this may change in the future considering QL‘s forced evacuation policy. Some argue 
that if residents are forced to evacuate by police then the police should provide shelter for the residents. In 
2004 the QL Fire and Rescue Service negotiated with the police to allow for residents to remain if they are 
properly prepared. However there is no indication that the act will be revised. After Black Saturday 
emergency services are more likely to err on the side of caution and call for evacuations rather than risk 
residents lives by advising them to stay. Currently there are no programs to account for vulnerable groups, or 
to regulate bushfire bunkers, but these will most likely be developed in the future as fires become more 
intense and changes in other states are evaluated. There have been a couple of incidents that were considered 
catastrophic conditions at which point some communities were evacuated. These instances did not receive a 
good response after the incident turned out to be far less destructive than originally thought. 
 
Because QL was in the middle of its fire danger season when the new policy was developed it elected 
to wait until the next season to implement the changes in order to create a smoother transition and gain more 
insight from other states. QL begins its fire season in April and has successfully implemented the new policy 
of ‗Prepare, Act, Survive‘ and the new FDRS. The transition required a lot more funding which was provided 
by the State Government. In the past fire season QL kept the majority of the old policies but implemented 
the new policy where possible. During the few major bushfires that occurred last season residents were 
advised to leave but some confusion resulted from the partial change in policy. 
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Overall the new policy has been well received by the QL Fire and Rescue Service, although the 
public, due to their lack of concern for the bushfire threat, is not as interested in the change. The QL Fire and 
Rescue Service commissioner has every intention of implementing the new policy and fears that despite the 
relapse back into the wet climate, QL will continue to grow hotter and drier and the bushfire threat will 
continue to grow. The majority of educational material is comprised of booklets and DVD‘s sent to 
specifically targeted risk groups. There are also presentations provided by local fire brigades to help spread 
bushfire awareness throughout communities through direct interaction. 
 
Research was conducted in 2003-2004 that concerned the level of bushfire understanding held by the 
public, and whether they felt they were at risk. The research showed that only 50% of the at-risk population 
actually realized this risk, and only a percentage of that claimed they would prepare for a threat. Because 
serious bushfire threat is so new to QL there is a lesser consideration for it by the public. QL Fire and Rescue 
Services wants to educate the public to have a similar awareness for bushfires as they do for cyclones.  
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APPENDIX H: WEBSITE ANALYSIS 
 
In order to acquire a better understanding of the State and territorial Fire Authority organizations we 
have conducted an analysis of the websites and other online resources provided by these organizations. This 
analysis focused on assessing the availability of information, specifically information pertaining to; the new 
Fire Danger Rating Scale, incident reports, weather and fire forecasts, fire bans and restrictions, and the 
nationally agreed upon ‗Prepare, Act, Survive‘ policy. We have also examined websites for information 
available in languages other than English, and information on the methods of communicating warnings in the 
State or Territory. Additionally we are using this examination as a method of acquiring background 
information to aid us in our interviews.  
 
Most of the information was analyzed based on its availability and accessibility, with a N/A 
corresponding to an absence of the information, and a number begging at zero, corresponding to the number 
of links followed to access the information. The number of available languages other than English is also 
given, starting at zero for no other languages other than English. The methods of communication and official 
broadcasters are described, along with the warnings announced via websites. We have also included additional 
information that assisted in our interviews or otherwise related to the implementation of the changes in 
policy. A list of the Websites used can be found in Appendix I, while the table used to tabulate some info can 
be seen in Appendix K. 
 
 
H.1 CFA 
 
The CFA website has most of the information concerning the new Fire Danger Rating Scale and 
‗Prepare, Act, Survive‘ policy readily available on the first page. Links to incident reports, warnings and 
advice, fire ban and fire restriction status, fire danger forecasts, household bushfire self assessment tools, 
guides to creating a fire plan, and detailed information concerning  the change in the Fire Danger Rating Scale 
and other policy changes are available on the home page. There is also a link to important CFA publications 
containing information essential during the fire season that are available in eighteen languages other than 
English. In addition to the warnings provided on the CFA website, there are Really Simple Syndication (RSS) 
feeds available for incident summaries, warnings and advice, total fire ban status, CFA latest news, CFA 
media releases, and CFA regional news. The site also lists an information hotline that provides useful 
information from operators and recorded messages as well as the number of the Victorian Bushfire 
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Information Line which can be accessed by the hearing impaired who have access to a TTY (teletext) 
machine. 
 
 
H.2 CFS 
 
The CFS website shows links to current warnings, fire ban information, and current incidents on the 
home page. There are links in the top drop down menus, under community information, that lead to 
information concerning the ‗Prepare, Act, Survive‘ policy and a display of the new Fire Danger Rating Scale. 
There are no resources available in languages other than English and the fire danger forecast and warning 
levels only extend to the current day. The website includes regional and statewide warnings, and media 
broadcasts and provides a place to register for RSS feeds for current incidents and warnings.  The website 
also describes the emergency alert system that is in place in South Australia, and provides information how 
the warnings are issued and under what conditions, and to whom, they are issued. The website also provides 
and emergency response number (000) and instructions to callers along with the type of information that will 
be requested by the operator. 
 
H.3 MFB 
 
 The MFB website does not contain much information relating to the ‗Prepare, Act, Survive‘ policy or 
the new Fire Danger Rating Scale. The MFB site links to the CFA site for information on total fire ban alerts 
and other bushfire information. There is also a section on what can and cannot be done during total fire ban 
periods. The only links to the CFA site are the fire ban information link and the current fire danger ratings 
link, and there is little mention of bushfires throughout the entire site. There is also a link to current and 
forecasted weather warnings for the next 4 days via the Bureau of Meteorology. 
 
H.4 DSE 
 
 The DSE website has a section specifically dedicated to bushfires in the State of Victoria. There is a 
link to a section describing the current and future planned burns for the season including the dates, locations, 
and status for each, as well as a description of the purpose and nature of planned burns. The first page of the 
Fire‘s today section shows the origins and status of current fires. The site also includes a section on the 
current emergency, watch and act, and advice warnings and provides detailed information on ongoing 
bushfires that may threaten communities. The site also includes a section listing the various information 
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services including, the CFA (for more bushfire information), the official emergency broadcasters, the 
Department of Health, Parks Victoria, The Department of Human Services (for recovery procedures), 
VicRoads, Environmental Protection Authority (for smoke information), Victoria Police (for traffic 
management points), Melbourne Water (for information on water catchments), Bureau of Meteorology (for 
weather information), and Help for Wildlife or Wildlife Victoria. The site also includes a description of the 
new Fire Danger Rating scale and a link to the CFA site for more information on the sale. There is also a 
section that explains the fire bans and restrictions, as well as a link to the CFA site for current restrictions. 
There is a chart showing the fire prohibition period for each region of Victoria and rules for acquiring a 
permit during fire ban periods. There is a section describing the methods of fire management in effect in 
Victoria that includes: Living with Fire: Victoria‘s Bushfire Strategy, Living with Fire: A Community 
Engagement Framework, Road Management Plan, Fire Areas and Districts, Fire protection Plans, Fire 
Protection, Fire Suppression, Causes of Bushfires, and Major Reviews and inquiries. 
 
 
H.5 SAMFS 
 
 The SAMFS website does not contain much information on Bushfires, although there is a link to the 
CFS site on the home page for current incidents and warnings. There is also a link to the CFS site for 
information on the ‗Prepare Act Survive‘ policy, the latest fire ban information, and the latest bushfire 
information. 
 
 
H.6 FESA 
 
 The FESA website has a large link on the home page leading to a section containing information 
concerning the ‗Prepare, Act, Survive‘ policy and other bushfire information. RSS feeds are provided for 
Alerts, Fire Danger Ratings, Total Fire Bans, and Media Releases. In addition to the website alerts, RSS feeds, 
and television and radio broadcasts, FESA is implementing a Statealert telephone warning system in which 
residents can register up to 3 addresses in addition to the normal billing address which is already registered.  
The FESA site contains information for all types of hazards, the bushfire information is available under the 
Hazards->fire section, while the alerts and warnings information is available under the News and Media-> 
Emergency Alerts section. 
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H.7 TFS 
 
The Tasmania Fire Service‘s website is well organized and easy to use. Links to the current fire rating, 
current fire incidents, fire weather, and information on Prepare Act Survive are large and near the top of the 
page which makes them easy to find quickly. The site also includes a specially designed mobile page which 
people with web capable phones can access to keep up to date on fire information in areas with cell phone 
coverage. However, there are several areas which can be improved. It takes two links to find both the total 
fire bands page as well as the fire permits page. Since these are pages that would be accessed quite often, the 
website could be improved by putting links to these pages on the home page that are similar to other bushfire 
information links. Also, the only language of the website is English. Adding a few more language options for 
the website would insure that visitors who may not speak English would be able to access information from 
the Website. Note: communication for warning systems is website and radio, so more communication 
methods could be useful. 
 
 
H.8 NSWRFS 
 
The New South Wales Fire Brigade website does not contain information on bushfires, but instead 
has a link to the New South Wales Rural Fire Services (NSWRFS) website, which deals exclusively with 
bushfire information for New South Wales. The NSWRFS‘s website contains large links for the current fire 
rating, current fire incidents, current fire bans, and information on Prepare Act Survive on the home page. 
Besides these links, there are many other large links for bushfire information such as a bushfire home 
assessment tool, safer places for local neighborhoods, and basic home training materials. These large links 
make information easy to find, but most of the links are in the middle and bottom areas of the home page, 
which can make finding the actual link difficult. Also, a link to weather information such as current outlook 
and forecasts for bushfires would be useful for people in the state to use for planning purposes. There are 22 
languages that residents can access information about bushfires in. Note: communication is web, radio, and 
television. 
 
 
H.9 ACTFB 
 
Both the Australian Capital Territory Fire Brigade (ACTFB) and the Australian Capital Territory 
Emergency Services (ACTESA) websites have a link that connects to a specific page which contains all the 
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available information for bushfires in the area. The link to bushfire page on ACTFB is very large and at the 
top of the home page which makes it easy to find. The link on the ACTESA site is to left and near the 
bottom of the home page, which isn‘t difficult to find but could be made larger and put closer to top to make 
it easier to find. On the actual bushfire page, the current fire rating and fire ban are at the top and to the left, 
which makes finding them easy and quick. It takes two links to find information on current fire incidents and 
Prepare Act Survive, and three links for fire weather information. The website could be improved by 
providing visually larger and more direct links to this information. The site could also be improved by 
providing more language options to view the site for people who may not speak English. Note. ACT utilizes 
many communication mediums such as web, television, press, radio, and phone. 
 
 
H.10 QFRS 
 
The Queensland Fire and Rescue Services‘ website has a link to the Rural Fire Service (RFS) website 
which contains all the available information for bushfires in the state. This link does not connect to the 
homepage of the RFS, but the just the bushfire information page. On this page, fire bans are reported and on 
the left near the top which makes finding ban information easy. In order to find more relevant information 
for bushfires such as warnings or fire weather reports, the user has to travel back to the home page. From 
there, the fire danger rating is accessed using three other links and the weather by using two. No information 
of bushfire incidents or on Prepare Act Survive is contained on the website. If the link from the QFRS to the 
RFS was made to connect directly to the homepage of RFS, finding information about bushfires would more 
direct and easy. Links directly to the fire danger rating and fire weather information would improve the ease 
of finding this information, and providing information about fire incidents and Prepare Act Survive would be 
useful to provide residents with information about fires in their areas and how to prepare for them. Providing 
more language options for the website would be useful as well. Note: communication includes the web, and 
the region would benefit from using other communication mediums. 
 
 
H.11 NTFRS 
 
The Northern Territory Fire and Rescue Service‘s website contains very little information about the 
new fire warning system. The website could be improved by providing links on the main page for information 
about these areas of the new warning system: current fire rating for various areas of the territory, current 
bushfire incidents, fire weather information, current fire bans in effect, and a complete section on the new 
105 | P a g e  
 
Prepare Act Survive policies. Providing this information would allow the website to better educate the 
residents of the new policies regarding bush fire warnings, possible danger and fires in their area, as well as 
how to respond when threatened by bushfires. Providing more language options would help people who may 
not speak English access information about bushfire warnings and response. Note: communication includes 
the web, and the territory would benefit from using other mediums to communicate warnings. 
 
 
H.12 Conclusion 
 
In general, the southern state and Western Australia have fully adopted the new warning system and 
have made efforts to educate their residents about changes they have made to their specific warning policies, 
and Queensland is still working on adopting the new warning system and educating their residents about 
changes to their policies. The Northern Territory has done very little to adopt the warning systems and is 
acting under the previous polices of the stay or go policy. The southern states and Western Australia have the 
fire rating posted either on the home page of specific fire authorities, or need one link to arrive at a page with 
the rating. Also, most of the websites have links to incidents, fire bans, weather, and prepare act survive on 
their home pages. Queensland does have all this information on their site, but I can take up to four links in 
order to access the information needed. Northern Territory has only certain information about the new fire 
warning system and does not contain information such as fire ratings, incidents, or fire bans. As for 
communications, VIC, SA, WA, NSW, and ACT utilize many different mediums, such as web, radio, 
television, sms, phones, mobile, and press, to communicate warnings to their residents. Tasmania, 
Queensland, and NT use the web and radio to communicate their residents. Most states and territories could 
benefit from adding more languages for information on bushfires to their websites, which would allow all of 
their residents to access this information easily. 
 
Table 4, shows the grid that was used to gain an initial idea of what was contained in each of the websites. 
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Table 4: Website analyses 
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APPENDIX I: COMMUNITY EDUCATION PROGRAMS 
 
As with changes to any new system, the educational aspect of the new fire warning system is crucial 
to its implementation and success. In order for the new system to be successful, residents must understand all 
of its aspects, including the fire danger rating index, how to appropriately prepare for a bushfire if one should 
occur, the appropriate action to take when a warning is issued, and how to react when a bushfire actually 
starts. A fare amount of the warning system‘s success also depends on residents‘ making proper preparations 
before the bushfire season starts, such as ember-proofing their homes to help prevent embers from bushfires 
causing their house to ignite. As such, it is important for bushfire preparation education to be readily available 
so residents are empowered to learn what precautions must be taken to help make their home more likely to 
survive a bushfire. To achieve this, each state or territory has its own community educational programs that 
help residents learn the details of the new system and how to prepare for an upcoming bushfire season. This 
section describes each state‘s or territory‘s methods for educating their residents in bushfire safety. 
 
 
I.1 Country Fire Services 
 
The Country Fire Service (CFA) of South Australia uses a public information program called 
Bushfire Ready Public Meetings. The goal of these meetings is to improve the general public knowledge of 
actions to take during a bushfire, and about how CFS operates. Through conducting research, CFS 
determined that one issue of safety was that in general the men of the house were in charge of deciding on 
bushfire preparations. Consequently, the women of the household were unsure of what actions should be 
taken if the men left to fight a bushfire. In order to address this issue, the CFS conducts Fiery Women 
Workshops. These workshops provide women with a safe non-threatening learning environment in which 
they can learn new skills to help protect their families from bushfires. Topics of the workshops include 
emotional preparation, understanding the new bushfire danger ratings and warnings, deciding on when to 
leave or stay and defend, preparing a bushfire survival plan, identifying hazards that may endanger their 
homes, and learning how to operate firefighting equipment, such as home pumps. They also include sections 
on bushfire behavior, and how to prevent injury from bushfires. The sessions are conducted from 9:00 am to 
3:00 pm, and given on certain dates which are listed on the CFS website. The CFS also conducts other 
community and volunteer programs such as bushfire planning workshops, land management meetings, and a 
community safe open day, which provides residents with an opportunity to speak with CFS staff and 
volunteers and gather information about bushfire survival, as well as suggestions for community plans. 
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Most states and territories were given an increase in funding to help implement the new warning 
system and educate their residents about the new catastrophic level warning and what actions to take. 
However, this funding is not expected to be maintained, and information campaigns will not be able to 
continue through the use of the fire authorities resources. To compensate, the CFS has introduced a program 
called VOICE. This program utilizes volunteers from each community by giving them training in bushfire 
education by CFS officials. The volunteers are then capable of educating their own communities about the 
new warning system and how to properly prepare for bushfires. The CFS also provides school safety sessions 
in which children from kindergarten to grade 12 are educated on general bushfire safety. Teachers are also 
provided with education materials that help with the problem of children starting arson bushfires, or 
bushfires that result from fires started intentionally. 
 
 
I.2 Country Fire Authorities 
 
The Country Fire Authorities (CFA) of Victoria uses similar community programs in order to 
educate their residents about the new bushfire warning system. Living with Fire is a program aimed to 
increase bushfire awareness and preparedness of the community. It is either conducted in city halls, or just on 
street corners, and has been very effective at educating people about the new warning system and their 
actions regarding bushfires. The CFA also conducts a program called Community Fire guards in which 
volunteers are trained to educate their communities. Topics of the program include introduction and fire 
behavior, understanding personal survival, understanding house survival, and developing bushfire survival 
plans. Some of the benefits that result from the program are an understanding of key essentials for a bushfire 
survival plan, an understanding of proper preparation, physical and emotional support from neighbors during 
a bushfire, emotional recovery after a bushfire, and building strong social networks with neighbors. This 
program does not train volunteers to be firefighters, nor are volunteers responsible for the safety of others in 
the community. They are simply trained educate their communities and help others prepare incase a bushfire 
starts in their area. 
 
CFA also concentrates on child education, and provides in-school lessons for kids, as well as 
information for teachers and parents. Brigades in Schools is a program in which CFA members go to schools 
and teach children about general fire safety, which includes a section on bushfires. This program works in 
partnership with the Mobile Education Unit, which travels to schools in rural areas and provides fire 
education to children in these areas. In order to provide teachers with fire safety information, Fire Safe books 
are distributed. They are catered to children from kindergarten to grade 6, and let teachers educate children 
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about general fire safety, including bushfire information. Some children have a tendency to play with fire, and 
sometimes these fires can ignite a bushfire that can become very destructive. The Juvenile Fire Awareness 
program target children that engage in fire-lighting activities and works with them so that they understand the 
dangerous consequences of playing with fire, and build up a healthy respect for it. Fire education information 
is also given to teachers who teach adult classes. Fire up English is a program designed for adults from non-
English speaking countries who are studying English as a second language. This program does not have a set 
structure, but instead gives teachers a range of activities and ideas for conducting fire education. 
 
The website of the CFA includes an education section designed for children. The CFA has a mascot, 
Captain Koala, who provides fun and entertainment with his friends, which are various animals and people of 
the fire brigade. Activities include flash games, puzzles and mazes, word games, and coloring sheets. There is 
also information available for school projects and a junior volunteers program, which focuses on providing 
young people with a sense of place in their community, enhance personal values, and increase the opportunity 
for future recruitment. Skills learned in the program include Social recreational development, skill 
development, personal development, and community service through the CFA involvement. CFA focuses on 
providing other tools and seminars to help educate the residents of Victoria. Farm fire safety provides 
information on how to minimize the risk of haystack fires for farms. Summer fire safety provides information 
for the upcoming bushfire seasons, including survival guides, household assessment tools, and fire danger 
ratings. They also provide meetings on emergency planning, roadside management to decrease fuel by 
roadsides, and municipal fire prevention, in which coordinated approach is taken for defining risks and 
responsibilities of the public. 
 
 
I.3 Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board 
 
The Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board (MFB) is specific to Melbourne and the 
surrounding region. As such, they have a different approach to bushfire education. They target the high-risk 
communities, such as elderly and people who are disabled, and work with these communities for preparing 
for emergencies, such as a bushfire, as well as distribute flyer and pamphlets that have more information 
about fire safety. MFB also works with hazardous facilities that hold dangerous chemicals, and plan how to 
minimize damages that could be cause by such a facility catching on fire. They provide school education 
programs in which a brigade goes to every primary school from kindergarten to 6th grade and educate 
children about bushfire safety. Public meetings are also held to distribute information about bushfires, and 
have been found to be very effective in reaching a large amount of people from a community. 
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I.4 New South Wales Fire Brigade and Rural Fire Service 
 
Although there are specific pieces of educational material given online by the New South Wales Fire 
Brigade, the New South Wales Rural Fire Service (RFS), which focuses on issues associated with bushfires, 
provides most of the bushfire education to local communities. Each area has an education program that 
tailored to a specific community. To help achieve this, the Community Fire Units program educates 
volunteers from different communities to help prepare their areas for bushfires. Objectives of the program 
include increasing community preparation and resilience to ember attack (embers blow ahead of the fire and 
onto houses) from bushfires, providing basic operational training and firefighting equipment, engage local 
communities in basic hazard reduction, fire safety, and prevention activities, empowering residents in urban 
bush land areas through education, training, and the provision of basic firefighting equipment, and to increase 
the communities‘ knowledge of bushfire behavior in their local area. Activities include attending induction 
and annual skills maintenance training, fire hazard reduction activities (such as property protection and 
reducing fire fuel), using supplied equipment to protect their home‘s from spot fires of ember attack until fire 
services arrive, and extinguishing small fires after a bushfire front has moved through. The RFS also provides 
a children education program called FireEd, which is unique because not only do teachers and students 
participate, but parents are a part of the program as well. Firefighters contact local primary school principals 
and teachers to request an approval to deliver the program within their school. Once they have permission, 
firefighters visit schools and present the FireEd material to students. Students, parents, and teachers then 
participate in selected fire activities after the firefighter‘s presentation. After the program has been completed, 
parents and teach provide feedback on the success of the program with respect to student learning and Fire 
Ed in general. 
 
 
I.5 Tasmanian Fire Services 
 
The Tasmania Fire Services (TFS) has taken a different approach to fire education. The TFS targets 
bushfire prone areas that are assessed and deemed to be at risk, and sends a bushfire DVD education video. 
The video covers a broad range of bushfire education complete with an explanation of the new warning 
system and what proper actions to take in order to prepare for bushfires, and to help residents decide 
whether they should stay and defend their home, or leave early. The video uses strong language and makes a 
clear point that bushfires are dangerous and need to be taken seriously. Anyone not living in a bushfire prone 
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area can request the DVD, but will not be sent one automatically. The TFS also has a Juvenile Fire Lighting 
Intervention Program (JFLIP). The JFLIP program is a free program for kids who demonstrate fire lighting 
behavior taught by specially trained firefighters. The program aims to teach children about the dangers of 
playing with fire and to have a healthy respect for fire through a series of activities, discussions, and role 
playing games. No official community education program that educates volunteers to relay bushfire safety 
information to their community exists yet, but the TFS is working on creating such a program and hopes to 
deploy it soon. 
 
Project Wake Up is a program aimed at improving home fire safety for people with disabilities and 
the elderly, such as people who are in community nursing as well as independent health care and doctors the 
deal with care assessment consultants. The way the program works is health organizations submit a list at the 
beginning of every month of residents with special needs who require a safety check. The Community 
Education Unit then contacts each individual person on the list to set up a time to conduct the safety check, 
and help install smoke alarms or other fire equipment.  TFS also runs a number of school education 
programs, the goal of which is to promote broad fire awareness in all primary schools in Tasmania. The 
program works closely with the Education Department to ensure that all children participate in the program, 
which is delivered by specially trained firefighters. The program includes topics such as basic fire prevention, 
fire safety procedures, and survival skills. When the children complete the program, they receive a Fire Safety 
Certificate. 
 
 
I.6 Fire Emergency Services Authority of Western Australia 
 
The Fire Emergency Services Authority of Western Australia (FESA) uses multiple tools to conduct 
bushfire education. Like the TFS, FESA distributes a bushfire safety DVD to residents in high risk areas to 
help educate and prepare residents for bushfires. FESA also uses a program called Bushfire Ready 
Facilitators. These facilitators are trained in bushfire education and are used to help their communities be 
properly prepared for bushfire. The program is coordinated by a Bushfire Ready facilitator, and is a self 
management program and very flexible as members can decide when, where, and frequency of meetings as 
well as the subjects that will be covered. Topics of the program include experiencing a fire, bushfire behavior, 
how to reduce bushfire risk in your home, street walk or property assessment, personal survival, bushfire 
survival plans, passive fire protection, and community strategies and warnings. One of the unique educational 
tools in Western Australia is the Fire and Emergency Services Education and Heritage center. This center 
provides education and activities to help promote a broad fire education, and includes programs on bushfire 
safety.  FESA also incorporates a winter burning program which encourages residents to conduct winter 
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burnings of brush and other bushfire fuels as a way to reduce these fuels on resident‘s properties and thereby 
reducing their bushfire risk. 
 
 
I.7 Northern Territories Fire and Rescue Service 
 
The Northern Territories Fire and Rescue Service (NTFRS) use a different method of community 
education. Rather than train volunteers to educate communities, the NTFRS prefers to sue their own staff to 
educate communities. The NTFRS feels that the information is more reliable and better trusted by residents if 
it comes straight from the fire authorities, and because of the Northern Territory‘s relatively small population, 
this method has worked very well. The NTFRS Conducts many school education programs in the classroom 
and encourages schools to visit their local fire stations for hands on learning experiences. The NTFRS also 
uses a program for children called Smart Sparx which uses a DVD, musical CD, story book, and lesson plans, 
as well as games and puppets. These programs are available through a lending program conducted by local 
fire stations. As many of the other states and Territories, NTFRS has a Juvenile Fire Awareness and 
Intervention Program. A two page brochure is posted online and explains possible reasons why children play 
with fire at certain ages, and encourages parents to get help if they are concerned about their child‘s behavior 
and how to do so appropriately. 
 
I.8 Analysis of State and Territories Educational Programs 
 
There are many community education programs that are common to the states and territories of 
Australia. Many states and territories have had issues with continuous funding for educating residents about 
the now warning system. In order to solve this problem, volunteers are trained in bushfire education so that 
they may continue educating their communities about how to prepare for bushfire season, and how to form 
an effective bushfire survival plan as well as education about the new warning system. Public education 
meetings are another popular program. These are informal meetings usually put on by the fire authorities in a 
public place such as a town hall or street corner, and are designed to give residents information about 
bushfire safety. Juvenile intervention programs are very common, and are intended to help stop children 
playing with fire. The programs are taught by fire officials and teach children to have a healthy respect for fire 
and the dangers and hazards of playing with fire. All states and territories have school education programs in 
which fire authorities visit schools and teach a fire education class, which includes information about 
bushfires. Other teacher information is available in most states and territories. 
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Besides these common programs, many of the states and territories have unique programs that work 
particularly well in their states. The Fiery Women‘s program of the CFS recognizes the need the need to 
direct more education toward women so that if their spouses have done much or all of the planning for 
bushfire safety and have left the home or are simply not home when the fire occurs, the women will be 
prepared to handle the situation themselves. Project Wakeup is not specifically designed for bushfires, but it 
addresses the need to specially prepare people who are disabled or elderly for emergency situations. Fired Up 
English goes beyond educating people who are native to Australia and speak English to people who do not 
use English as their first language, and addresses the social issue of preparing everyone in the state or territory 
for bushfires, not just the general public. Being involved school education get children started on fire safety 
early and is effective in teaching children about the dangers fire can pose, but getting the parents involved is a 
new approach that helps parents understand what their child is learning in the fire courses to help them 
understand their child‘s knowledge of fire safety.  
 
Beyond actual education programs, there are many pieces of educational material that is distributed 
to the public or publically accessible. Some states and territories have started distributing bushfire DVDs 
which can contain a lot of specific information about bushfire safety. These have been particularly useful 
because the recipient doesn‘t have to leave their home or go online to find the information. Targeting high 
risk areas with this information has worked well because people who are in danger of bushfires are much 
more likely to be receptive to the information that is being distributed. Another approach to this in home 
education method is the Smart Sparx education pack. This pack can be taken out on loan from a local fire 
station and contains lots of useful information about fire safety, and puts the responsibility of fire education 
on the resident allowing residents to be more self reliant. Another interesting public education method is use 
of a bushfire museum. This method allows the public to explore the history of bushfires and hands on 
education about bushfire safety, allowing residents to come away with a better understanding of how 
bushfires are fought and how they can take measures to prepare themselves. These unique programs provide 
an alternative means for fire education. 
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APPENDIX J: MEDIA REPORTS 
 
To gain a clearer view of the public‘s view on the new FDRS and warning system in the various 
states we have analyzed many news articles to assess how the public has responded to these changes. To 
easily see the changes the next three sections will give some common examples of reports from after Black 
Saturday, this past years‘ pre-fire season and post – fire season. 
 
 
J.1 After Black Saturday 
 
After Black Saturday there was a great call for the fire authorities to implement changes such that 
such a catastrophe would not happen again. At this point fear had set in and took its form in rushing to enact 
changes before the next fire season. This included the quick response of a Royal Commission and an Interim 
Report that outlined national policies and recommendations that needed to be made.  
 
Immediately following the fires there were articles honouring the dead firemen and looking for 
consolation for the victims and their families. (Pain of Fire, 2009) Following this response the media and the 
survivors looked at who to blame: arsonists, the fire officials, the government? People began to look at how 
the stay or go policy had worked and what could have been done differently. The first response was to start 
forced evacuations which had the highest probability of saving lives yet as Terry O‘Gorman states:  
 
―The right to defend your most valuable asset is to some people a major right. If it is to be taken 
away, it should be accompanied by a change in the law which says if people are made to leave, and robbed of 
the opportunity to save their house … they will be given by the government full replacement compensation 
…‖ (O‘Gorman, 2009). 
 
This would force the government to cover losses which could be impossible to cover. The other 
argument is during these evacuations you would be putting more people at risk. David Packman states: 
 
―You can‘t evacuate an area in less than hours and hours, you can‘t put all those people on the road 
and expect them to get through, added to the fact that you‘re likely to have dropped trees over major roads, 
power lines, even fires.‖ (Packman, 2009). 
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With these arguments at the fore front the decision was to keep the choice of leaving or staying on 
the residents yet change how the warning system worked and where the emphasis would be put. The final 
major issue that sprouted up was how many people had very little to no warning, leaving them little time and 
less information to work with, people frantically tried to escape in their cars or find places of refuge in their 
property. They were uninformed and uneducated to what should be done is such situations (Doherty, 2009). 
The following months continued to find people and processes that could be at blame but by this point the 
job had been assigned to the royal commission to find what needed to be done. 
 
 
J.2 Pre Fire Season 
 
Before the fire season and during the first few months was the time when most states began to 
implement the new fire danger rating scale. The public began criticizing where the money was going such as 
separate funding to the CFA, MFB, and DSE within Victoria for similar needs yet separate due to its 
structure. Due to this many fire fighting volunteers have called for the need to merge these groups and create 
a more fluid line of authority (Cooke - 1, 2009). When the changes to the new fire danger rating scale was 
made public, many people feared that during ratings such as Catastrophic would cause a hysteria in which 
large unplanned evacuations would take place possibly putting people in more danger than if the rating hadn‘t 
been issued (Akerman, 2009). The other issue is if it had gone by without any major event people would 
eventually become complacent. The language used is considered too strong by many people and could 
possibly create the effect of ―the boy who cried wolf‖ (Extreme distribution, 2009) 
 
One minor issue that has seem to come up a few times within Victoria is how during the change to 
the new FDRS the authorities posted new signs over the old ones recommending passerbys to look in the 
appropriate places for fire information and detailing the new system. The main issue is that it does not give 
the actual danger in the area and the amount of information on it is too great for a driver to read and 
understand what it is trying to tell him (Jackson, 2009). 
 
Throughout this time period the media and Royal Commission lawyers were making sure each area 
was in fact ready for the fire season. Many changes were made yet some of the same old faults that had been 
seen during Black Saturday were still present. The number of qualified incident controllers and teams was 
considered inadequate if there was a large distribution of severe fires. Training was to continue yet time was 
still needed (Cooke – 2, 2009). Finally with the interim report out questions were raised as to the 
implementation of Neighborhood Safer Places (NSPs) and the apparent ―lack of urgency‖ for further 
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research and plans. Certain places were deemed as possible safe places but were often private property that 
did not offer facilities that people would need in such situations (Kissane, 2009). 
 
Overall many changes were made yet seemed to merely add more work to the already understaffed 
fire units. While many changes were needed to give the public more information less was done to give them 
more options during a fire and much of the public‘s discontent came from this. From their point of view 
much time and funds were used for pointless things and was not an efficient use of time. 
 
 
J.3 Post Fire Season 
 
When the fire season had finally began to come to a close the public and media looked back and saw 
how many of these changes were a good start yet as Dr. Packham points, ― We‘re very fortuanate this year 
has been a gentle year.‖ It‘s believed that many of the changes came out of an ―accelerated solutions 
environment‖ that was forced due to the fear of the Black Saturday fires and choices were made that were 
considered too ―simplistic‖. John Brumby states that ―too many‖ people were still complacent about fire 
danger. Dr. Tolhurst comment on a survey that people ―were saying, ‗We‘ll wait until we know that there‘s a 
fire in our vicinity,‘ and that‘s a reasonable thing to do.‖ The new system has yet to take the vegetation, 
topography and probability of ignition in an area when deciding how dangerous it may be to stay. Without 
any immediate threat it will be hard to convince residents to leave (Bachelard – 1, 2010). 
 
One more issue that has turned up is while focusing on these changes and the future of the fire 
authorities, some places have seem to forgotten the place of the volunteers. In Victoria alone volunteers 
comprise 97 per cent of its workforce yet have been forgotten and underutilized.  Many of these volunteers 
qualified for leadership roles and left little room to advance and gain recognition for their work. As Garth 
Head states ―Emergency service volunteers are an irreplaceable asset. The choice is ours: invest in and utilize 
them – or lose them.‖ (Head, 2010). 
 
Overall the post fire season media reports has shown that improvements may have been done, more 
effective and efficient ones are still needed. 
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APPENDIX K: ANALYTICAL DATA 
 
K.1 “Where Are They Going?” 
 
In order to gain a perspective of resident‘s opinions, understanding, and actions taken with respect to 
the new bushfire warning system, we have researched a document called, ―Where Are They Going?,‖ a study 
conducted by the Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner of Victoria on specifically the reasons 
why, when, and how people leave their homes, and they incorporate leaving into their bushfire survival plan. 
The study used 616 households in 54 areas deemed to be high risk for bushfires, and surveys were conducted 
by over the phone interviews with one member from each household. A workshop with representatives from 
the emergency management sector was also used to help verify the results of the study and give their own 
personal experiences with the warning system and issues they have experienced. Although the sample size of 
this survey study is considerably small given the size of the population, both with respect to the areas 
identified and Victoria, we believe the research was conducted in a proper scientific manner, and the results 
offer an insight to the public‘s response to the new bushfire warning system. The following sections 
summarize the study‘s results and key findings, as well as our own interpretations of the data. 
 
K.1.1 Deciding To Leave 
 
When asked up until what point residents plan to leave before a bushfire occurred, 32.8% replied 
that they wait for emergency services to tell them when to leave, and 32.6% replied they would wait until a 
fire occurred in their area. This type of behavior can be dangerous because emergency services only 
specifically advise residents to leave under very extreme circumstances, such as when a community is under 
imminent threat of a bushfire, and may not advise residents to leave when they should with regards to their 
preparedness. Not that, but if residents wait until authorities advise them to leave, then the warning system is 
defeated since its main purpose is to alert residents to bushfires in their area and advise them on what actions 
to take. What is more dangerous is over 14% replied they would wait until threatened by a bushfire, and by 
this time it may well be too late to leave their homes and be able to get to safety.  Only about 15% replied 
they would follow the proper action of leaving in advance for a high fire danger day. However, there is an 
improvement from bushfire season 2008-2009 in that only 10% said they would stay and defend their 
properties no matter what for the bushfire season of 2009-2010, which is down from the 28% figure for the 
2008-2009 season.  The results from this question are in Table 5. 
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Table 5: When did you plan to leave? (2008 - 2009) 
When asked whether or not respondents would leave on a day when the new code red (catastrophic 
level) warning was issued, only 45% said they would plan to leave their homes. In addition, more than 26% 
replied they would only leave when advised to do so by emergency services. 5.4% did not know what they 
would do in this situation, and although it is a relatively small percentage, there are still people who do not 
have a good understanding of the warning and are unsure of what actions to take when it has been issued. 
However, about 60% replied they would leave well in advance, meaning the night before or morning of the 
day for which the catastrophic warning was issued. Discussions form the focus group suggested that people‘s 
behavior with respect to a catastrophic warning being issued could change depending on the day of the week. 
On a weekend, people may be more likely to leave their homes since they will not be missing work. On 
weekdays, schools may be officially closed, but work areas and farms will not be closed, unless doing so is 
specifically in their bushfire plan. The potential loss of work could increase resident‘s tendency to stay if they 
in they are planning on working that day. 
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Table 6: Would you plan to leave on a Code Red day? 
The study then asked residents what they would their decisions about leaving would be for various 
prompts, such as a fire being reported by radio, told by officials, can see smoke from the flames, etc., and 
were given the choice of definitely leave, likely to leave, unlikely to leave, and definitely wouldn‘t leave. The 
most effective prompts were found to be when they felt their family was threatened, told by emergency 
services, and when they could see the smoke and flames, with the response of definitely leave being 83.4%, 
83.1%, and 60%, respectively. These kinds of prompts are the most dangerous because they only occur at the 
last minute and by then might be too late to get to safety. If people were prompted by a fire reported on the 
radio, only 35% said they would definitely leave, and yet, in most states, radio is the primary way to 
communicate warnings to the public. Lowest response for prompts to leave was if residents were advised to 
leave by neighbors or family with a response of only 27% that would definitely leave. This may not seem like 
a big issue, but many states have community volunteer programs in which volunteers are trained to help their 
neighbors prepare for and act during bushfires. It is important to note that for the least effective prompts, 
there were a fair amount of people who reported they would be likely to leave or unlikely to leave. Since these 
are not definitive responses, it is important to focus on what residents would definitely do in a situation. With 
respect to this, very few residents said they would definitely stay behind (fewer than 10%). The results of this 
question are given in Table 7. 
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Table 7: Prompts for leaving if bushfire threatens 
 
K.1.2 Places to Go 
 
After analyzing the aspects of why and when residents leave during a bushfire warning or actual fire, 
residents were the asked to comment on where they would go if they decided to leave. The top three places 
people would go if a bushfire occurred were relative and friends outside of the local area, a public place inside 
the local area, and Melbourne or the provincial city with responses of 29.3%, 20.1%, and 11.9%, respectively. 
It is unsettling that 20% of the respondents would leave to a place inside their local are because this is most 
likely not far enough aware from a bushfire if one should occur. Local authorities generally advise residents to 
go to an area that has a much lower risk of bushfires on the day residents leave. Overall, 26% residents chose 
an option that was specifically inside their local area, and only 37.3% chose an option that was specifically 
outside the area, which is the proper place to go when leaving. Table 8 shows the results of the respondents. 
121 | P a g e  
 
 
Table 8: Where specifically would you go? 
Last resort places are places that people should go if they fail to defend their homes. However, 
residents are using these places as a place of first resort instead of using areas designated as safer places. 
When asked about how residents would utilize these places, 20% of residents said they would not use these 
places under any circumstances. What is more concerning is 20% of residents said that would use these places 
as a first resort. This decision presents two issues. If residents use these places as first resorts, whey will not 
find things like refreshments or accommodations that they may be expecting to find, and since these areas 
may become overpopulated when others come planning to use these places a true last resort. In fact, only 
20% of residents said they would use these places in that manner.  Safer places are public areas in a 
community outside of the fire zone where refreshments and even accommodations may be available. 
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K.1.3 Demographics 
 
The study found that the differences between male and females can determine how decisions about 
bushfire survival are made in a household. Men showed a strong intention to stay and defend their homes 
even if the warning forecast was a catastrophic warning, and for those who said they would leave would go to 
a place less than 10 min away from their homes.  Men also felt strongly about returning to their homes as 
soon as possible to try and defend it against any residual fires resulting from bushfire embers. It was also 
mainly male respondents who replied that there were no occasions on which they would leave their homes or 
would incorporate places of last resort into their bushfire survival plans. The responses from women in the 
study‘s population were completely different from the response of the men. Women were much more likely 
to exorcise caution and leave their homes rather than stay and defend them, and were also more likely to go 
places of friends or relatives outside the fire safety zone.  Women were also more likely to listen to the radio, 
as well as use advice from neighbors and friends to help them make a decision on what to do in a bushfire 
situation. Women also seemed to be much more organized and methodical when making decisions about 
bushfire survival. 
 
There is not only a difference in the decision making process between males and females, but the 
composition of a family can greatly influence bushfire survival decisions as well. For example, families with 
children or supporting elderly people were found to be the highest group that had made changes to their 
bushfire survival plans, as well as were much more likely to leave their property when a bushfire was reported 
in the area. However, only one in seven families were found that would actually leave their area when a high 
fire danger day was forecasted (). Of the elderly group, many residents identified places of last resort as their 
first place to go in case of a bushfire, and getting to these places takes less than ten minutes. The study also 
notes that elderly people may not have beneficiaries such as younger members of their family living with them 
or close by, which would make public areas possibly their only place to go if a bushfire occurred in their area. 
According to the study, this age group‘s responses indicate they would be making risky decisions concerning 
their bushfire survival plans which could endanger their lives. 
 
 
K.1.4 New Catastrophic Warning (Code Red) 
 
In addition to the various questions previous about the catastrophic warning level, the study asked 
participants what their plans were on days of weather associated with high bushfire risk, and especially if a fire 
occurs in their area. When a code red warning has been issued, residents were asked what they are most likely 
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to do or have done in the past. Only 25% responded with an answer of having left in a timely manner, 40% 
leave their homes when a fire occurs in their area and go to a place outside the fire area, but 20% leave their 
homes when a fire occurs in their area and intend to stay within the fire zone.  Still, 10% said they would stay 
and intend to defend their homes when catastrophic level warning was issued. The result of this feedback 
means that 75% of the study‘s population is not taking the proper actions during a catastrophic warning day.  
Not only are these residents not properly prepared, but 30% of the study‘s population intends to make risky 
decisions on a catastrophic warning day.  Even on days when a catastrophic warning is not issued, 50% of 
these residents said they will be leaving at various times during the day. This decision is extremely risky 
because not preparing a set time to leave during the day could leave residents unprepared to leave if a 
bushfire occurs earlier than the residents expected, and could cause a large amount of people to leave at the 
same time and be caught in the bushfire. Of this 50%, half (25% of the study‘s population) said they intend to 
stay in the bushfire zone, which is a poor decision since staying in the fire zone is not safe. Table 9 shows the 
results of this study. 
 
 
Table 9: Planned actions on high bushfire risk days 
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K.1.5 Summary of Study‟s Results 
 
The study summarizes its results in mainly two sections: positives and weaknesses. On positive of the 
study‘s research is that despite there is an issue of a lack of knowledge about bushfire safety among women, 
there are many women who are well organized and plan to leave their homes if a bushfire warning is issued, 
especially if the catastrophic warning is issued.  At least 20% of the study‘s population understands that the 
special areas designated as places of last resort are a last measure of defense and intend to use them as such. 
Also, 10% of residents appear to be able and willing to defend their homes during a bushfire, and understand 
how to make safe decisions while doing. 
 
Some of the weaknesses found by this survey are as follows. People who are above 65 years of age 
have trouble traveling and are unlikely to have places nearby they can stay at, such as family or friends. 
Because people have a tendency to leave their homes at the last minute, there is too much volume for the 
roads to handle and residents are caught by the fire since they cannot leave quickly enough. When residents 
leave their homes, there is too much usage of places for last resort when residents should be evacuating to 
safer areas. Men do not leave early enough, and have the most tendency to go against the advice of a warning 
that has been issued, while women tend to choose caution and leave their homes early on a day of high fire 
risk. When a fire occurs, the day on which it occurs with respect to weekdays or weekends affects the 
decisions of people whether to stay and defend or leave to go to a safer place. 
  
K.1.6 Analysis of the Study 
 
One of the biggest themes we‘ve noticed in this study is that people are becoming more dependent 
on emergency services. When it comes to acting during a bushfire, residents want to be told what to do and 
when to do it right down to the decision of staying or going. The reason for this behavior is most likely 
because of the amount of effort people feel is required to take on the responsibility of defending themselves 
from bushfires. Residents are also waiting too long before they try to leave their houses and get to safety 
when in the path of a bushfire. They are waiting until they are being told to leave by emergency services or 
even until they can actually see the flames or smoke. Since bushfires can sweep over an area of land in a 
matter of minutes, residents only have a short time to get out of their homes if they wait this long, let alone 
try to escape from it. By waiting this long, residents are putting themselves and their families at risk. In terms 
of prompting people to leave, most information on bushfires is given to people through radio messages. 
However, warnings provided by radio services were only effective for about a third of the people in advising 
them to leave, which indicates that radio messages may not be the best method to issue bushfire warnings. 
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The study found that more than half the population of the study would not leave if a catastrophic 
warning was issued. This seems to be a result of two issues: residents have either failed to understand the 
warning, or, as more likely indicated by the study, residents simply do not wish to adopt the new catastrophic 
warning, probably because it requires them to leave every day it is issued. While this may keep residents safer, 
it can disrupt people‘s lives, and if it is issued often enough, residents will not want to follow its advice, 
especially if a fire does not occur or does not pass through the area. This theory would especially hold true if 
a catastrophic warning was issued during the week when residents are working, and could require people to 
choose their safety over income. According to this study, three quarters of the population will not take the 
proper action on a day when a catastrophic warning is issued. 
 
There is also an issue with residents knowing where to go when they leave their homes. One quarter 
of respondents said that when they decide to leave their homes, they will be staying in the local area. This 
becomes a problem because the bushfire zone usually covers a local area, not just an individual community. 
Staying the local area means that residents have not fully removed themselves from danger even though they 
have left their homes. Also, there is an apparent lack of knowledge with how residents should use places of 
last resort. A fifth of residents say they will use places of last resort as a first option to go to after leaving their 
house. As was mentioned before, using these places as first resort locations is a problem because residents 
will not be provided with such amenities as refreshments or beds, and could overpopulate the area if it is 
needed for people who are fleeing their homes at the last minute. 
 
The study also made some interesting observations of about how the demographics of a house hold 
comes into play when making decisions about bushfire survival. Men tend to be the decision makers in the 
household about bushfire survival. They tend to make decisions that support staying and defending their 
property. This is not surprising piece of information as men are often characterized as needing to appear 
strong and capable of defending themselves. Women tend to make decisions that air on the side of caution, 
and usually support leaving and going to a safer area rather than staying and defending the home. According 
to the study, women seem to be more concerned about personal and family safety rather than property. 
Women also tend to be more organized and methodical when planning their bushfire survival. Having to 
support children or elderly also plays a role in decision making, and most families with dependents support 
leaving and relocating to a safer area, but only when they feel threatened by a bushfire. As noted before, only 
one in seven families would leave on a catastrophic warning day. There is also a concern about where elderly 
people would go to if they decided to leave their homes since many would unlikely have family to stay with, 
or may not leave at all if they are not physically able to. 
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APPENDIX L: POWERS OF EVACUATION 
 
State Powers of Evacuation 
Victoria      The chief officer of the CFA may only remove a person from an area if they are 
interfering with fire fighting operations and they do not have a pecuniary interest in the area. 
This also applies to police officers acting under the Country Fire Authority Act 1958 (Vic). 
     MFB members and police within the metropolitan area may forcibly remove a person only 
if they do not have a pecuniary interest n the area. Police may use force regardless of 
pecuniary interest if they are interfering with brigade operations within the metropolitan area 
and where there has been an ‗alarm of fire‘.  
    The Coordinator in Chief of Emergency Management may remove a person from a 
declared ‗disaster area‘ (defined in section 23 of the Emergency Management Act 1986 (Vic)) 
after the state of disaster has been declared and only if they do not have a pecuniary interest 
in the area.  
     Forced evacuations typically involve interference of the evacuee‘s body by the emergency 
service member, which can be classified as assault if unlawful. Because assault is a serious 
matter courts usually find that force can only be used if legislation clearly allows for it. 
     The Emergency Management Act 1986 allows police to direct any person found out in the 
open or in a vehicle to immediately leave an emergency area (declared by the most senior 
police officer under section 36A of the Emergency Management Act 1986 (Vic)). If an 
offence against the Act is suspected then ‗reasonably necessary force‘ (Loh, 2007) may be 
used to remove people. Otherwise the use of force is not authorized.  
    Even people with pecuniary interests may be prohibited from entering their property and 
some residents with pecuniary interests may have conditions placed on their staying, although 
the authorization to use force in these situations is not clear.    
South 
Australia 
In any case where there is a fire, or a state of emergency has been declared emergency 
workers are granted the power to remove any person to a location deemed fit by the officer at 
the time. The movement of people and vehicles can also be directed and prohibited by the 
officer during these situations. In either case fines of up to $20,000 are applicable if the 
person does not adhere to the directions of the officer.  
Western 
Australia 
When a ‗rescue operation‘ (defined as ‗the rescue and extraction of any person or property 
endangered as a result of an accident, explosion, or other incident‘ in section 4 of the Fire 
Brigades Act 1942 (WA)  is being carried out, the Director of operations, members of the fire 
brigade in charge, or authorized officers of the Fire and Emergency Services can order a 
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person to evacuate and may use reasonable force to ensure enforcement. Emergency Service 
Officers (ESO‘s) cannot order or force people to evacuate in any other situations unless they 
are interfering with brigade operations.  
     A bushfire control officer holds the same powers as the Director of Operations under the 
Bush Fires Act 1954, under the conditions that it is ‗necessary or expedient‘ (Loh, 2007), for 
extinguishing or preventing the spread of a bushfire. Land Management and Conservation 
officers may also exercise these powers on or near Crown or forest land. The SES and  
FESA units may direct and prohibit movement of people and vehicles, with reasonable force, 
but are usually not given the power to evacuate unless an emergency situation or state of 
emergency is declared. Whether or not SES and FESA units have the right to evacuate under 
declared emergencies depends on whether they have received authorization under section 61 
of the emergency Management Act 2005 (WA).  
    When an emergency situation or state of emergency is declared, the most senior police 
officer present and the hazard management officer (defined under section 61 of the 
Emergency Management Act 2005 (WA)) can direct the evacuation and removal of people 
from the area. During a state of emergency the most senior police officer or authorized 
officer may remove any person who interferes with emergency management activities. 
 
 
New South 
Wales 
    Forced evacuations are only allowed when a state of emergency has been declared by the 
Premier in accordance with section 33 of the State Emergency and Rescue Management Act 
1989 (NSW), or if an area has been deemed a disaster area (defined as ‗the area specified by a 
senior police officer as the area in which an emergency is causing of threatening to cause 
injury or death‘ in section 60KA of the State Emergency and Rescue Management Act 1989 
(NSW)) by a senior police officer. In a state of emergency only authorized emergency service 
officers can forcibly evacuate people regardless of pecuniary interests, and only a senior 
police officer may force evacuations or authorize others to force an evacuation in a disaster 
area.  
    If there has been no declaration of a state of emergency of disaster area, the powers to 
force evacuations are only implied by the broad powers given to officers in the Fire Brigades 
Act 1989 (NSW) and Rural Fires Act 1997 (NSW). It is subject to interpretation whether 
these broad powers overrule the common law position. However the Fire Brigades Act 1989 
(NSW) states that an officer may remove a person from a fire district if they are interfering 
with the brigade operations.  
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Tasmania Forced evacuations are only clearly allowed if specifically authorized by the State Controller 
or relevant Regional Controller. The Fire Services Act 1979 (Tas) and emergency 
Management Act 2006 (Tas) do not provide any general conditions for forced evacuations. 
The only indication that forced evacuations can be conducted by fire officers are the broad 
powers outlined in the Fire Services Act 1979 (Tas), in which case it is up to interpretation 
whether these powers override the common law position. Regardless, a person can be 
removed by fire officers if they are interfering with brigade operations. Police may also 
remove people from an area that is being threatened by fire, by request by fire authorities or 
of their own accord, even if the people are not interfering with brigade activities.   
Queensland    In Queensland authorized officers under the Fire and Rescue Service Act and Disaster 
Management Act may evacuate and prohibit people from an area using reasonable force 
during any fire incident or when a disaster or emergency situation has been declared. 
However, an authorized rescue officer, a district disaster coordinator, or a person authorized 
by the Chairperson of the State group may only direct a person to leave. In this case the 
official has no clear power to force the evacuation however it is an offense to not comply 
with the direction. 
Australian 
Capital 
Territory 
   In any circumstance it is a power of the emergency services to order an evacuation of an 
area, although there is no power to forcibly evacuate people, unless it can be shown that they 
are interfering with emergency service activities. However it is considered an offense if a 
person refuses to heed these orders. The Emergencies Act 2004 gives emergency workers the 
power to direct people to leave an area or direct their movements during a state of 
emergency, and whether or not forced directions of movements are allowed is unclear.    
Northern 
Territory 
   Under the Fire and Emergency Act 1996 (NT) the Incident Commander, members of the 
NTFRS and police officers (if authorized) can order an evacuation of an area. The act does 
not offer any powers to enforce the evacuation and therefore it is up to interpretation 
whether the officers can force an evacuation. The act does state that a person can be forcibly 
removed and charged with an offence if they interfere with fire-fighting activities.  
    The Bushfires Act 1980 gives the fire control officer broad powers to do ‗any act‘ 
necessary to protect property and life. It is not clear whether forced evacuations are implied 
under this statement. It is only clear that forced evacuations are authorized during a disaster 
or state of emergency in an area where the Administrator has declared an evacuation should 
occur.  
 
